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This dissertation is the result of one of the projects within the MICORD program, initiated by Prof. dr. 
Jan de W it and Prof. dr. Ben Dankbaar. The MICORD program (acronym for Managing Innovation, 
Cooperation and Outsourcing of Research and Development) is intended to contribute to the 
understanding and solution of the so-called 'Knowledge Paradox': universities develop a wealth of 
new knowledge, but the industry does not seem to be able to use this knowledge for its economic 
activities. Pre-research carried out in 2004 in 22 companies in different industrial sectors resulted in 
two probable causes for this:
• Firms have diminished their investments in fundamental research and are therefore not 
capable anymore of radical innovation
• Industrial researchers are too much oriented on the short term and have lost the ability to 
effectively communicate with university scientists
Based on these preliminary results we chose to investigate three sectors in more detail: the food 
industry, the chemical industry and the high-tech machine manufacturing industry. These three 
sectors are representative for three of the four types of sectors identified by Pavitt (1984) in his 
influential paper on sectoral patterns of innovation. Moreover, these three sectors are important 
sectors in the Netherlands, represented by many multinational companies. Within the MICORD 
program, four PhD projects in the food and chemical industries are based on the two 
abovementioned causes. In the third sector we found that innovation is already at the center of 
interest, but we identified two other problems (see figure below):
• What should the role of suppliers be in new product development?
• How can companies develop new business opportunities?
The two projects in the high-tech machinery sector are based on these two problems.
The first four projects started early in 2006 and the other two in the latter half of 2007. The 
MICORD program is sponsored by the Top Institute Food & Nutrition; TNO Innovation Policy; the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs; the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science; Dutch Polymer Institute, 
Akzo Nobel, The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), Philips, ASML and Shell.
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Introduction
1 Introduction
This book presents the results of a study on how firms develop ambidextrous marketing organizations 
to resolve the market learning paradox when developing really new products. This first chapter 
explicates the reasons for carrying out the research, its objectives, and specifies its structure.
The first section of this chapter explains the potential of marketing tasks, such as market and 
customer research and product positioning in new product development. These activities ensure that 
new products will satisfy customer needs and are efficiently introduced into the market. In contrast, 
the second section argues that marketing activities can also hurt new product development 
performance because they distract attention from really new products opportunities and steer away 
from unserved, but potentially attractive, market segments. The third section examines this 
contradiction in more detail. It uses an organizational learning perspective and distinguishes between 
two types of market learning: exploration and exploitation. It argues that really new product 
development projects need a combination of both and that managers should explore the tension 
between them and thereby tap the potential for organizational renewal. However, it is also argued 
that this is a complicated task and that more research is needed to gain insight into this matter. 
Subsequently, this chapter presents the research aim and question that have initiated the research, 
the theoretical contributions and its managerial relevance. Finally, the last two sections provide the 
research approach and outline of the book.
1.1 The potential of marketing activities in product development
Consider the following well-known product development examples:
'In 1994, Unilever launched its new product 'Persil Power' across Europe. It was based on a major 
technological breakthrough and the company had spent more than 10 years and millions of Euros on 
development. The product used a new catalyst which Unilever claimed washed whiter at lower 
temperatures. Although the company had test marketed the new product, reports by Proctor and 
Gamble, Unilever's main competitor, and the British Consumer Association found that under certain 
conditions Persil Power significantly damaged clothes. After several unsuccessful attempts to counter 
negative press, Unilever was forced to withdraw the new product.
In hindsight one of the main reasons for this failure was bad product testing and positioning. Unilever 
did most of its product tests in The Netherlands and Dutch people typically separate their white fabric 
from their colored ones and tend to read washing instructions. In contrast, consumers from southern 
Europe tend to wash all fabrics together at a hot temperature irrespective of any instruction. The newly 
developed catalyst acted fine at lower temperatures for white fabric only, but reacted with certain dyes 
at higher temperatures. Additionally, Persil Power was positioned as a general detergent suitable for all 
fabrics. However, in practice it was a niche product only effective for white fabric at low temperatures' 
(Tidd et al. 2001 : 173).
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'In 1975, Sony introduced its BetaMax format in the emerging VCR market. It was the first compact, 
lightweight inexpensive VCR with a recording capacity of one hour. Sony's goal was to set the standard in 
this market. In several ways BetaMax was technically superior to the competitive VHS format. It had a 
broader carrier signal band width and also a higher signal to noise ratio. However, in standard setting the 
format was defeated by VHS. One of the most important reasons proved to be the total absence of 
market research when developing the format. When potential partners conducted their own market 
research they found out that Betamax's superior technology was not critical. What consumers really 
wanted was a minimum tape capacity of two hours before considering a purchase. This need could be 
met by VHS (6 hour capacity) but could not be provided for by BetaMax (1 hour capacity)' (Cohen 1989 ; 
Cusumano et al. 1992).
The abovementioned examples clearly show that carrying out sufficient marketing activities in 
product development can be critical for new product effectiveness. Although this understanding can 
not be emphasized enough, it certainly did not pass by many managers and students of business. 
Both gurus and academics time and time again emphasized to stay in touch with the market when 
innovation is high on the agenda. As far back as 1959, Peter Drucker (1959: 39-40) already boldly 
declared that organizations have only two basic functions: innovation and marketing. Today, it is 
almost self-evident that through ongoing monitoring of customer needs and the use of the resulting 
knowledge in new product decision-making firms effectively renew themselves. Scholars often 
capture this behavior by the concept of market orientation (Day 1994a; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; 
Narver and Slater 1990). A recent meta-analysis on the subject (Kirca et al. 2005), reviewing dozens 
of earlier studies, confirmed that a firm's market orientation positively affects its new product 
effectiveness. Deeper analyses revealed that a market orientation positively influences the creation 
of new products, and that these new products enable the organization to meet the evolving needs of 
customers, thus influencing customer loyalty and the perceived quality of a firm's products.
Findings from product development scholars are in line with those of their marketing colleagues. 
Already in the late 1970s, Cooper (1979) concluded that a strong market orientation was one of the 
controllable factors that contributed to new product success. Several important product 
development studies echo these findings. In their meta-analysis, Montoya-Weiss and Calantone 
(1994) conclude that the proficiency of marketing activities during the product development process 
has a strong positive effect on new product advantage. In a similar vein, the literature review of 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) argues that a significant number of studies highlight the importance of 
customer involvement for the effectiveness of product concepts and better product designs. 
According to Cooper (2001) a failure to build in the voice of the customer, a poor competitor 
analysis, and limited understanding of market trends are common weaknesses found in many studies 
on new product failures. As Leonard (1995: 177) indicates, it seems that no information is more 
important to a firm 'than information flowing in from the market, as this information shapes science 
into commercial product or service'. Contrary to general expectations, a market orientation may also 
improve product development efficiency (Burchill and Fine 1997; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1994a). 
For example, based on analyses of data from 103 product development projects from the chemical
2
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industry, Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1994a) found that including a customer viewpoint into the new 
product process did not increase but actually reduced product development cycle time.
1.2 The risk of marketing activities in product development
The last section made clear that significant evidence points to marketing activities enhancing new 
product performance. However, controversy remains. Several studies warned for the potential risk of 
a market focus for innovation purposes.
Already in the 1970s and 1980s, Tauber (1974), Bennet and Cooper (1981), and Hayes and 
Abernathy (1980) claimed that fanatically putting the spotlight on customers could reduce the firm's 
competence to develop really new products. An important argument is that asking customers to 
express their needs will not generate truly new product ideas and restricts product innovation to 
incremental product updates. According to Shanklin and Ryans (1987), asking customers for input in 
generating really new product ideas has limited value because customers do not always have explicit 
needs for a product until it is introduced into the market. Customers seem to have limited 
capabilities to see through the eyes of firm technologists and do not know what solutions, functions 
and enhanced features a technology might offer (Leonard 1995). Hamel and Prahalad (1994) notice 
that customers have limited capacities to envision really new products and seldom asked for 
products that eventually became essential. An example is the mobile phone. Although there was a 
clear need for mobile communication in remote areas, it took a second generation mobile phone 
system before the average customer started to envision how the technology would benefit them.
Furthermore, since market segments only represent a fraction of the total market (Day 1999), 
organizations paying close attention to current customers and market segments may miss out on 
emerging technologies that are at first sight only attractive to non-customers or small unserved 
market segments, but eventually make their products obsolete. A well-known example is the disk 
drive industry. Christensen and Bower (1996) have shown how leading firms in the technology that 
dominated this industry at a certain point in time, systematically lost their leadership when new 
technology came about. It is argued that this happened because too much emphasis was placed on 
needs expressed by existing customers when allocating investments for product development. On 
the contrary, winning companies took risks and invested resources in really new projects that did not 
seem to have great initial market potential but proved to be products that later dominated the 
market. The losing companies listened too carefully to their customers and were trapped by 'the 
tyranny of the served market' in which managers see the world only trough their current customers' 
eyes (Hamel and Prahalad 1994: 83). Christensen (1997), in his award-winning book, subsequently 
examined a variety of other industries for which he identified the same pattern. The same reasoning 
applies for technological capabilities that are already available inside the firm. Danneels (2007), for 
instance, illustrates how difficult it was for a chromatography firm to apply its existing technology in 
new market spaces, because resource allocation was mainly based on current customers' needs.
Is seems that on the one hand ongoing monitoring of customer needs and market conditions and 
the use of the resulting knowledge in new product decision-making enhances new product
3
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performance while on the other hand these same marketing activities may hinder the process. How 
to make sense out of this contradiction?
1.3 Exploitation and exploration in market learning
A closer look at marketing activities in new product development can bring some clarity. In doing so, 
we will draw upon the literature on organizational learning, specifically the seminal concepts of 
exploitation and exploration introduced by James March (1991). Although the work on organizational 
learning shares several similarities with market orientation (Bell et al. 2002), it offers additional 
insights that can enrich the latter concept (Jaworski and Kohli 1996). Consequently the use of an 
organizational learning perspective in the marketing field is not uncommon (Atuahene-Gima 2005; 
Baker and Sinkula 1999a; Day 1994b; Moorman 1995; Sinkula 1994; Slater and Narver 1995).
While organizations need to learn through experience, refining and using their existing knowledge 
base, they also need variety in experience by experimenting with alternatives and new knowledge to 
ensure long-term viability. These two types of learning have been captured by the twin concepts of 
exploitation and exploration (March 1991: 71). Exploitation refers to activities such as refinement, 
choice, and implementation, while exploration captures elements such as variation, search, and 
experimentation. In the context of marketing activities in product innovation, exploitation in market 
learning refers to the organizational generation and use of market information pertaining to current 
customers, product domains, market segments, and expressed customer needs. In contrast, 
exploration in market learning concurs with discovering market opportunities by searching for latent, 
unarticulated customer needs and new market segments (Atuahene-Gima et al. 2005; Jaworski et al. 
2000; Slater and Narver 1998).
Exploitation in market learning involves external market information which is largely restricted to 
the firm's preexisting knowledge base and experiences of current customers and market segments. It 
enhances the ability of product developers to effectively respond to existing customer problems, and 
to refine their products to better serve customer needs or increase efficiency (i.e. incremental 
product development). It may also have a positive influence on future product development projects 
through experience effects: increased familiarity with an existing operational domain increases 
absorptive capacity in this same domain (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Levinthal and March 1993). A 
focus on current customers and their expressed needs makes future information search more 
predictable and its use in product development more reliable and less complex (Atuahene-Gima et 
al. 2005).
Exploration in market learning, in contrast, is about searching for market information that is new 
to the firm and takes the firm beyond the scope of current experiences. Focusing on new market and 
technology developments enhances the probability of finding new market information. This new 
information increases the problem solving capacity of product development project teams (Levinthal 
and March 1993). It may also challenge current beliefs, cause-effect relationships, and mental 
models of the market resulting in ideas for really new products and adaptations to shifts in the 
external environment (Atuahene-Gima et al. 2005; Day and Nedungadi 1994; Slater and Narver 
1995).
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Although it can be argued that really new product development is by definition a sole act of 
exploration, we will follow scholars claiming that both types of learning are necessary in this process 
(Atuahene-Gima 2005; Cheng and Van de Ven 1996; Danneels 2002; Katila and Ahuja 2002; 
Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004; McGrath 2001). The majority of really new product ideas 
combine knowledge resources that already reside in the firm with knowledge that is newly 
generated. In these cases, existing knowledge provides the necessary absorptive capacity to use new 
knowledge, and ideas are a synthesis between a problem and its solution where neither the problem 
nor the solution are new in themselves (Danneels 2002; Kogut and Zander 1992; Luo 2002). Still, 
even if really new product ideas are purely based on exploration, exploitation is needed as well: the 
newly generated knowledge has to be refined and developed to the extent that the product is ready 
for market introduction (Cheng and Van de Ven 1996; McGrath 2001). Hence, to successfully 
generate really new product ideas, develop the really new product, and introduce it into the market, 
it is maintained that organizations need to build up market knowledge that is new to the firm (i.e. 
exploration) and update the market knowledge base that was already developed (i.e. exploitation). 
Exploitation without exploration results in a narrow product development portfolio which is full of 
incremental new products but has no space for really new product development projects. 
Conversely, exploration without exploitation will result in a product development portfolio that 
includes a lot of really new product concepts but lacks refined market knowledge that is necessary to 
successfully introduce these concept into the market and capitalize on ideas. The two types of 
marketing activities fulfill complementary roles (Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999). Exploitation 
increases the impact of exploration by refining new knowledge and reaping its benefits. Similarly, 
exploration overcomes the inherent limitations of exploitation, such as lack of breakthrough learning 
and the inability of adapting to significant environmental changes.
1.4 Research aim and question
Although firms have to combine the two types of market learning to achieve success in really new 
product development projects, this remains a difficult task. Exploitation and exploration represent 
fundamentally contradictory project strategies and are associated with different and inconsistent 
mental models, skills and processes (March 1991; Van de Ven et al. 1999). Combining these two 
activities represents a tension between old and new. It embodies a struggle between the comfort of 
the past and the uncertainty of the future. While exploration results in variation, exploitation 
benefits the selection and retention stages of the learning cycle (Zollo and Winter 2002). As such, 
market learning in really new product development projects presents a learning paradox: the 
simultaneous presence of contradictory elements (Lewis 2000; Poole and Van de Ven 1989; Quinn 
and Cameron 1988).
As both activities need scarce resources and attention these inconsistencies and their associated 
contradictory logics create organizational challenges (Atuahene-Gima 2005; Brown and Eisenhardt 
1997; Christensen 1997; Duncan 1976; Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Sheremata 2000; Tushman and 
O'Reilly 1996). Whereas exploitation is rooted in variance decreasing activities, disciplined problem 
solving, and the organization's past, exploration is about variance increasing activities, learning by
5
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doing, and looking into the future. Researchers of organization have pointed out traps that firms can 
fall into if they, consciously or unconsciously, ignore these learning paradoxes (Levinthal and March 
1993; Miller 1992).
Inertia may cause organizations to get stuck in the past resulting in exploitation driving out 
exploration. Past success with existing organizational knowledge, skills, mental models, and project 
set ups increases the efficiency of further exploitation in similar domains. As a result 'organizations 
discover the short term virtue of local refinement and the folly of exploration' (Levinthal and March 
1993: 106). Furthermore, managers often become risk averse in situations of gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). Since the returns from exploitation are typically more certain, closer in time, and 
closer in space than these from exploration (March 1991), exploratory experiments may suffer from 
lack of resources or even repression. This preference for exploitation may enhance short-term 
performance but eventually can result in a competence trap since firms may become incapable to 
respond to environmental changes (Christensen and Bower 1996; Danneels 2003; Hamel and 
Prahalad 1994; Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). Accordingly, highly specialized core competences may 
become core rigidities (Leonard-Barton 1992), or core incompetences (Dougherty 1995).
Although the more common situation for established firms is the one in which exploitation tends 
to drive out exploration, organizations can also be trapped in opposite circumstances. When 
exploration drives out exploitation, organizations suffer the costs of constantly renewing their stock 
of knowledge without reaping its benefits of exploiting them. Excessive exploration carries high risks 
and costs because there is a higher degree of inefficiency associated with a focus on new knowledge. 
Organizations may get caught in the failure trap in which they 'are turned into frenzies of 
experimentation, change and innovation by a dynamic failure' (Levinthal and March 1993: 105). 
Failure to exploit new knowledge leads to search for new knowledge which leads to failure to exploit 
and so on.
This research addresses dealing with the tension which results from combining exploration and 
exploitation in product development. Specifically, it takes an integral perspective on market learning 
in really new product development projects. It aims to enhance our understanding of how firms 
organize the combination of both exploration and exploitation in market learning (i.e. resolve the 
market learning paradox) during the course of really new product development projects. More 
formally stated it intends to answer the following research question:
'How do firms resolve the market learning paradox in the course of really new product
development projects?'
1.5 Theoretical contributions
By enhancing the understanding of how firms resolve the market learning paradox this research 
contributes to existing literatures in several ways. In our perspective, this research mainly 
contributes to the fields of (1) marketing organization, (2) organizational ambidexterity, and (3) 
market learning in product development.
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An important theme in the organization of the firm's marketing function is the investigation into 
interdependencies among basic strategic orientations and organizational configurations, aiming at 
developing common configurations that lead to high performance. The underlying assumption is that 
the choice of configuration of the marketing organization depends on the challenges a firm faces. 
Workman and colleagues (1998), for example, argue that organizations should adapt the 
configuration of their marketing organization if the firm switches from a non-innovation oriented 
strategy to an innovation oriented strategy. Several conceptual and empirical studies on marketing 
organization inform us about the importance of making discrete choices between conflicting 
demands, and emphasize that there is no 'one best way' of organizing (Olson et al. 2005; Ruekert et 
al. 1985; Vorhies and Morgan 2003; Workman et al. 1998). However, as a consequence of operating 
at high levels of analysis these studies largely fail to inform us on how to develop a marketing 
organization that can deal with multiple conflicting and fluctuating contingencies such as the market 
learning paradox in product innovation projects. The tendency to focus on discrete either/or choices 
is further strengthened by the marketing discipline's bias towards using quantitative theory testing 
approaches that use well established either/or measures (Anderson 1994; Desphande 1983). Indeed, 
recent studies in the marketing field have called attention to the need for research on how firms 
actually organize for dealing with multiple contingencies in product innovation and benefit from it 
(Atuahene-Gima 2005; Atuahene-Gima et al. 2005; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004; Slater and 
Mohr 2006). Additionally, Jaworski and Kohli (1993) suggest carrying out in-depth studies of a few 
organizations to develop deeper insight into the processes involved in achieving a market 
orientation, in order to complement the quantitative, correlation-based information provided by 
large-scale survey studies. This research responds to these research needs.
More than researchers in the field of marketing, scholars of organization have paid attention to 
paradoxical thinking and organizing for exploration and exploitation in innovation (Abell 1999; 
Eisenhardt 2000; Lewis 2000; Poole and Van de Ven 1989; Prud'homme van Reine and Dankbaar 
2009; Quinn and Cameron 1988). Already in the 1960s and 1970s, Wilson (1966) and Duncan (1976) 
recognized the importance of combining and synchronizing seemingly contradictory organizational 
tensions. Duncan (1976) proposed that firms had to become ambidextrous if they wanted to deal 
with the conflict of both initiating and implementing really new product ideas inside their own 
organization. Ambidextrous organizations are complex organizational forms composed of multiple 
internally inconsistent architectures that are collectively capable of operating simultaneously for 
exploitation and exploration (March 1991; Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). Recently, the concept of 
organizational ambidexterity has gained momentum in research on organizations. The number of 
articles in several leading management journals that explicitly refer to organizational ambidexterity 
has increased from less than 10 in 2004 to more than 80 in 2009 (Raisch et al. 2009). Current 
syntheses of research on organizational ambidexterity has pointed to the notable use of the concept 
in the context of product innovation (Li et al. 2008b; Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008). Yet, organizational 
ambidexterity is still in the process of developing into a new research perspective in organization 
theory. Consequently, several aspects need further development. For instance, most of the studies 
that address the concept in the context of product innovation take the firm's total product
7
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development portfolio as level analysis. From this perspective, exploitation is attributed to 
incremental new products while exploration is ascribed to really new products. However, tensions 
between old and new organizational knowledge and capabilities are often felt at a more detailed 
level (i.e. the single project instead of the product portfolio) (Leonard-Barton 1992; McGrath 2001). 
The engineers who developed BMW's new Rolls-Royce Phantom model, for instance, used elements 
that were taken from BMW's existing 7-series vehicles (i.e. exploitation) and components that were 
completely new to the firm (i.e. exploration) (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008: 401). Furthermore, 
exploitation and exploration requirements may differ from project to project and have distinct 
implications for different organizational departments and functions (Danneels 2002; Gatignon et al. 
2002; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004). Instead of all-or-nothing recommendations, a more 
detailed analysis may reveal that different innovation contexts need different organizational 
configurations. As such, a project level perspective, as taken in this study, may complement studies 
that take the product portfolio as level of analysis. Additionally, the research on organizational 
ambidexterity has frequently taken a static viewpoint on organizational behavior, suggesting an ideal 
system state where exploitation and exploration is combined at a single point in time. Nevertheless, 
firms may need to continuously reconfigure their project set-ups to meet changing demands in 
internal and external contingencies (Lewis et al. 2002). For example, the combination of exploration 
and exploitation may be strived for by exploring at a certain period in time and then carefully shifting 
towards exploitation or vice-versa. As a consequence, managing the simultaneous pursuit of 
exploration and exploitation may thus be a task of dynamic rather than static alignment of 
organizational configurations (Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003). Recent research efforts have started to 
investigate how product development organizations are adapted in the dynamic context of product 
innovation (Westerman et al. 2006). Because this research takes a process perspective and looks into 
resolving the market learning paradox in the course of product innovation projects, it contributes to 
this emerging area of investigation as well.
As discussed before, the general relationship between market orientation and product innovation 
performance has gained widespread attention. However, the integration of market learning in the 
product development process has received far less consideration (Kok et al. 2003). The present study 
contributes to this field of inquiry by explicating what market knowledge resources are used in 
product innovation and what organizational mechanisms and structures facilitate their usage. 
Thereby, market knowledge will be unraveled in more detail than has been done in previous studies. 
By identifying four discrete market knowledge resources, it moves beyond the general dichotomy of 
knowledge on customer preferences and knowledge on the environmental forces that shape these 
preferences (Adams et al. 1998; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver and Slater 1990; Veldhuizen et al. 
2006). Besides focusing on the refinement and use of organizational market knowledge in product 
innovation, our research also addresses how product innovation can yield new market knowledge for 
the firm as well (Atuahene-Gima 2005; Danneels 2002; Srivastava et al. 2001).
8
Introduction
1.6 Managerial relevance
Next to several theoretical contributions this research is also relevant for managers and policy 
makers. In our perspective, this managerial relevance largely boils down to insight into flexible 
organizational configurations to resolve the market learning paradox in product innovation.
It is almost axiomatic that in order to stay competitive, firms need to renew their product 
offerings. Consequently, it is not surprising that well respected firms have explicitly articulated 
product innovation strategies. In chemicals, for example, the Dutch life science and materials 
company DSM has appointed a Chief Innovation Officer and has set long term product innovation 
targets. Another example is Solvay. This Belgian chemical company has developed an innovation 
strategy where it has announced that 30% of the firm's income should come from new products or 
technologies developed within the past five years.
In earlier days, it was recommended that firms should be designed to focus on either incremental 
product updates and existing organizational knowledge resources or really new products and 
supplementing existing knowledge with new knowledge (Burns and Stalker 1961; Miller and Friesen 
1986; Porter 1980). However, the globalization of markets, rapid technological developments and 
more sophisticated customer demands have shortened product life-cycles and changed business 
environments (Barczak et al. 2009; Wind and Mahajan 1997). Not just fast-moving, high-tech 
industries have been facing these changes, even industries that used to be relatively stable show 
increased speed of transformation (D'Aveni 1994; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Grant 1996a; Harreld 
et al. 2007). As a result, the need for really new products and therefore coping with the market 
learning paradox has increased for many firms. Surprisingly, few attempts have been made to come 
up with principles and guidelines that can help managers to deal with this tension and adapt to 
multiple contingencies. The majority of tools and advice have addressed either the exploitation or 
the exploration part without looking at the other. For example, while prescriptions such as Stage­
Gate product development systems, Design for Six Sigma, and large scale customer surveys deal with 
the incremental refinement of current market knowledge and learning activities, they are less useful 
for exploration purposes (Benner and Tushman 2003; Leonard 1995). In contrast, creativity 
techniques, customer intensive market research, and organizational roles such as idea hunters and 
gatherers (De Bono 1995; Leifer et al. 2001; Leonard 1995) are useful for developing new market 
knowledge, but ill-suited for exploitation. As proposed by McKee (1992), firms that want to combine 
exploration and exploitation should develop additional skills and resources as well.
With large differences in new product success rates between firms (Barczak et al. 2009), and CEOs 
demanding that the marketing function should play a more active role in creating new organizational 
knowledge and product innovation (Webster et al. 2005) there is still sufficient room for 
improvement. Indeed, it appears that several leading institutions that bring together researchers and 
practitioners in the field of marketing still see research on organizing for product innovation and 
implementing marketing initiatives as important research priorities (ISBM 2009; MSI 2008). Detailed, 
action oriented, evidence concerning the way(s) firms are resolving the market learning paradox in 
product innovation is therefore highly relevant for contemporary managers.
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1.7 Research approach
We answer our research question by using a qualitative multiple case study (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007; Yin 1994). The use of this approach is appropriate for, at least, two reasons. First, this 
research studies a complex phenomenon (i.e. organizational learning) that takes place in a complex 
and dynamic social setting (i.e. product innovation in established firms). Looking into such 
multifaceted events benefits from using qualitative procedures by which event sequences can be 
clarified, overlapping causal factors disentangled, and contexts can be taken into account (Langley 
1999; Lee 1999; Pettigrew 1990). Second, because there is little research on how firms resolve the 
market learning paradox in product innovation a primary motivation for this study is to contrast pre­
existing understandings with observed empirical events to re-conceptualize and extend existing 
theories. For these purposes, the case study is an appropriate research strategy (Burawoy 1991; Yin 
1994).
The research approach in this study consists of a literature review and an empirical study. The 
literature review covers three distinct streams of literature (i.e. product development, organizational 
knowledge and learning, and marketing) and integrates these into a conceptual framework. These 
streams of literature are chosen because they complement each other in a first attempt to frame the 
research problem. The literature on product development sketches a context in which market 
learning takes place. The works on organization knowledge and learning are used to detail dynamics 
in organizational knowledge, distinguish between exploration and exploitation, and identify 
supporting organizational structures. Finally, research in the field of marketing is used to specify the 
knowledge flows between the organization and the external market environment and their 
organization.
The empirical study is guided by the conceptual framework and is carried out in the context of the 
chemical industry. Although the choice of a single industry limits the generalizability of the results, it 
also reduces problems that arise when sampling from different industries. Different industries 
increase extraneous sources of variance which have to be controlled for when examining firm level 
phenomena (Bass et al. 1978). The main unit of analysis in our study is the product innovation project 
in a business unit of a chemical firm. However, product innovation projects are not viewed as self- 
containing units of analysis, but as visible arenas for the interaction between old and new 
organizational market knowledge. Thus, dynamics in organizational resources are placed under a 
magnifying glass by studying market learning in product innovation projects. As Pettigrew (1990: 269) 
put it, the research focuses on both 'vertical and horizontal organizational levels of analysis and the 
interconnections between those levels through time'. The total sample consists of ten projects in six 
business units of six different chemical firms. Interviewing key organizational actors has been the 
main data collection method. These interviews have been complemented by archival data. The 
combination of interviews and archival data collection enables a rich understanding of the research 
phenomenon and provides the opportunity for data triangulation (Jick 1979; Schwenk 1985).
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Although it might appear that the research has been a rather linear journey, in reality it went 
through several cycles of confrontation between theory and empirical data. Each iteration cycle 
directed us to additional empirical data and theory.
1.8 Outline of the book
The remainder of this book is constructed around two main parts and a concluding chapter.
Part I contains two chapters. Chapter two discusses the theoretical background that is relevant for 
framing the problem under study. It draws upon the literature on product development, 
organizational knowledge and learning, and marketing. Chapter three presents the conceptual 
framework that is used to guide the empirical study and is based on the literature that is discussed in 
chapter two.
Part II starts with presenting the methodological details of the empirical study in chapter four. It 
explains the choice of case study research as research strategy and looks deeper into the nature of 
this strategy and how it is used in this research. Also the characteristics of the research setting (i.e. 
chemical industry), case selection, data collection and coding, data analysis and presentation of the 
findings are discussed. Chapters five through eight present the results of the empirical study. 
Although the ten cases are analyzed individually, their description is constructed around their 
relative deviance from the underlying product/process technology and the market application of 
existing business unit products. Chapter five describes three projects in which project members 
develop new technology to target existing market applications (i.e. tech-discontinuities). Chapter six 
presents findings on four projects that target new market applications with existing technology (i.e. 
market-discontinuities). Chapter seven focuses on three projects that target new market applications 
with new technology (i.e. tech/market discontinuities). In chapter eight, the ten cases are cross 
compared.
Finally, chapter nine presents overall conclusions and a discussion. It also presents theoretical, as 
well as managerial implications. Chapter nine concludes with the limitations of the current research 
that provide meaningful opportunities for further research. Figure 1.1 (next page) presents the 
outline of the book
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2 Theoretical background
The aim of this chapter is to build a foundation for developing the conceptual framework that will 
guide empirical analyses. This foundation will include literature on new product development, 
organizational knowledge and learning, and marketing. While each stream carries its unique 
perspective, together they provide the groundwork for answering the main research question. We will 
start by defining 'really new' product development. Then we will discuss research on the working 
strategy of the development organization and the nature of senior management involvement for 
successful 'really new' product development (2.1). Subsequently, we turn to a more detailed level of 
analysis and will discuss research on the organizational knowledge and learning processes that 
underpin new products. In this section we will also discuss organizational features that support these 
knowledge dynamics (2.2). The chapter ends with discussing research on the specifics of interacting 
with the market environment in product innovation and the management of this process (2.3).
2.1 'Really new' product development
Innovation research can be subdivided into two streams of literature (Adler 1989; Souitaris 2002). 
The first stream is a macro level, economics oriented tradition which studies differences in 
innovation across countries, the evolutions of technologies, and differences in innovation patterns 
within and between industrial sectors. Although this type of inquiry is very useful for sketching the 
context of product development in organizations, it regards the actual process of generating new 
product ideas and their development as black box (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995). The second stream 
of research, the product development literature, complements the first stream by opening this black 
box. Product development includes all activities needed to conceive, design, produce, and deliver a 
product to market.
Over the last 30 years, the product development literature has grown. Researchers have modeled 
the process and did in-depth analyses on specific parts and relationships. This paragraph will 
highlight some general findings from this second stream of literature to develop the background 
against which market learning in product development takes place. Because this research focuses on 
managing market learning in really new product development it particularly concentrates on 
contingent models of product development which distinguish between the magnitude of innovative 
change, or task uncertainty, between different product development projects.
A thorough analysis and a review of the literature on product development was undertaken by 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1995). These authors made the attempt to organize a broad selection of 
literature from 1969 until 1995, created an integrative model, and developed a sense of future 
research directions. Because their work is largely in line with other product development review 
studies (Cooper 2001; Henard and Szymanski 2001; Krishnan and Ulrich 2001; Montoya-Weiss and 
Calantone 1994), we will use this study as point of departure. In their analysis, Brown and Eisenhardt
(1995) found that the literature they studied could be subdivided into three streams: product 
development as rational plan, communication web, and disciplined problem solving. Each stream,
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they argued, involves a pattern of cumulative studies using the same theoretical perspective and 
research methods evolving from one or two pioneering studies. The rational plan stream builds on 
the work of Myers and Marquis (1969) and the SAPPHO studies (Rothwell 1972; Rothwell et al. 1974). 
This stream is primarily exploratory and a-theoretical. Because of its broad-based perspective it helps 
to define a wide range or relevant factors in product development. The communications web stream 
is based on the work of Allen (1971; 1977). Theoretically, this work is based on information 
processing and the resource dependency perspectives. Finally, the problem-solving stream is based 
on the work of Imai and colleagues (Imai et al. 1985), who studied the development of successful 
Japanese products. This stream of research takes the theoretical perspective of information 
processing one step further to problem solving strategies.
Brown and Eisenhardt (1995: 366) argue that 'the overlapping and complementary focal interests 
as well as the theoretical complementarities suggest that the three streams of literature are ready 
for synthesis into an integrative model'. In developing this model, they recognize that there are 
multiple agents whose actions influence new product performance. Specifically they argue that (a) a 
development organization1, senior management, and suppliers affect new product process 
performance (i.e. speed and productivity of product development), (b) a development organization, 
customers, and senior management affect product effectiveness (i.e. the fit of the new product with 
firm competences and market needs) and (c) the combination of an efficient process, an effective 
new product, and a market that is large, growing and involves limited competition shapes the 
financial success of product development (i.e. revenues, profitability, and market share).
One of the further observations of these authors is that the contingent nature of product 
development such as the impact of the magnitude of innovative change, or task uncertainty, is not 
well understood. Such a contingency perspective is important for our theoretical background 
because the market learning paradox is only apparent in situations of really new product innovation. 
The next sections explicitly deal with organizational differences based on the extent to which product 
development is simple, repetitive, and predictable. These are structured around two important 
agents in the innovation process as identified by Brown and Eisenhardt (1995): the development 
organization and senior management. The two other important agents, suppliers and customers, are 
not included for different reasons. Suppliers are less interesting for answering the research question 
and customers are discussed when research in the field of marketing is addressed. This section is 
concluded with a summary.
New product development under high task uncertainty
Since the 1960s, a growing literature has both documented and attempted to explain organizational 
variation. Its starting point was a series of research studies which called into question the basic, 
sometimes implicit, proposition of classical theories of organization that there was 'one best way' to 
organize regardless of circumstances (Brech 1957; Fayol 1949). These studies showed instead that 
organizational forms varied in different circumstances. This line of reasoning has led to contingency
1 A development organization may include project members and a formal or informal project leader.
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theory which seeks to explain why this variation occurs. Contingency factors, such as environmental 
uncertainty (Burns and Stalker 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) and type of employees (Mintzberg 
1979) are regarded as causal, independent variables and the elements of organizational 
configurations as dependent variables. The influence of contingency factors on organizational 
elements is mediated by the nature of the work to be organized (Donaldson 1996). A number of 
intermediate variables have been identified: interdependence of work processes (Thompson 1967) 
organizational strategy (Chandler 1977), and information processing (Galbraith 1973). Donaldson 
(1996) argues that these intermediate variables largely boil down to 'task uncertainty' or the extent 
to which work tasks are simple, repetitive, and predictable.
There is also a long history of contingent approaches to the organization of innovation (Burns and 
Stalker 1961; Hage and Dewar 1973; Perrow 1971). However, it is only more recently that empirical 
research has explored the detailed characteristics of organizing product development with varying 
levels of novelty resulting in various levels of task uncertainty. To distinguish different levels of 
novelty, several new product categorizations can be found in the literature. Such typologies are 
relevant for research and practice, but it is important to note that categories are not completely 
objective. It is critical to distinguish between relative and absolute measures of novelty (Garcia and 
Calantone 2002; Tushman and Smith 2002). What is relevant when answering our research question 
is how close a product innovation project is to existing firm skills and past experiences, which is a 
relative and not an absolute matter. Clearly what is an uncertain project for one firm may be a small 
step for another. For example, the development of a new electronic control unit might be considered 
as a low uncertainty project in an electronics firm, but a much higher uncertainty project for a 
machine tool manufacturer (Tidd and Bodley 2002: 129). Product development literature typically 
distinguishes between two levels of novelty. Product innovation with a low level of novelty (or task 
uncertainty) is often referred to as 'incremental' product development. Projects in this category 
focus on the incremental improvement of existing products for existing markets, using current firm 
technologies, market positions, and channels (Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004). Product 
development with a higher level of novelty is identified with labels such as 'discontinuous', 'radical', 
'new-to-the-world' or 'really new' product development. Firms use this type of projects to move 
beyond current product/market linkages and focus on new organizational knowledge. In these cases, 
higher novelty and task uncertainty may come through two major sources: newness in market and/or 
technology (Abernathy and Clark 1985; Garcia and Calantone 2002; Tushman and Smith 2002). We 
will use the term 'really new' product development for the 'higher level of novelty' category of 
projects throughout this research.
2.1.1 The working strategy of the development organization
In complex and mature organizations, product development is performed by employees from 
multiple functions such as research, marketing, and manufacturing. Subsets of individuals from these 
functions form emergent organizations that might or might not have well marked boundaries. 
Following Sheremata (2000: 392), we refer to these as 'development organizations'. A development 
organization includes all individuals and groups working directly on the development of a particular
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product. They form a product innovation micro-context and can be considered as 'organizations 
within organizations' (House et al. 1995; Shenhar 2001). Development organizations include the 
employees who actually do the work of product development and transform vague ideas, concepts, 
and product specifications into the design of new products. In this section we will discuss some 
research which argues that the appropriate characteristics of the working strategy of the 
development organization are contingent on the task uncertainty, or innovativeness, of the product 
innovation project under consideration.
Product innovation projects can be described as a collection of tasks that has to be performed by 
the development organization. For the purpose of organizing and structuring this work different 
process models have been described. Clustering project tasks into process stages gives a common 
and practical format for discussing problems and solutions. In table 2.1 (next page) an overview of 
several process models is presented and synthesized. As can be seen, the basic progression of 
activities is rather similar. Most of the models start with a planning phase and end when a product is 
introduced into the market. While the process models of table 2.1 break down product development 
work into four to thirteen tasks, some studies distinguish between a smaller number of stages, each 
with several subtasks and decisions (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986; Hauser et al. 2006). For example, 
in their study of product development expenditures, Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1986) studied 13 
commonly cited activities and divided them into three major phases: predevelopment, development, 
and commercialization. More recently, the Product Development and Management Association 
(PDMA) has organized its 'body of knowledge' around the same three product development stages: 
discovery (the front end), development (the middle), and commercialization (the back end). 
Following this reasoning, this chapter synthesizes product development project tasks into three main 
types of activities: initiation, development, and commercialization.
Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) observed that the working strategy of the development organization 
is mainly discussed in the rational plan and the disciplined problem solving research streams. Both 
streams see product development as a complex problem solving task that can be rationalized. They 
advocate extensive planning before a disciplined execution of development and commercialization is 
carried out. Planning reduces uncertainty and therefore improves the speed and productivity of the 
development process by eliminating extra work, ordering the steps of the process, and avoiding 
errors.
18
Theoretical background
Table 2.1: Product development; three main phases
Booz, Allen 
and
Hamilton
(1968)
Cooper and
Kleinschmidt
(1986)
Urban and
Hauser
(1993)
Song and
Montoya-Weiss
(1998)
Veryzer
(1998a)
Crawford and 
Di Benedetto 
(2005)
Three
main
phases
Exploration Initial screening Opportunity
identification
Strategic project 
planning
Dynamic
drifting
Opportunity 
identification 
and selection
Initiation
Screening Preliminary
market
assessment
Idea development 
and screening
Convergence Concept
generation
Business
analysis
Preliminary
technical
assessment
Business and 
market 
opportunity 
analysis
Formulation Concept/product
evaluation
Detailed market 
study
Preliminary
design
Business analysis
Development Product
development
Design Technical
development
Evaluation
preparation
Development
D
evelopm
ent
Testing In-house product 
testing
Testing Product testing Formative
prototype
Customer tests 
of products
Lead user 
testing
Design
modification
Prototype
Commerciali­
zation
Test market/trial 
sell
Introduction Product
commercialization
Commercializa­
tion
Launch
Com
m
ercialization
Trial production
Pre­
commercializa­
tion business 
analysis
Production start
up
Market launch
Life cycle 
management
Later research has nuanced these findings and introduced another problem solving logic. This logic 
represents knowledge structuring under higher task uncertainty as in the case of really new product 
development. When product innovation is highly uncertain, strictly separating planning from 
execution becomes problematic. Although some planning may still be favorable, the basic orientation 
is experimental. 'Probe and learn' is the main strategy rather than investing in accurate preliminary 
analyses. The underlying idea is that in these situations, where the product innovation outcome is 
largely unknown, it is not helpful to plan extensively. Rather maintaining flexibility and learning 
quickly through improvisation and experience yield effective performance.
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995: 84), for instance, analyzed different strategies for speeding up the 
product development process. They proposed a compression strategy and an experiential strategy. 
Under the compression strategy product development is seen as a 'predictable series of well defined
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steps'. The strategy for speed under this logic is rationalization and then squeezing the process by 
using supplier involvement, overlapping stages and computer aided design. In contrast, the 
experiential strategy regards product development as an 'uncertain path through foggy and shifting 
markets and technologies'. It is proposed that speed under this logic is achieved by quickly building 
understanding and options while maintaining focus and motivation, by using tactics such as multiple 
iterations, extensive testing and frequent project milestones. The authors gathered data from 72 
product development projects in the global computer industry to test their strategies. Using a split­
analysis, they found that the compression strategy was only effective in a more mature industry 
segment characterized by low uncertainty, while the experiential strategy was found to particularly 
shorten development cycle times in an uncertain industry segment. Comparable observations were 
made by Lynn et al. (1996), using a multiple case study including four successful innovative new 
product lines (such as GE's CT scanner). These authors found that the product development process 
in their cases was fairly different from the conventional, incremental process that follows a 
sequential linear pattern of planning and execution. The companies under study developed the 
products by probing potential markets with early versions of the product, learning from the probes, 
and probing again. The early product prototypes were not the result of a complete development 
process, but rather one of the initial steps. As Bobby Bowen, a key figure in GE's development of CT 
puts it (Lynn et al. 1996: 26):
'Several cases have been written about the history of CT, but they don't describe anything that I 
recognize. They tend to project what ought to have been rather than was. There is a tendency to assume 
that a lot more occurred by planning than what actually occurred...In fact, one thing tended to follow 
from the next. There were a lot of curves on the road that we hadn't anticipated. We took things as they 
came. A lot of people think of product development as involving a lot of planning, but I think the key is 
learning and an organization's ability to learn.'
Moorman and Miner (1997) aimed to analyze in what conditions organizational improvisation, 
defined as the composition and the execution of action converging in the same time, is likely to occur 
and is more effective than separating planning from execution. The authors applied a longitudinal 
study and analyzed 102 action events in two innovation projects in two mid-sized firms. Results 
showed that organizational improvisation occurred moderately and that less task uncertainty 
decreased its incidence. Furthermore it was found that the data supported the concern that 
improvisation could reduce product effectiveness. However, results also indicated that higher task 
uncertainty can reduce negative effects and sometimes create a positive effect for improvisation. 
Song and Montoya-Weiss (1998) investigated the interplay between a product's innovativeness, the 
product development process, and the product's performance of 163 really new projects and 169 
incremental projects in a high technology industry context. They found that planning activities were 
also important for projects with a higher degree of innovativeness. However, they also found 
different effects regarding the type of planning. Business and market opportunity analysis was 
counterproductive for really new products but increased the profitability of incremental new 
products. Conversely, improving the proficiency of strategic planning had a positive effect on the 
profitability of really new products, but showed a negative effect in situations of incremental product
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development. Veryzer (1998a) asked himself if processes for really new projects differed from the 
general models. Drawing on data of eight in-depth case studies of projects in several Fortune 500 
firms, he developed a descriptive model of the really new product development process, and offered 
insight into general requirements for effective management of these projects. The process for really 
new product development was more exploratory and less customer driven than the typical process. 
In all cases, prototypes were developed at a much earlier stage. Prototype construction supported 
product application formulation from emerging technologies, and preceded opportunity analysis, 
assessment of market attractiveness, market research and financial analysis. Finally, Salomo, Weise 
and Gemünden (2007) aimed to investigate, among other things, the effects of product development 
planning on the success (product effectiveness, process performance and financial performance) of 
really new product development projects. Drawing on project level data of 132 launched new 
products, these authors confirmed the findings of Song and Montoya-Weiss (1998) that strategic 
project planning enhances innovative product innovation performance. They also found that while 
detailed project planning showed no effect, project risk planning, also had a positive impact on really 
new product development performance.
2.1.2 Senior management involvement
Senior management involvement refers to organizational managers that are involved in strategic 
product planning, and the allocation and control of product innovation resources but are not, like 
project members, involved in day-to-day project activities. In most cases these managers belong to 
the top management team of the organization or are their direct reports (Brown and Eisenhardt 
1995; Tushman and Smith 2002). Senior management support and control is critical for product 
development success. The importance of support is specifically recognized in the rational plan stream 
of research and well supported by empirical research (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995). By support these 
authors mean the provision of resources to the project team, including both financial and human 
resources. This support is essential to attract development organization members, gain project 
approval to go ahead, and provide the funding necessary to foster development efforts. As important 
as senior management support is senior management control (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995). Control 
is particularly essential for achieving superior process performance. It involves having a central vision 
necessary to develop and communicate a distinctive and coherent product concept and tracking 
progress of work. At the same time, it is argued that control should be carried out subtly. It should 
also include delegation by senior management to the development organization so that they have 
enough autonomy to be motivated and creative. While the emphasis on subtle control stems from 
the problem solving research stream, Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) also argue that its theoretical link 
with performance is blurred and lacks rigorous empirical examination. For example, previous 
research is vague on how the responsibilities of senior management differ from the responsibilities 
of development organizations. Recent research efforts have brought supplementary insights 
regarding the topic and have identified some differences in beneficial support and control 
responsibilities of senior management. In these studies the level of innovativeness was included as a 
contingency factor.
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For instance, a study by Swink (2000) investigated to what extent technological innovativeness 
moderated the effect of senior management support on product development goal achievement. A 
survey of 136 product innovation projects drawn from firms representing most of the major U.S. 
manufacturing industries provided data for the study. Senior management support was measured by 
the degree to which very explicit project objectives and goals were used, to what extent resources 
were adequate to make the project a success, and to what extent senior management was 
committed to making the project a success. Overall results showed that senior management support 
was positively associated with better time based performance, design quality, and financial 
performance. However, a significant interaction effect suggested that high levels of senior 
management support were ineffective in securing good financial performance of highly innovative 
projects. In speculating on this result the author discusses the possibility that what begins as senior 
management support can actually manifest itself as senior management interference. In turn, senior 
management interference might be specifically detrimental in high technology innovative projects 
because inexperience with new technologies increases the likelihood that senior management's 
situation assessments are incorrect. Another explanation could be senior manager's over optimism in 
situations of really new product development (see also Schmidt and Calantone 1998). If managers 
find it more difficult to 'pull the plug' on really new projects, then they are likely to support a greater 
percentage of 'bad projects'. For incremental product development projects senior management is 
likely to be more objective and less prone to support projects with poor financial prospects. An 
interesting study in the context of senior management involvement was performed by Bonner and 
colleagues (2002). These authors investigated the relationship between product development 
control mechanisms used by senior management and product development performance. The study 
also aimed at capturing possible moderating effects by the project's level of innovativeness on the 
relationship of several control mechanisms and performance. Based on prior research, six types of 
relevant project control mechanisms were included: process control, output control, development 
organization-based rewards, development organization's strategic control influence, development 
organization's operational control influence, and management intervention. A survey instrument was 
used resulting in sufficiently complete data on 95 projects from a diverse set of organizations. Overall 
the findings suggest that while project teams need some level of direction concerning the objectives 
to be accomplished and the procedures to be followed, senior managers can exercise too much 
control. Specifically the findings showed a significant negative association between the use of formal 
process control and project performance. The findings also indicated that the degree to which senior 
management intervened in project-level decisions during product development was negatively 
related to project performance. However, results also supported the notion that early and interactive 
decision-making on control mechanisms is important for effective projects. Specifically early 
involvement of both development organization members and senior management in setting 
operational controls, such as goals and procedures for monitoring and evaluating the project, was 
positively associated with performance. Contrary to other work, these authors did not find significant 
support for the moderating role of the level of innovativeness on the relationship between formal 
process and output control, respectively, and project performance. A study by Cardinal (2001)
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examines the impact of organizational wide formal controls on innovativeness at the firm level. 
Drawing on a database of 57 pharmaceutical firms or business units that was compiled by using 
archival and questionnaire data this author tested the relationships between three types of formal 
controls and two categories of innovative outputs. The types of formal control included input control 
(e.g. professionalization and specialist diversity of R&D members), behavioral control (e.g. 
formalization of procedures), and output control (e.g. emphasis on patents and new drug 
introductions). The two innovative categories were incremental new products in the form of drug 
enhancements and really new products in the form of new drugs. Results showed that input, 
behavior, and output control enhanced really new product performance and that input and output 
control enhanced incremental new product performance. Although the similarities between 
organizational level controls may interact with actual differences for individual projects, and a single 
industry context might limit broad applicability, the study illustrates that some dimensions of formal 
control are relevant for product development in general, regardless of its level of innovativeness. A 
study by Lewis and colleagues (2002) explored the effects of using contrasting project management 
styles on the effectiveness and efficiency of product development projects. In their study the authors 
included an emergent style and a planned style. An emergent style facilitates project member 
creativity, flexibility, and improvisation, while a planned style is more formal and centralized, 
including management discipline and direction setting. They also investigated to what extent project 
task uncertainty moderated the proposed relationships. By using a multiple panel approach of 
collecting survey data on several points in time, the authors studied 80 projects in one chemical 
company over a maximum period of two years per project. The findings indicate that the use of a 
paradoxical blend of both styles enhances overall project performance. The results on the 
moderating effect of task uncertainty were quite complex. Among the findings was that in situations 
of increasing technological uncertainty it appeared that the planned style and specifically formal 
reviews by senior management increased in importance for project effectiveness. In situations of 
high market uncertainty it appeared that planned style elements such as formal monitoring of 
milestones and directive control slowed the development process. On the contrary, participative 
control, which fits the emergent style, benefited project effectiveness in situations of high market 
uncertainty. Finally, Sethi and Iqbal (2008) researched the effect of rigorous formal product 
development process control on new product financial performance. They also analyzed how this 
relationship was moderated by product innovativeness. 'Formal product development process 
control' was put into operation by specifically focusing on the widely embraced Stage-Gate process 
(see e.g. Cooper 2001), which combines formal process and output control mechanisms. Stage-Gate 
controls break the traditional product development process into a set of discrete and identifiable 
stages with each stage consisting of a set of prescribed activities. The stages are separated by gates, 
which serve as control and go/no-go check points. Gates are often designed in the form of meetings 
that take place between senior management and representatives from the development 
organization. Using a survey instrument, the authors gathered data on 120 projects from a wide 
variety of industries in which a Stage-Gate methodology was used. They found a positive linear effect 
of project gate review criteria 'strictness', 'objectivity', and 'frequency of evaluation' on project
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inflexibility. These effects were not mitigated when a certain level of relaxation in gate evaluation 
(gate conditionality) was applied. In turn, project inflexibility was positively related to project 
learning failure. Finally, project learning failure adversely affected the financial performance of 
projects with a high level of innovativeness. Based on their study the authors argue that recent 
suggestions of making the Stage-Gate process more conditional for mitigating some of the 
unintended consequences of rigorous gate evaluations is not effective. They think it is better to 
create separate control mechanisms for incremental and really new product development projects, 
along with separate gate review committees. Additionally they admit that it is not always possible to 
come up with a set of standard criteria for evaluating all types of really new product development 
projects. As a possible solution they suggest senior managers to involve members of the 
development organization in modifying standard criteria to accommodate project specific needs.
Overall the results of the studies suggest that senior management support is generally beneficial 
for really new product development, however Swink's (2000) study shows that it can also have 
negative implications. Additionally, formal control mechanisms used by senior management can be 
beneficial for both incremental and really new product development, under the conditions that the 
development organization is involved in specifying them and that they are tailored towards the 
specific product development project needs stemming from its level of innovativeness.
2.1.3 Summary
To develop a perspective on the context in which market learning in really new product innovation 
takes place, this section specifically focused on reviewing empirical studies on aspects of successful 
product development that explicitly include the level of innovativeness as a contingency variable. 
These aspects were structured around two important organizational agents (i.e. development 
organization and senior management) in the innovation process as identified by Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1995). Table 2.2 presents a summary of the findings.
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Table 2.2: Aspects of successful product development; really new vs. incremental projects
Aspects Really new projects Incremental projects Illustrative literature
DEVELOPMENT
ORGANIZATION
(working
strategy)
'Three main product 
development phases; Learning 
by doing: Some planning, 
but basic orientation is 
experimental; 'Probe and 
learn' is the main strategy 
rather than investing in 
accurate preliminary 
analyses'
'Three main product 
development phases; 
Learning before doing: 
Extensive planning and 
disciplined execution of 
development and 
commercialization'
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 
(1995);
Lynn et al. (1996); 
Moorman and Miner 
(1997); Song and 
Montoya-Weiss (1998); 
Urban and Hauser (1993)
SENIOR
MANAGEMENT
(support and 
control)
'Support generally beneficial 
but can have negative 
implications; Formal control 
mechanisms used by senior 
management beneficial, 
under the conditions that the 
development organization is 
involved in specifying them 
and they are tailored towards 
the specific needs of a really 
new project'
'Support generally beneficial; 
Formal control mechanisms 
used by senior management 
beneficial, under the 
conditions that the 
development organization is 
involved in specifying them 
and they are tailored towards 
the specific needs of an 
incremental project'
Swink (2000)
Bonner et al. (2001); 
Cardinal (2002); Lewis et 
al. (2002); Sethi and Iqbal 
(2008)
This overview presents preferable management practices for really new product development and 
how they differ from the ones that suit its incremental counterpart. In the underlying studies, really 
new product development is seen as a set of rather homogeneous inter-functional activities aiming 
at developing products that move beyond current product/market linkages. However, if we take a 
closer look this homogeneity seems to disappear. From a more detailed perspective, really new 
product development is a term that is used to describe activities that may differ from project to 
project and have distinct implications for different organizational departments and functions. Some 
really new product development projects, for instance, require a state of the art research 
department because their newness may lie in developing a path-breaking technology. In contrast, 
other projects may use an established product and might need entrepreneurial marketing managers 
to launch it in an emerging market segment. Finally, a third group of project might need both. 
Consequently, if we want to arrive at a detailed perspective on resolving the market learning paradox 
in really new product development projects we have to add scholarly work that details differences in 
activities in really new product development projects. A way to do so is to extend the theoretical 
perspective of product innovation as information processing and see it as the creation and 
integration of specific organizational knowledge resources (Madhavan and Grover 1998).
2.2 Organizational knowledge and learning in the context of product innovation
As was illustrated in the last section, the underlying theories of the work on product development 
discussed in the review by Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) stressed the importance of information. As 
knowledge can be seen as 'information in context' (Nonaka et al. 2000) this chapter will focus on 
organizational knowledge and learning processes underlying product innovation. More specifically,
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we will look at product innovation through the lenses of the knowledge based view of the firm that 
argues that the capability to create and utilize knowledge largely defines an organization's ability to 
develop new products. Successively, we will discuss work in the fields of organizational knowledge 
and organizational learning and relate this to product innovation. This theoretical discussion will be 
concluded by a summary.
2.2.1 Knowledge as organizational resource
The resource based view of the firm (RBV) considers knowledge as an important resource of 
organizations (Amit and Schoemaker 1993; Barney 1991; Dierickx and Cool 1989; Grant 1991; Peteraf 
1993; Wernerfelt 1984). Within the RBV framework it is assumed that firms are bundles of different 
resources, that these resources are heterogeneously distributed across firms, and that resource 
differences persist over time. Based on these assumptions, RBV researchers have theorized that 
when firms have resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable they are able to 
achieve sustainable competitive advantage by implementing value creating strategies that cannot be 
easily duplicated by other firms. In this context, resources include physical assets, capabilities (or 
competences), organizational processes, and knowledge controlled by the firm (Barney 1991). Amit 
and Shoemaker (1993) make a subsequent and widely adopted addition by distinguishing between 
resources, being tradable and non-specific to the firm, and capabilities as being firm specific and 
used to utilize the resources within the firm. Later work on dynamic capabilities and the knowledge 
based view of the firm has extended RBV thinking.
Extending RBV: Dynamic capabilities
The increasing dynamism in the firm environment with its frequent and rapid changes in technology, 
customer preferences, and competition, has caused researchers to question the sustainability of 
superior performance of a given strategic position and bundle of resources (D'Aveni 1994; Eisenhardt 
and Martin 2000; Grant 1996a; Harreld et al. 2007). It was doubted that understanding superior 
performance at one point in time would explain how superior performance is consistently achieved 
over time. Addressing this thought, RBV thinking has been extended with the dynamic capabilities 
perspective. This perspective focuses on the capacity of an organization facing a changing 
environment to create new resources or to renew and alter its resource mix. Teece et al. (1997), 
which is recognized as one of the first contribution developing explicitly the notion of dynamic 
capabilities (Ambrosini and Bowman 2009), defined these as the firm's ability to integrate, build, and 
reconfigure resources to address rapidly changing environments. Since its introduction, the concept 
has attracted increasing attention (Eisenhardt 2000; Helfat et al. 2007; Makadok 2001; Wang and 
Ahmed 2007; Winter 2003; Zahra et al. 2006; Zollo and Winter 2002). Ambrosini and Bowman (2009) 
argue that this accumulation of work has led to a consensus that dynamic capabilities are repeated 
organizational processes in the most general sense and that their role is to change a firm's resource 
base. Furthermore it is argued that dynamic capabilities are built rather than bought in the market, 
are path dependent and evolved over time, are embedded in the firm, and are a source of, at least, 
temporary competitive advantage.
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Important to notice is that dynamic capabilities and 'ordinary capabilities' are distinct constructs in 
typologies of organizational capabilities. Collis (1994), for example, introduced a hierarchy in 
capabilities. The first category consists of those that reflect the ability to perform the basic functional 
activities of the firm, such as selling products more effectively than competitors. The second category 
of capabilities is grouped around the theme of dynamic improvement of firm activities, such as 
purposeful updating of the organizational knowledge base and incremental product development. 
The third category of capabilities, which is closely related to dynamic improvements, comprises the 
capabilities to recognize the intrinsic value of other resources or to develop novel strategies before 
competitors, such as the development of new knowledge resources and really new product 
development. According to Ambrosini and Bowman (2009), both the second and the third categories 
can be seen as dynamic capabilities in the view of the definition of Teece and colleagues (1997) 
because they relate to the modification, creation, and extension of the organizational resource base. 
Collis (1994) also identified 'higher order' or 'meta capabilities' which are necessary for learning to 
learn capabilities. This author argued that these meta capabilities can go on 'ad infinitum' and that 
there is a kind of infinite wave of capabilities to renew capabilities to renew capabilities, etc. 
Consequently, the value of organizational capabilities is context dependent and finding the ultimate 
source of competitive advantage is therefore impossible. Comparable typologies have been 
developed and used by researchers such as Winter (2003), Danneels (2002), and Zahra et al. (2006).
Extending RBV: Knowledge based view of the firm
Next to the dynamic capabilities perspective, the RBV has been extended by the knowledge based 
view of the firm (KBV). This extension also builds on the assumption of environmental dynamism. The 
KBV argues that organizational knowledge and its generation, transfer, integration, and application 
are the main organizational resources and capabilities because these are relatively more likely to be 
idiosyncratic to the firm in which they reside (Argote and Ingram 2000; Dierickx and Cool 1989; Grant 
1996a; 1996b; Kogut and Zander 1992; Verona 1999). Connor and Prahalad (1996: 477) even go so 
far as stating that knowledge based resources are 'the essence of the resource based perspective'. 
While Teece (1982) argues that the existence of large diversified firms can be explained by the high 
transaction costs of their knowledge.
One of the earliest attempts to increase dynamics in the RVB and focus it in the direction of 
organizational knowledge was by Dierickx and Cool (1989). These authors conceptualized the 
knowledge of firms in terms of stocks and flows. Stocks of knowledge are accumulated knowledge 
assets, while flows are knowledge streams within and between organizations that contribute to the 
accumulation of knowledge. Superior stocks and flows are seen as sources of competitive advantage 
and superior performance. Kogut and Zander (1992) also emphasized the strategic importance of 
knowledge as a source of advantage. They posited that what firms do better than markets is the 
creation and transfer of knowledge. They argued that knowledge, in the form of 'know what' and 
'know how' is held by individuals, and yet is also embedded in the organizing principles by which 
people voluntarily cooperate in organizational context. Because the creation of new knowledge 
depends on existing capabilities and organizing principles, the knowledge of the firm develops in a
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path dependent way, through the replication and recombination of existing knowledge. The authors 
also argued that the ability to replicate knowledge determines the firm's rate of growth, but this 
replication also facilitates imitation by competitors. Therefore, organizations are able to grow and 
deter competitive imitation only by continuously recombining their knowledge and applying it to new 
market opportunities. Hence, in a competitive environment, superior performance can only be 
sustained through continuous (product) innovation. Finally, important contributions were made by 
Robert Grant (1996a; 1996b) who claimed that organizational knowledge is a source of sustained 
competitive advantage. In his view, the essence of organizations is their ability to integrate 
knowledge and apply it in innovation activities to develop new products and services. Yet, because 
this knowledge is possessed by organizational individuals and not the organization, a critical element 
of sustained competitive advantage is the ability to integrate the knowledge of organizational 
members. The author identified three characteristics of knowledge integration that he claimed 
increase its strategic value. The first one is the efficiency of knowledge integration which is a function 
of the level of common knowledge among organizational members, the frequency and variability of 
the organizational activity, and the organizational structure. The second is the scope of the 
integration, with a broader scope facilitating the creation and preservation of competitive advantage. 
The third is the flexibility of integration to include new knowledge and the reconfiguration of existing 
knowledge. In addition Grant pointed out that knowledge can also be integrated externally through 
relational networks that span organizational boundaries. These networks which can be used for 
accessing and generating new knowledge are specifically important in dynamic environments where 
the speed and scope of knowledge integration is paramount for sustaining competitive advantage.
Knowledge attributes
Considering knowledge as organizational resource has caused researchers to develop classifications, 
or taxonomies of knowledge, to examine the various strategies, routines, and techniques through 
which different types of knowledge are created, codified, converted, transferred, and exchanged 
(Tsoukas 1996). Despite the fact that knowledge in itself is inherently unobservable, which makes it 
difficult to distinguish it in an unambiguous manner (Spender 1996; Szulanski 2000), researchers 
have tried to develop classifications based on knowledge characteristics. A recent study by Turner 
and Makhija (2006) synthesized twenty-two highly cited papers that identify knowledge 
characteristics in problem-solving situations. These authors argued that a variety of knowledge 
characteristics, generally, can be captured by three attributes that represent important qualitative 
differences: codifiability, completeness and diversity. The authors discussed these attributes in 
relation to knowledge that relates to means, behaviors, or processes, by which organizational goals 
are accomplished (i.e. 'know how'), and the ends and outcomes of these processes such as 
knowledge on the market or technologies (i.e. 'know what')2. Because the exact value of the 
attributes can vary per problem-solving situation the combinations of the three knowledge attributes 
are potentially infinite, reflecting the potential heterogeneity in knowledge resources and capabilities
2 This distinction mirrors the division between 'capabilities' (i.e. 'know how') and 'resources' (i.e. 'know-what').
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between different entities (i.e. individuals, work groups, organizations, inter-organizational 
networks).
Codifiability refers to the extent to which knowledge can be broken down into specific 
components that are easily understood and articulated (Kogut and Zander 1992). This characteristic 
is widely used in the literature and is essentially based on the distinction made by Polanyi (1967) 
between explicit and tacit knowledge. According to this author, explicit knowledge is articulated and 
specified either verbally or in writing, while tacit knowledge is unarticulated, intuitive and non­
verbalized. Explicit knowledge tends to be relatively unambiguous, observable, and indisputable. It 
can be readily transferred within organizations or between individuals without loss of meaning 
(Grant 1996b). In contrast, tacit knowledge is not easily codified or broken down into component 
parts. Therefore this knowledge is difficult to articulate or express. The ability to use tacit knowledge 
depends on the individual's prior experience and familiarity with the knowledge, which provides a 
base from which new knowledge can be understood more easily. To some extent, Polanyi's 
distinction is troublesome and differently interpreted among researchers. Some argue that tacit 
knowledge can be converted into explicit knowledge (Kogut and Zander 1992; Nonaka and Takeuchi 
1995). Other authors see tacit and explicit knowledge as essentially distinct and complementary 
forms of knowledge. They argue that perception underlies the paradigm of tacit knowledge and that 
even in perceiving a simple object there are clues that cannot be specified. As Tsoukas (2003: 425) 
puts it: 'tacit and explicit knowledge are not two ends of a continuum but the two sides of the same 
coin; even the most explicit kind of knowledge is underlain by tacit knowledge'. However, while this 
last observation may hold, it can be argued that some knowledge is potentially more suited for 
display or manifestation (i.e. codification) than other knowledge.
The notion of completeness refers to 'the degree to which the knowledge for problem solving or 
completing tasks is entirely sufficient and available for the problem solver's use' (Turner and Makhija 
2006: 199). Knowledge completeness mirrors task uncertainty in the sense that knowledge is likely to 
be less complete when decision situations are new, instable or unpredictable. These situations 
reduce the likelihood that it is known what knowledge is required in advance to achieve goals. The 
potential variations in the requisite set of knowledge will often lead to more complicated search 
processes (MacDonald 1995a), such as knowledge sources that operate external of the organization. 
In contrast complete knowledge reflects task certainty and implies that all knowledge necessary for 
making a decision is available. Note that tacit knowledge may still be complete to perform particular 
tasks (Turner and Makhija 2006). Consider the deep knowledge of special manufacturing techniques 
used by a worker in a custom-made Italian shoe company. The worker has complete knowledge to 
manufacture custom-made shoes even though it may be highly embedded in this individual.
Diversity refers to the number of parameters required to characterize the knowledge in question. 
This is also addressed in the literature as 'knowledge complexity' (Kusonoki et al. 1998; Winter 1987; 
Zander and Kogut 1995). Highly diverse knowledge may come from distinct and multiple functional 
areas or disciplines or incorporates multiple complementary dimensions linked to the decision 
situation.
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Alternative perspectives on organizational knowledge
Next to the cognitive possession conceptualization of knowledge as a resource, which has been the 
dominant perspective of KBV, other viewpoints have emerged. Spender (1996) argues that a dynamic 
theory of the firm which is based on knowledge should not treat the concept as an 'ordinary' 
resource because it is not an observable and transferable commodity. In his view, the organization is 
not treated as a collection of rational agents. Rather it is argued that organizations learn and have 
collective knowledge and that the self identity of its members, meaning, and communication is 
influenced by the organization's evolving identity. The firm is seen as a system of knowing activity 
rather than a collection of knowledge resources that can be transferred across the organization.
Quite similar to Spender's thoughts is the constructionist, or social-process perspective on 
organizational knowledge (Blacker 1995; Brown and Duguid 1991; Cook and Brown 1999; Lave and 
Wenger 1991; Orr 1990). This perspective is descriptive in nature. It suggests that the treatment of 
knowledge as an ordinary resource is clearly incomplete. Authors in this stream advocate a more 
contextual, processual, and situated view of knowledge, with closer ties to organizational learning 
and social identity. This perspective proposes that reality is socially constructed or conceived and is 
based on social interaction. These social constructions involve plurality and diversity and come about 
through communication. In this view, a shift should take place from knowledge as a commodity that 
individuals and organizations may acquire to studying knowing as something that they do. It 
understands knowledge as a process, and for this reason it is called 'knowing'. It is always rooted in a 
context of interaction and acquired and applied through some form of participation. The firm is 
characterized as a 'community of practice' or 'activity system' where knowing is mediated by 
artifacts, and power relations and interests are key factors in the interpretation process.
Although our research will take a cognitive possession perspective which sees knowledge as an 
organizational resource, we recognize that knowledge is not an ordinary resource and that it can be 
adapted by interaction. Therefore we will avoid using the word 'transfer' which connotes that pieces 
of knowledge can be transferred from one place to the other while keeping the exact the same 
meaning.
2.2.2 Managing knowledge dynamics in product innovation
In addition to understanding knowledge and how it can become a source of competitive advantage, 
literature in this field has also studied the processes through which knowledge is managed. Thus 
besides discussing organizational knowledge's potential impact on competitive advantage and the 
nature and types of organizational knowledge this research also looks into knowledge dynamics and 
studies the micro-processes by which knowledge is generated or created, and integrated or used.
Including multiple levels and perspectives can result in a large number of distinct knowledge 
processes. For example, what for an individual is knowledge integration may be knowledge 
generation for an organizational group. Additionally, when studying knowledge processes at the 
group level, what is integration of current knowledge in the eyes of the sender may be the 
generation of new knowledge in the eyes of the receiver. For studying product development in
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mature and complex organizations, we will take the perspective of the functional group and consider 
two important knowledge dynamics: knowledge generation and knowledge integration.
Knowledge generation is the process by which functional knowledge is updated or renewed. In this 
context, 'functional' refers to relatively fixed knowledge frames of groups in organizations that are 
the result of task partitioning and specialization (i.e. research vs. marketing) and the configuration of 
authority by hierarchy (i.e. project members vs. senior management) (Kusonoki et al. 1998; Schulz
2001). This knowledge may be created by organizational members through research or 
experimentation or generated via external sources through scanning, searching and inter-firm 
collaboration. It can occur either through systematic processes consciously engaged in by 
organizational members or as an unintentional by-product of other processes (Huber 1991). 
Knowledge integration refers to the dissemination of function specific knowledge to other functions 
in the organization and applying it in product development to create the new idea, the new 
prototype and, finally, the new product (Grant, 1996b) (Figure 2.1).
-------- ►  = Knowledge generation
< ----- ►  = Knowledge integration
Figure 2.1: Knowledge generation and integration in product innovation (P.I.)
Knowledge dynamics in product innovation: the effect of social capital
To describe how dynamics in knowledge are influenced beyond the effect of knowledge attributes, 
we will use a social capital perspective. Given the social embeddedness of dynamics in organizational 
knowledge this perspective provides opportunities for systematic theoretical analyses (Nahapiet and 
Ghosal 1998). Because the social capital perspective uses networks of social actors to describe and 
analyze social affairs and productivity it is useful to identify a focal actor. Following the approach 
taken in the last section, the focal actor in our theoretical discussion will be the functional unit within 
the firm which is both involved in new product knowledge generation and integration. The impact of 
social capital on knowledge dynamics will be discussed by looking through the eyes of this network 
actor.
Although the social capital perspective is still in the early phases of its life cycle (Hirsch and Levin 
1999), several organizational theorists have made attempts to develop overarching definitions and
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integrative frameworks. Adler and Kwon (2002: 23) synthesized 19 definitions from a wide variety of 
fields resulting in the statement that 'social capital is the goodwill available to individuals or groups. 
Its source lies in the structure and content of the actor's social relations. Its effects flow from the 
information, influence and solidarity it makes available to the actors'. Social capital can be described 
as a resource that actors derive from specific social structures or from specific social relations. The 
ultimate value of social capital heavily depends on the task demands placed on the focal actor. What 
matters is the fit between the network and organizational goals (Krackhardt and Hanson 1993). 
Following authors such as Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) and Inkpen and Tsang (2005), social capital 
can be broken down into three distinct but interrelated dimensions: structural, relational, and 
cognitive.
From the perspective of the focal actor, the structural dimension of social capital reflects the level 
of connectedness, or who you can reach to generate and integrate knowledge (Burt 2000; 1992). The 
relational dimension of social capital refers to the strength of the relationship between the focal 
actor and other actors. Whereas the structural dimension primarily has its impact on the accessibility 
to actors, the relational dimension impacts the motivational aspect. Strong ties between actors 
reflect frequent contact, are usually long-term, reciprocal, and involve a strong degree of emotional 
closeness (Granovetter 1973). Actors rely on strong ties for advice and support, and are less reserved 
about making heavy investments in this type of relationship. Strong ties yield trust, norms, shared 
goals, and identification which support knowledge generation and integration (Hansen 1999; Inkpen 
and Tsang 2005; Nahapiet and Ghosal 1998). Opposed to strong ties, weak ties are temporal, 
transient and normally involve little emotional investment (Granovetter 1973). Weak ties also have 
their specific value in knowledge sharing and integration. Communication and idea exchange 
between actors that do not meet very often and know little about each other can provide new 
perspectives and provide new arguments for discussion. Although weak ties may hamper sharing 
ambiguous knowledge, investments in building them are often low and they can be a source of 
opportunity and new knowledge (Hansen 1999). The cognitive dimension of social capital refers to 
the representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning among actors. Although it is widely 
recognized that innovation happens through combining different knowledge resources and 
experiences, meaningful knowledge generation and integration requires at least some context 
sharing between actors (Moorman and Miner 1997; Nooteboom et al. 2007). Nahapiet and Ghosal
(1998) identify that context sharing may come about through the existence of shared language and 
through the sharing of collective narratives. These provide a frame of reference for observing and 
interpreting the environment and therefore may provide a common context for evaluating the 
benefits of knowledge sharing. In turn, this facilitates actual knowledge generation and integration. 
Related to the cognitive dimension of social capital is the notion of absorptive capacity as coined by 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990). This prominent theme in the literature on knowledge sharing refers to 
the network actor's abilities to recognize, assimilate and apply new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990; Lane et al. 2006; Zahra and George 2002). It is used in the context of both intra-firm (Gupta 
and Govindarajan 2000; Szulanski 1996) and extra-firm (Lane et al. 2006) knowledge sharing. A 
prerequisite of absorptive capacity is at least some overlap of cognitive frames. As Cohen and
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Levinthal (1990: 128) put it: 'the organization needs prior related knowledge to assimilate and use 
new knowledge'.
In short, social capital can thus be assumed to affect knowledge generation and integration by: 
providing access to actors with relevant knowledge or needs (structural); providing a common 
interest and an atmosphere of mutual trust and appreciation of the value of others' knowledge 
(relational); sharing a common ability that helps in understanding other actor's knowledge and as 
well as 'correct' interpretation and assessment of all knowledge (cognitive).
Facilitating knowledge dynamics in product innovation
Based on the argument that social capital plays a critical role in knowledge generation and 
integration, a set of organizational conditions can be proposed that influence actors' social capital 
and therefore has the potential to facilitate knowledge flows in product innovation (table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Conditions facilitating knowledge flows in product innovation
Social capital dimension Intra-firm knowledge flow  
(knowledge integration)
Inter-firm knowledge flow 
(knowledge generation)
Structural 
Establishing connections Personnel transfer between 
functions; Co-location; 
Decentralization of authority by 
senior management; Structural 
integration mechanisms; ICT 
infrastructure.
Boundary spanning function to 
establish and maintain external 
connections
Relational 
Enhancing tie strength Clear and transparent interrelated 
reward criteria and incentive 
systems
'Shadow of the future'
Cognitive 
Developing shared language and 
narratives
Boundary objects Boundary objects.
Personnel transfer and co-location between intra-firm actors (i.e. functions) establish additional 
connections on top of the more formal ties in which the latter are strengthened by the existence of 
the former (Griffin and Hauser 1996; Inkpen and Tsang 2005; Orlikowski 2002). Decentralization of 
authority enables functions to establish lateral ties on their own initiative. Because senior 
management approval is not always necessary, this mechanism changes the hierarchical network 
configuration in such a way that it facilitates timely sharing of ambiguous knowledge among network 
actors (Tsai 2002). Similarly, structural integration mechanisms such as integrating roles and 
departments, task forces and teams, and liaison roles change the network configuration in such a 
way that it enhances personal interaction and therefore the integration of knowledge (Grant 1996b; 
Griffin and Hauser 1996; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Moenaert et al. 2000). Although the 
contribution of the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure to knowledge
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integration is a subject of debate, it can play a supporting role by influencing the network 
configuration. Van den Hooff and Huysman (2009), for instance, found that the presence of an 
effective ICT infrastructure influences the structural dimension of social capital by helping to show 
where knowledge is located and improving organizational connectivity. Inter-firm relationships are 
not part of an established hierarchical network. From the perspective of the firm installing boundary 
spanning functions enhances the opportunity that it develops external connections providing access 
to external knowledge (Rowley et al. 2000; Tushman 1977).
It is argued that intra-firm networks are social structures of 'coopetition' between different 
functional specialists (Hill et al. 1992; Luo et al. 2006; Tsai 2002). While intra-firm cooperation has to 
occur for working towards overarching organizational goals, intra-firm competition results from 
direct comparisons between functions, limited tangible and intangible resources, divergent 
secondary goals and strategic priorities. When competition takes the overhand suspicion may replace 
trust and consequently knowledge sharing and integration may be sacrificed because of lack of 
collaboration. Clear and transparent interrelated reward criteria and incentive systems can reduce 
this mistrust among functional specialists and strengthen ties (Griffin and Hauser 1996). Within inter­
firm relationships, ties can be strengthened by developing a 'shadow of the future' (Parkhe 1993). A 
shadow of the future refers to the bond between anticipated future benefits of collaboration and 
present interactions between firms. Collaborative performance is better promoted the longer the 
shadow of the future, or the thicker the nexus between current moves and future consequences, 
since the forward-looking expectations diminish the tendency towards the violation of current 
agreements. Shadows of the future can be lengthened by long term collaborative goals, frequent 
partner interactions, and high behavioral transparency.
Boundary objects are key elements of knowledge representation that can provide for shared 
language and narratives to facilitate both knowledge generation and integration (Carlile 2002; Im and 
Rai 2008; Star 1989). The creation and management of boundary objects is a key process in 
developing and maintaining representation schemes across different actors. Examples in product 
development are prototypes, formalized models and shared processes. Common knowledge brought 
forward by these objects is used to negotiate and transform knowledge and resolve different 
interests among actors.
2.2.3 Organizational learning and product innovation
Although we have discussed some work on organizational knowledge that stresses knowledge 
dynamics, the organizational learning perspective primarily emphasizes the processes trough which 
knowledge changes or flows (Vera and Crossan 2003). In this research I follow the cognitive 
perspective on organizational learning (Chiva and Alegre 2005) which fits the cognitive possession 
perspective on organizational knowledge that was taken earlier. In agreeing with a growing group of 
theorists who emphasize the relationship between cognition and behavior it is argued that a learning 
process encompasses change on both aspects (Argyris and Schön 1978; Duncan and Weiss 1979; Fiol
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and Lyles 1985; Huber 1991)3. Individuals and groups seem to learn by understanding and then acting 
or vice-versa (Crossan et al. 1999).
Because of their intrinsic notion of change, organizational learning approaches have been 
associated with questions of how organizations evolve and transform (Barnett et al. 1994), renew 
themselves (Crossan et al. 1999; Henderson and Cockburn 1994; Leonard-Barton 1992), and perform 
product innovation (Lynn et al. 1999; McKee 1992; Michael and Palandjian 2004; Moorman 1995).
The cognitive perspective on organizational learning: two approaches
The cognitive perspective on organizational learning roughly consists of two approaches (Chiva and 
Alegre 2005; Cook and Yanow 1996). The first approach focuses on individual learning as a model for 
organizational learning. Thus, learning in organizations is based on human learning processes (Cyert 
and March 1963; Daft and Weick 1984; Hedberg 1981; Levitt and March 1988). This approach 
assumes that organizations are able to learn because they have similar or comparable capacities to 
those of individuals. Organizational learning is regarded as being more than the sum of the learning 
of its members. As was argued by Hedberg (1981: 6). 'Although organizational learning occurs 
through individuals, it would be a mistake to conclude that organizational learning is nothing but the
cumulative results of their members' learning... members come and go, and leadership changes,
but organizational memories preserve certain behaviors, mental maps, norms and values over time'. 
The second approach understands organizational learning as individual learning in organizational 
context (Dodgson 1993; March and Olson 1975; Shrivastava 1983; Simon 1991). Theorists following 
this approach consider organizational learning as being a type of individual learning carried out in 
organizations by key individuals whose learning is linked to possible organizational change. As Simon 
(1991: 176) argued: 'All learning takes place inside individual human heads; an organization learns in 
only two ways: a) by the learning of its members; or b) by ingesting new members who have 
knowledge the organization did not previously have'. Most authors, however, follow the first 
approach and perceive organizational learning to be somewhat more than the sum of individual 
learning of organizational members, although the role of individuals and their learning is also taken 
into account (Huysman 1999; Vera and Crossan 2003). By acknowledging the existence of non-human 
repositories of knowledge and organizational learning systems that allow firms to learn, to know, and 
to have a memory, this first approach is also adopted in this research. When individual and group 
learning becomes institutionalized, organizational learning occurs and knowledge is embedded in 
non-human repositories such as routines, systems, structures, culture and strategy (Crossan et al. 
1999; Nelson and Winter 1982; Walsh and Ungson 1991).
Organizational learning and performance: the importance of learning strategy
Researchers carry opposite viewpoints on the impact of learning on performance. One side of the
discussion is represented by scholars that emphasize a positive link between these constructs arguing
3 Additionally, it is recognized that there can be a time gap between these two types of change (Menon and 
Varadarajan 1992; Sitkin et al. 1998).
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that improved performance is learning (Cangalosi and Dill 1965; Fiol and Lyles 1985). On the other 
side, authors stress that the direct link between organizational learning and performance is not that 
obvious. As Miner and Mezias (1996) argue: 'although learning carries a positive connotation in many 
cultures, research on organizational learning clearly shows it may or may not produce good 
outcomes'. Additionally, Levitt and March (1988: 335) argue that 'learning does not always lead to 
intelligent behavior', while Huber (1991: 89) adds that 'learning does not always increase the 
learner's effectiveness, or even potential effectiveness .... entities can incorrectly learn, and they can 
correctly learn that what is incorrect'. Finally, by reviewing the organizational learning literature, 
Crossan and colleagues (1999) conclude that good performance is not a sign of learning and that 
learning may negatively impact performance. This research joins this latter group. It is claimed that 
the effectiveness of learning can only be assessed if contextual, and in particular strategic, variables 
are included. Only when the organizational learning strategy matches the organizational strategy the 
impact of learning can be positive (Vera and Crossan 2003). If this match is not achieved, learning 
may have no impact or even a negative impact on performance. Recently, researchers have started 
to develop learning or knowledge strategy constructs. Bierly and Chakrabarti (1996), for instance, 
define a knowledge strategy as the set of strategic choices that shape and direct organizational 
learning processes and determine the firm's knowledge base. Another definition comes from Zack 
(1999) who suggests that a knowledge strategy describes the overall approach an organization 
intends to take to align its knowledge resources and capabilities to the intellectual requirements of 
its business strategy. Through a knowledge strategy, organizations identify the knowledge required 
to execute their strategic intent, compare that to the existing knowledge base and recognize 
knowledge gaps and opportunities for learning. A common challenge in developing and 
implementing a learning strategy is combining exploration and exploitation (Argote 1999; Bierly and 
Chakrabarti 1996; March 1991; Zack 1999).
Combining exploration and exploitation in organizational learning
Some of the earliest theoretical contributions relevant to exploration and exploitation can be found 
in the work of Cyert and March (1963). These authors posit problematic search and slack search as 
drivers of organizational change in general and innovation in particular (Greve 2007). This work 
addresses the fundamental assertion in strategic management and organizational theory that 
successful organizations and other adaptive systems balance conflicting demands of today's 
operations while preparing for tomorrows opportunities and challenges4. Over the last two decades 
March's (1991) seminal discourse on combining exploration and exploitation in organizational 
learning has caught the imagination of researchers in framing theoretical propositions and guiding 
empirical research. Next to organizational learning, March's approach has been applied to product 
innovation, organizational design, organizational adaptation, and strategy making and 
implementation (Gupta et al. 2006; Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008).
4 Similar ideas have pervaded in other classical works such as Penrose's (1959) 'growth trajectories' and 
Thompson's (1967) 'paradox of administration'.
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March (1991) proposes that all activity includes at least some learning. Even when an organization 
attempts to do nothing more than replicate past actions it accumulates experience and moves down 
the learning curve, albeit in an incremental manner (Yelle 1979). For adaptive systems there is no 
such thing as perfect replication. Thus, there is always some learning even if this is very little and 
serves only to reduce variation around a historical mean. Additionally, March proposes that 
organizational learning consists of exploration and exploitation, which are two fundamentally 
different learning activities, between which organizations have to divide their time and resources. 
Whereas exploration refers to notions such as variation, search, and experimentation, exploitation is 
associated with activities such as updating, refinement, choice, and implementation (Gupta et al. 
2006; March 1991). Combining these two activities represents a tension between old and new. It 
embodies a struggle between the comfort of the past and the uncertainty of the future. While 
exploration results in variation, exploitation benefits the selection and retention stages of the 
learning cycle (Zollo and Winter 2002). Exploration and exploitation may therefore require 
fundamentally different strategies, mental models, systems, and practices (Crossan et al. 1999; 
March 1991). As such, organizational learning often presents a paradox: the simultaneous presence 
of contradictory elements (Lewis 2000; Poole and Van de Ven 1989; Quinn and Cameron 1988). 
March's twin concepts reflect other classifications of different modes of learning such as double loop 
versus single loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1978), generative versus adaptive learning (Senge 
1990), long jump versus local search (Levinthal 1997), and radical versus incremental learning (Miner 
and Mezias 1996).
Following March's (1991) observation of the inherent tension between the two activities, some 
strategy scholars suggest that firms should choose one learning mode over the other (Barney 1991; 
Miller and Friesen 1986; Porter 1980). It is argued that organizations that pursue both activities are 
sacrificing internal consistency, which will lead to inferior overall performance if compared to more 
focused firms. These arguments are, however, contrary to March's belief that organizations have to 
pursue both types of learning despite the challenges involved. He argues that problems and tensions 
will invariably arise if organizations focus on one of these at the expense of the other. Embracing 
learning paradoxes and tap their potential for organizational renewal becomes specifically relevant in 
today's organizational environments. As competition intensifies and the pace of change accelerates, 
combining exploration and exploitation becomes a crucial capability for survival (Brown and 
Eisenhardt 1997). In the industry for mobile phone devices, for instance, firms should explore new 
technologies and markets (i.e. exploration) and at the same time refine their operational processes 
to keep costs at an increasingly lower level (i.e. exploitation). This view has led to the proposition 
that organizations capable of pursuing both exploration and exploitation are, eventually, more likely 
to achieve superior performance than organizations emphasizing one at the expense of the other 
(Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). Researchers of organization have pointed out traps that firms can fall 
into if they, consciously or unconsciously, ignore this learning paradox (Levinthal and March 1993; 
Miller 1992).
Organizations that principally pursue exploration run a risk because their returns are difficult to 
estimate a priori and may take a long term to materialize, if at all. As Levinthal and March (1993: 105)
37
Theoretical background
argue, these firms run the risk of falling into the failure trap in which they turn 'into frenzies of
experimentation...by a dynamic of failure'. These entities will ordinarily suffer from the fact that
they will never gain the returns of their knowledge. Failure to exploit new knowledge leads to search 
for new knowledge which leads to failure to exploit and so on. In contrast, organizations that will 
only go for exploitation usually will receive returns that are proximate and predictable but not 
necessary sustainable. These organizations run the risk of falling into the success trap where they 
discover the 'short term virtue of local refinement and the folly of exploration' (Levinthal and March 
1993: 105). As continuous exploitation causes greater and greater competence in a particular 
activity, they engage in that activity more, thus further increasing competence and the opportunity 
costs of exploration. This narrow search may lead to increasingly rigid cognitive maps, strategies, 
routines and practices and highly specialized competences that may become core rigidities (Leonard­
Barton 1992) or core incompetences (Dougherty 1995). An excessive focus on exploitation may 
enhance short-term performance but can result in a capability trap as organizations may not be able 
to respond adequately to environmental changes (Ahuja and Lampert 2001; Levitt and March 1988)5.
Exploration and exploitation and performance
Despite the rapidly expanding number of studies referring to combining exploration and exploitation, 
eventually, leading to higher performance, empirical tests and evidence have just started to emerge 
(Uotila et al. 2009). He and Wong (2004) were among the first who tested the 'combining 
hypothesis'. Based on data from 204 Asian manufacturing firms and in the context of technological 
innovation strategies they found evidence that the interaction between simultaneous exploration 
and exploitation is positively related to sales growth rate while the relative imbalance between the 
twin concepts is negatively related to sales growth rate. Additionally, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004), 
based on data from 4,195 individuals in 41 business units, found evidence that a business unit's 
capacity to simultaneously achieve high levels of exploration and exploitation was significantly 
related to its higher performance. Lubatkin and colleagues (2006) tested the effect of combining 
exploration and exploitation on firm performance by using a dataset of 139 small and medium-sized 
enterprises. These authors found that combining an exploitative and exploratory orientation 
positively affects performance. A study by Uotila and colleagues (2009) investigated the trade-off 
between exploration and exploitation and tested its effect on firm market value. Based on data from 
279 S&P 500 manufacturing firms spanning the years 1989 - 2004, these authors found an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between the relative share of exploration and firm market value. Additionally 
they found that this relationship was positively moderated by the research intensity of the industry 
and that solely relying on exploitation benefits the market value of firms in low research intensive 
industries. Thus, these authors find evidence that the benefits of balancing exploration and 
exploitation might be contingent upon the environment an organization faces (see also Benner and 
Tushman 2003; Gupta et al. 2006; Jansen et al. 2006; Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003 for the
5 If mature organizations fall into a learning trap it is more likely that they fall into the success trap than into the 
failure trap, because they already gain returns from their ongoing operations (Beckman 2006; Benner and 
Tushman 2003; 2002; Uotila et al. 2009).
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moderating impact of environmental dynamism). Finally, Venkatraman et al. (2007) tested the 
effects of both simultaneously and sequentially combining exploration and exploitation on firm 
performance using data from a sample of 1,500 software firms. While simultaneously balancing 
exploration and exploitation did not have a significant effect on firm performance, sequentially 
balancing exploration and exploitation had a significant positive effect. Additionally, these authors 
argued that differences in firm resources might have moderated the effect of simultaneously 
combining the twin concepts on firm performance.
Thus, for most contemporary organizations that want to be successful in the long run, the message 
is to be active in both exploration and exploitation. The ability to achieve this combination has been 
said to lie at the heart of an organization's dynamic capabilities (Ancona et al. 2001; Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000; Teece et al. 1997) and has caused a significant number of organizational researchers to 
shift from trade-off to paradoxical thinking (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000; Lewis 2000; Poole and Van 
de Ven 1989; Prud'homme van Reine and Dankbaar 2009; Quinn and Cameron 1988).
Exploration and exploitation in the context of really new product innovation
Because product innovation is considered as a critical strategic option for firm growth and 
adaptation, its successful implementation demonstrates a firm's capability of effective organizational 
learning (von Hippel 1994). As such, it is no surprise that exploration and exploitation are profoundly 
used in the context of product innovation. However, haziness in terminology remains (Gupta et al. 
2006; Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008).
Some of this ambiguity results from researchers using different levels of analysis. Most work on 
the twin concepts in the context of product innovation has focused on the product innovation 
portfolio level (Li et al. 2008b; Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008)6. From this perspective, exploitation is 
attributed to refining current products for current markets, or incremental product innovation, while 
exploration points to experimenting with new ideas, or really new product innovation (Benner and 
Tushman 2002; He and Wong 2004; Jansen et al. 2006). However, another possibility is taking a more 
detailed perspective and attributing exploitation and exploration to changes in the knowledge 
resources that underpin new products (Cheng and Van de Ven 1996; Danneels 2002; Katila and Ahuja 
2002; McGrath 2001). In the latter case, exploitation refers to updating existing firm knowledge 
resources and using this knowledge in product innovation, while exploration is about generating new 
knowledge and its usage in innovation activities.
For incremental product innovation, the difference in perspective yields limited interpretation 
problems: the refinement of current products for current markets is solely based on updating 
existing knowledge resources and using them in product innovation activities. In contrast, different 
viewpoints may lead to ambiguity in the case of really new product innovation. While some may see 
this set of activities as pure exploration, others might argue that the process is based on combining
6 Li et al. (2008b) also identify studies that attribute exploration and exploitation in the context of product 
innovation to less detailed levels of analysis such as the corporate group level and the industry level. However, 
from their literature review it appears that these studies only represent a fraction of the total number of 
papers on the topic.
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exploitation and exploration in underlying knowledge resources. From a more detailed perspective, 
instead of solely building on new knowledge, the majority of really new product ideas combine 
knowledge resources that already reside in the firm with knowledge that is newly generated 
(Danneels 2002; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004). In these cases, existing knowledge provides the 
necessary absorptive capacity to use new knowledge, and ideas are a synthesis between a problem 
and its solution where neither the problem nor solution is new in itself (Kogut and Zander 1992; Luo
2002). Thus, a detailed perspective permits a more granular view which opens up the possibility to 
study variation at the subsystem level. Within the context of really new product innovation the 
exploration/exploitation combination may vary. Some components might be the result of exploration 
while others might be produced by exploitation (Gatignon et al. 2002). BMW's new Rolls-Royce 
Phantom model, for instance, used elements that were taken from BMW's existing 7-series vehicles 
(exploitation) and components that were completely new to the firm (exploration) (Raisch and 
Birkinshaw 2008: 401).
2.2.4 Combining exploration and exploitation in organizational learning
Although various scholars have stressed the importance of combining exploration and exploitation in 
organizational learning, the question how firms actually resolve this learning paradox has gained 
much less attention (Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008).
As was discussed before, firms can accept the tension between exploration and exploitation, 
choose one learning mode over the other, and align their organization to the mode of choice. In this 
case, the firm develops an organizational configuration based on internally consistent elements. For 
instance, it is well known that mechanistic configurations, which rely on standardization, 
centralization, and formalization, support exploitation but hinder exploration. In contrast, organic 
organizations, which have high levels of decentralization and autonomy, fit innovative activities such 
as exploration but are less suited for exploitation (Burns and Stalker 1961). Another possibility to 
accept the learning paradox has been to externalize either exploration or exploitation through 
outsourcing or establishing alliances (Holmqvist 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; Rothaermel and 
Deeds 2004). For example, a significant part of really new product development in the 
pharmaceutical industry happens through collaborations between small biotech firms that focus on 
exploration and 'Big Pharma' addressing exploitation.
Next to accepting the learning paradox, firms may develop ambidextrous organizations that 
resolve the tension between exploration and exploitation and tap their potential for organizational 
renewal. In general, organizational ambidexterity refers to the organization being able to do two 
different things at the same time (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004). The term was introduced by Duncan 
(1976) who used it to describe organizations that were able to design dual architectures that 
facilitated both the initiation and the implementation phases of the innovation process7. More 
recently, Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) described ambidextrous organizations as complex
7 Although Duncan (1976) was the first to use the term, according to Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008) it was 
March's (1991) article on exploration and exploitation that acted as catalyst for the current interest in the 
topic.
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organizational forms composed of mechanistic and organic elements that are collectively capable of 
operating simultaneously for exploration and exploitation. Given the paradoxical nature of combining 
and synchronizing exploration and exploitation, it should be noticed that developing ambidextrous 
organizations is a complex task. In general, literature describes two ways of how organizations may 
become ambidextrous and resolve the organizational learning paradox. These different approaches 
can be identified by their difference in organizational structure and senior management roles (Raisch 
and Birkinshaw 2008).
One group of studies has emphasized structural differentiation, which refers to the subdivision of 
exploration and exploitation into distinct organizational units each with a suitable organizational 
context for one learning task. In this approach, exploitation takes place in the mainstream 
organization that is responsible for the running business and has a mechanistic organizational 
configuration, while exploration should happen in smaller, more decentralized and flexible units that 
focus on new directions (Benner and Tushman 2002; Christensen 1997; Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). 
However, because exploration and exploitation have to be combined to create long-term value, the 
coexistence of exploration and exploitation in different units is an important yet insufficient 
condition for organizational ambidexterity. Therefore, several researchers have pointed to the 
importance of combining structural differentiation with senior management integration across 
differentiated units (Benner and Tushman 2003; O'Reilly and Tushman 2008; Smith and Tushman 
2005; Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). Senior managers should develop an overarching and compelling 
strategic intent and have a large stake in explicitly integrating exploration and exploitation. Although 
it is acknowledged that integration at high organizational levels is important, some recently emerged 
research has advocated lower level integration mechanisms between the two units as well. Based on 
data from a detailed case study in a fashion company Tran (2008), for instance, illustrates that the 
organization used several processes and organizational routines to integrate and coordinate the 
overall development of synergies between their main collection (exploitation) and their catch-up 
collections (exploration). Similarly, Jansen and colleagues (2009) found that besides top management 
integration also lateral organizational interfaces between exploration and exploitation units can 
contribute to the effectiveness of pursuing the twin concepts simultaneously.
A second group of studies has focused on structural integration and emphasized behavioral 
mechanisms that allow organizations to pursue exploration and exploitation within the same unit 
(Adler and Borys 1996; Adler et al. 1999; Ghoshal and Bartlett 1994; Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; 
McDonough and Leifer 1983; Sheremata 2000). Because in these organizations the majority of 
organizational members rely on the same basic experiences, values and capabilities to carry out both 
learning tasks, there is a certain risk that they fall into the success trap, in which exploitation drives 
out exploration (Inkpen and Tsang 2005; Levinthal and March 1993). To lower this risk, scholars have 
proposed that single organizations should develop multiple structures. In these cases, the integrated 
organizational context should be complemented by 'tactical' differentiation practices such as, setting 
up project teams, quality circles, and job enrichment schemes, which enable organizational members 
to make choices and move back and forth between a more bureaucratic structure for exploitation 
and a more organic structure for exploration. Again senior management has an important role. As
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key leaders in organizations they should put in place strategies and systems that shape the 
exploration and exploitation behavior of organizational members acting on a lower hierarchical level 
(Ghoshal and Bartlett 1994; Smith 2006) or play a more catalytic role, in which they promote 
ambidextrous ideas that emerge bottom up (Floyd and Lane 2000; Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004).
Because neither differentiation with tactical integration nor integration with tactical 
differentiation may allow for maximizing both exploration and exploitation, an organizational 
designer's task is to determine the right degree of differentiation and integration in organizational 
structure. It is speculated that the right degree depends on the relative importance of exploration 
and exploitation in organizational tasks (Raisch et al. 2009). Additionally, most literature on 
organizational ambidexterity has taken a static viewpoint and recommends fixed positions (e.g. 
Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). However, modern contingency theory has brought to light that 
alignment between exploration and exploitation is often a dynamic process rather than something 
that ends in a steady state. Organizations frequently need to reconfigure to adapt to changing 
internal and external contingencies (Short et al. 2008; Siggelkow 2002). Cheng and Van de Ven 
(1996), for instance, found that the initiation phase of product innovation was characterized by high 
levels of exploration while the implementation phase showed increasing levels of exploitation (see 
also Zaltman et al. 1973). Although some literature on organizational ambidexterity has taken a 
dynamic perspective, it remains unclear how small differentiated units that are designed for 
exploration evolve over time. Several studies point to the benefits of temporary decentralization in 
which mainstream organizations use differentiated units for exploration and then reintegrate them 
in later phases of the innovation life cycle when exploitation becomes more dominant (Siggelkow 
and Levinthal 2003; Westerman et al. 2006). In contrast, a second group of studies has shown that 
differentiated units can remain differentiated from the mainstream organization for long periods of 
time despite increasing levels of exploitation. For example, Raisch (2008) showed that the premium 
coffee maker Nespresso started out as a rather autonomous unit within the Nestlé Group and 
maintained this position for over two decades even though the level of exploitation in activities 
increased.
2.2.5 Summary
This second section discussed really new product innovation from a knowledge management 
perspective. It defined knowledge attributes and addressed that knowledge (approached from a 
cognitive possession perspective) and its dynamics are important for really new product innovation 
and firm competitive advantage. Knowledge generation from the external environment and its 
integration with other relevant product innovation knowledge resources were identified as major 
knowledge flows in really new product innovation. Based on different social capital dimensions 
(structural, relational, and cognitive) of a focal actor (functional department) we have proposed 
specific conditions for facilitating knowledge flows. This section also shed light on knowledge 
dynamics from the perspective of organizational learning, which allows for linking knowledge 
dynamics to firm level strategies. Specific attention was given to exploration and exploitation in 
organizational learning and the importance of combining these twin concepts for firm survival. This
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section concluded with discussing different perspectives on the meaning of exploration and 
exploitation in the context of product innovation and identifying different organizational approaches 
for combining exploration and exploitation in organizational learning within the firm.
Extending the theoretical perspective of 'product innovation as information processing' with work 
on creating and integrating knowledge and organizational learning allowed for developing a more 
detailed perspective on really new product development projects. However, we think that 
complementing the two research streams with work from the field of marketing can bring another 
perspective to the table and convey relevant insights that, until now, had limited consideration.
2.3 A marketing perspective on product innovation
Overall, the marketing literature is well positioned to participate in the initial understanding of how 
firms resolve the market learning paradox in the course of really new product innovation projects. A 
necessary component of product innovation performance is product effectiveness which depends on 
satisfying customer needs better (or more efficiently) than competitors (Brown and Eisenhardt 
1995). Research in marketing is intrinsically customer- and competitor-focused and thus highly 
relevant when studying how a firm learns from the market during product innovation (Dahan and 
Hauser 2002; Hauser et al. 2006; Verhoef and Leeflang 2009). To complement the theoretical 
perspectives in our research, this section will discuss the specifics of interacting with the market 
environment in product innovation and the management of this process. More specifically, we will 
present contributions of the literature on market orientation and market oriented product 
innovation. This section will be concluded by a summary.
2.3.1 Introducing market orientation
During the 1950s and 1960s, marketing thought was moving from the world of mere techniques to 
the broader field of management (Webster 2002). A rising number of scholars argued that customer 
satisfaction should be the guiding principle of firms and the ultimate aim of organizational activities. 
Peter Drucker (1959: 37), for instance, asserted that the only valid definition of business purpose is to 
create a satisfied customer'8. This perspective has traditionally been associated with the term 
marketing concept which 'maintains that all areas of the firm should be customer oriented, all 
marketing activities should be integrated, and profit, not just sales, should be the objective' (Hunt 
and Morgan 1995: 11). It took until the 1990s before the analytical work on implementing the 
marketing concept was performed (Lafferty and Hult 2001). This happened under the flag of market 
orientation. The relevance of market orientation in the marketing literature is clearly demonstrated 
by the market orientation construct totally superseding that of the marketing concept in the 
academic debate of the 1990s. As Hunt and Lambe (2000: 25) put it: 'If there were any contributions 
that marketing could make to business strategy that might be considered universally to be uniquely 
marketing, it would be that of market orientation'. Initially two perspectives on market orientation 
emerged which, to some extent, can be considered as opposite viewpoints (Day 1994a; Homburg and
o
For additional work from this period see also Levitt (1960), Kotler (1967), and McNamara (1972).
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Pflesser 2000; Hunt and Morgan 1996; Jaworski and Kohli 1996; Lafferty and Hult 2001). The first 
perspective is centered on behavior, while the second perspective has a cultural viewpoint.
The behaviorists see market orientation as a set of information processing activities. Although a 
number of scholars take this perspective9, most of these studies are based on the foundations built 
by Kohli and Jaworski (1990), incorporating measures in Kohli, Jaworski, and Kumar (1993), and 
Ruekert (1992). Through an analysis of previous literature and a series of interviews with marketing 
and non-marketing managers in a wide variety of industries, these authors defined market 
orientation as: 'The organization-wide generation of market intelligence pertaining to current and 
future customer needs, dissemination of the intelligence across departments, and organization-wide 
responsiveness to it' (Kohli and Jaworski 1990: 6). The behaviorists highlight the information content 
that denotes market orientation. A firm can consider itself more or less market oriented depending 
on the ability to process market information. Kohli and Jaworski (1990) conceptualized market 
information as a broad concept going beyond the verbalized needs and preferences of customers. 
They included monitoring competitors' actions and their effect on customer preferences, as well as 
other exogenous factors such as government regulations, and technology and environmental forces. 
The responsiveness to market information can take the form of selecting the appropriate target 
markets, and designing, producing, promoting and distributing products that meet current and 
anticipated customer needs.
The other widely adopted perspective is the cultural view10, which regards market orientation as a 
business philosophy embedded in the firm's culture. Its foundations were built by Narver and Slater 
(1990). These authors (1990: 21) saw market orientation as 'the organizational culture that most 
effectively and efficiently creates the necessary behaviors for the creation of superior value for 
buyers and, thus, continuous superior performance for the business.' Although Narver and Slater 
defined market orientation as organizational culture, they put it into operation with three behavioral 
components: customer orientation, competitor orientation, and interdepartmental coordination. 
Thus it appears that organizational culture represents market orientation itself, while market 
information processing is its behavioral consequence. In contrast with Kohli and Jaworkski (1990), 
these authors place a greater emphasis on competitor information.
While there are pros and cons to both the behavioral and the cultural view of market orientation 
with respect to conceptualization and measurement (Oczkowski and Farrell 1998), and there is a 
debate on the value of each perspective (Jaworski and Kohli 1996; Lafferty and Hult 2001), both 
conceptualizations share certain similarities. First, information on customer needs and wants is 
central to market orientation. Second, both balance an internal and external organizational 
perspective. Third, there is an explicit sentiment that the whole firm should respond to identified 
customer needs. Fourth, the scope of market orientation goes beyond customers and incorporates 
competitors and the forces shaping customer needs such as technology, regulations and the like.
9 See for an overview of studies, for instance, Lafferty and Hult (2001)
10 A critical contribution to the conception and modeling of market orientation as organizational culture can be 
found in Harris and Ogbonna (1999).
44
Theoretical background
Market orientation and related concepts
The market orientation stream of literature has some overlap with several other theoretical concepts 
(Jaworski and Kohli 1996; Morgan 2003) of which two important ones have already been discussed in 
earlier sections: organizational learning and dynamic capabilities. In the remainder of this section 
related concepts are compared and contrasted with the market orientation construct with the 
purpose to elaborate on their relationship.
The marketing literature is characteristic in detecting elements in cognate disciplines and 
introducing them within the perspective of mainstream marketing (Zinkhan 1999). As a consequence, 
organizational learning has been touched upon by several marketing scholars. It can be argued that 
the description of organizational learning presents similarities with the concept of market 
orientation. They both help to explain the critical organizational capability of market sensing, are 
concerned with organizational wide phenomena such as culture and norms, and encompass 
relationships and interdependencies between individuals and groups and the coordinated use of 
both tangible and intangible resources (Bell et al. 2002: 79). The marketing field proposes that for a 
firm to sustain competitive advantage it has to learn faster on how to create superior customer value 
than its competitors (Day 1994a; 1994b). Research has suggested (Slater and Narver 1995) and 
empirically verified (Baker and Sinkula 1999a; 1999b; Sinkula et al. 1997) a complementary role of 
the construct 'learning orientation', next to a market orientation, to support market information 
processing. Additionally, Sinkula (1994) discussed market information processing as market-based 
organizational learning consisting of the acquisition, distribution, interpretation and storage of 
market information. Sinkula's approach offers several insights which enrich market orientation 
thought (Jaworski and Kohli, 1996). First, the market orientation perspective implicitly suggests that 
market information is interpreted by the person(s) acquiring this information prior to disseminating 
it. In contrast, Sinkula's approach suggests that interpretation may also occur after the information is 
shared with others. Second, his approach is more explicit on memory (i.e. storage) shaping the 
nature of acquisition and dissemination within organizations. Third, where market orientation tends 
to focus on information generation from external sources, Sinkula's approach suggests that market 
information may also be generated from internal sources such as company databases.
Marketing scholars have also combined the dynamic capabilities approach with market 
orientation. In an influential work, Day (1994a: 38) defines capabilities as 'complex bundles of skills 
and accumulated knowledge, exercised through organizational processes, that enable firms to 
coordinate activities and make use of their assets'. He classifies capabilities depending on the focus 
of the processes into inside-out capabilities, outside-in capabilities and spanning capabilities. Inside 
out capabilities form one end of the spectrum and have an internal focus. They are deployed from 
the inside out and activated by market requirements, competitive challenges, and external 
opportunities. Examples are 'manufacturing' and 'technology development'. At the other end of the 
spectrum are outside-in capabilities whose focal point is almost exclusively outside the organization. 
The purpose of these outside-in capabilities is to connect the other capabilities to the external 
environment, enabling the business to compete by anticipating market requirements and creating 
durable relationships. Finally, spanning capabilities are needed to integrate both inside-out and
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outside-in capabilities. For example, product innovation, which is a spanning capability in Day's 
terms, must be informed both from external and internal analyses. Day argues that market driven 
organizations are specifically superior in two outside-in capabilities: market sensing and customer 
linking. While a market sensing capability is, in essence, comparable with market orientation, the 
author complements it with a customer linking capability. This capability can be defined as the 
capability to create and manage close customer and channel member relationships. A similar 
addition is made by Srivastava et al. (2001) who link the resource based view and capabilities 
thinking to marketing. Next to a firm's intellectual market based assets, which are developed through 
market information processing activities, these authors identify relational market based assets. These 
assets are built through developing close relations with customers to the point that they may be 
relatively rare and difficult to replicate by competitors. From a market information perspective, 
including this relational perspective adds another relevant customer information dimension. Besides 
information on customer needs and wants one can also conceptualize customer contact information 
(Zahay et al. 2004).
In sum, it can be argued that insights from organizational learning and dynamic capabilities have 
enriched the market orientation construct. The adoption of organizational learning has focused the 
attention to the importance of cognitive elements such information interpretation and organizational 
memory in market information processing. Insights from the field of dynamic capabilities have put 
the spotlight on the importance of customer relationships and customer linking capabilities, next to 
market information processing, for market orientation and firm performance.
2.3.2 Market oriented product development
Until the mid-90s, market orientation models did not explain why an organization that systematically 
generates, disseminates and utilizes market information is able to attain better performance than a 
firm that does not undertake such activities. The question is: in what way can adopting a market 
orientation enable an organization to attain competitive advantage? One of the answers is better 
product innovation. The rationale is that a market oriented culture and the associated information 
processing behaviors reduce risk associated with performing product development. Specifically from 
the mid-90s onwards, many studies link market orientation, or closely related conceptualizations, to 
product development activities and/or product innovation performance (Atuahene-Gima 1995; 
Atuahene-Gima et al. 2005; Baker and Sinkula 2007; Gatignon and Xuereb 1997; Kyriakopoulos and 
Moorman 2004; Li and Calantone 1998; Moorman 1995; Narver et al. 2004; Ottum and Moore 1997; 
Veldhuizen et al. 2006). Additionally, studies have analyzed the mediating power of product 
innovation in the market orientation - performance relationship (Baker and Sinkula 1999a; Han et al. 
1998; Langerak et al. 2004; Zhou et al. 2005). A meta-analysis performed by Kirca et al. (2005), which 
included 114 studies, empirically verified that a market orientation, generally, has a positive 
influence on organizational performance via the organizational capability of product development11.
11 Organizational performance was measured by cost-based performance indicators, which reflect performance 
after accounting for the costs of implementing a strategy (e.g. profit measures), revenue-based performance
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Deeper analyses revealed that a market orientation positively influences the creation of new 
products, and that new products enable the organization to meet the evolving needs of customers, 
thus influencing customer loyalty and the perceived quality of a firm's products. In turn, the 
elements of customer loyalty and perceived quality positively influence organizational performance.
Furthermore, findings from the product innovation literature report the importance of a market 
perspective for product development effectiveness as well. Already in the late 1970s, Cooper (1979) 
concluded that a strong market orientation was one of the controllable factors that contributed to 
new product success. Several important product development studies echo these findings. In their 
meta-analysis, Montoya-Weiss and Calantone (1994) conclude that the proficiency of marketing 
activities during the product development process has a strong positive effect on new product 
advantage. In a similar vein, the literature review of Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) argues that a 
significant number of studies highlight the importance of customer involvement for the effectiveness 
of product concepts and better product designs. According to Cooper (2001), a failure to build in the 
voice of the customer, a poor competitor analysis, and limited understanding of market trends are 
common weaknesses found in many studies on new product failures. Contrary to general 
expectations, a market orientation may also improve product development efficiency (Burchill and 
Fine 1997; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1994b). For example, based on an analysis of data from 103 
product development projects from the chemical industry, Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1994) found 
that including a customer viewpoint into the new product process did not increase but actually 
reduced product development cycle time.
Market orientation and really new product innovation
While a market orientation generally is regarded as positive in the context of product innovation, 
there has also been criticism. Already in the 1970s and 1980s, Tauber (1974), Bennet and Cooper 
(1979; 1981), and Hayes and Abernathy (1980) claimed that the excessive focus of firms on expressed 
customers needs reduced their capacity to generate really new products, which are based on 
satisfying latent customer needs. It was argued that being market oriented locks the firm into its 
current customer base, thereby causing the firm to miss out on the wave of new technologies and 
emerging customer needs (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). A decade later, following the same line of 
reasoning, Christensen and Bower (1996) opened this debate once again with their longitudinal study 
on the disk drive industry. These authors showed how leading firms in the technology that 
dominated the industry at a certain point in time, systematically lost their leadership when new 
technology came about. The authors argued that this happened because too much emphasis was 
placed on customers' expressed needs in allocating investments for product innovation. On the 
contrary, winning companies took risks and invested resources in more innovative projects that did 
not seem to have great market potential at start but proved to be products that later dominated the 
market. The losing companies listened too carefully to their customers that simply were not aware of
indicators (e.g. sales and market share), and manager's perceptions of overall business performance (e.g. 
comparisons of organizational performance with company objectives and/or competitors' performance).
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new technological developments and therefore did not express a need for them. Christensen (1997) 
subsequently examined a variety of other industries and identified the same pattern. Additionally, 
similar ideas have been put forward by other researchers (Berthon et al. 1999; Frosch 1996; 
MacDonald 1995b).
Specifically Christensen and Bower's article gave rise to a series of comments in Strategic 
Management Journal articulating different positions in the debate on the effects of market 
orientation on product innovation performance. Slater and Narver (1998) draw a distinction between 
customer orientation and market orientation. Firms that adopt the former emphasize customer 
expressed needs while firms emphasizing the latter develop long term thinking, a desire to satisfy 
existing customers' latent needs and search for new customers and market opportunities. (see also 
Connor 1999; Ketchen et al. 2007; Slater and Narver 1999). In the context of this debate, Danneels 
(2003) analyzed the paradox of tight linkages with customers and their benefits for product 
innovation performance. By borrowing the notion of tight and loose coupling (Orton and Weick 1990) 
he illustrated how firms forged tight customer links, in which cognitions and actions reinforced each 
other, and became increasingly focused on them. However, this tight coupling came at a price of 
increased commitment and restricted vision. Therefore he argued that firms should put effort in 
balancing the natural process of tight coupling with a deliberate process of loose coupling. In a 
subsequent study, Danneels (2007) used a dynamic capabilities perspective and illustrated that the 
leverage of existing technology to address needs of customers from unserved markets required loose 
coupling to be complemented by a marketing capability to build new customer linkages.
Market orientation, alternative perspectives, and really new product development 
Although important market orientation scholars agree that market oriented firms are also capable of 
addressing latent customer needs and leading customers during really new product development 
(Day 1994a; Kohli et al. 1993; Slater and Narver 1998; Slater and Narver 1999) it took some time to 
adopt and communicate this position. Several researchers initially emphasized that next to a market 
orientation, firms needed additional strategic orientations to address both expressed and latent 
customer needs such as an entrepreneurial orientation (Atuahene-Gima and Ko 2001; Slater and 
Narver 1995; Zhou et al. 2005).
Later research has argued that the debate and confusion regarding the effect of market 
orientation on different types of product innovation is heavily influenced by the original market 
orientation measurement instruments. Some scholars believe that the market orientation constructs 
are too narrowly put into operation to capture the effect of market orientation on lead-the-customer 
innovation activities. Most notably, Narver et al. (2004) argue that the concept of market orientation 
benefits both customer led (i.e. incremental) and lead-the-customer (i.e. really new) product 
development but that current measures assess market oriented behavior that is associated only to 
customer-led processes. In solving this problem, they re-operationalize the market orientation 
construct as having two elements: responsive market orientation and proactive market orientation. 
Responsive market orientation refers to the generation, dissemination and use of market 
information pertaining to current customers and product domains, focuses on expressed customer
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needs, and is associated with incremental product innovation. In contrast, proactive market 
orientation is concerned with discovering and satisfying latent customer needs, has the potential to 
direct the firm to new technology, and is connected with really new product innovation12. Using the 
new measures in analyzing business unit product innovation portfolio success, Narver et al. (2004) 
find that a proactive market orientation is relatively more associated with innovativeness and plays 
an important positive role in explaining product innovation success. Using similar measures 
Atuahene-Gima et al. (2005) analyze both the individual relationships between each type of market 
orientation and their interaction effect on business unit product innovation performance. Using data 
from 175 U.S. business units from a wide variety of manufacturing firms, the authors find complex 
relationships between the two dimensions of market orientation and performance. As key result 
these authors find a negative interaction effect of responsive and proactive market orientation on 
product innovation performance. The authors argue that 'this finding, coupled with the positive 
correlation between the two dimensions, suggests that firms engage in both behaviors 
simultaneously but do not necessary derive greater benefits from a high-high combination' 
(Atuahene-Gima et al. 2005: 476). This implies that responsive market orientation will be more 
valuable to a firm's product innovation when it is matched with lower level proactive market 
orientation and vise-versa. Thus, while both responsive and proactive market orientations are 
needed, overall product innovation performance is enhanced when one is at a higher level and the 
other is at a lower level13. While this study provides insight into the specific combined effects of both 
market orientation dimensions on a business unit's product innovation performance, it does not 
inform us about the specific effect of market orientation on individual really new product innovation 
projects.
The effect of market orientation on really new product innovation performance 
More detailed empirical evidence comes from recent studies that do not link market orientation to a 
firm's total product innovation portfolio but specifically focus on its impact on really new product 
innovation projects. Kyriakopoulus and Moorman (2004) contribute to the debate by suggesting that 
market orientation does not necessarily guide the firm to be reactive or proactive. It only emphasizes 
the focus on customers. Therefore these authors do not include marketing strategies in a firm's 
market orientation but separate these two elements. The authors consider marketing exploitation 
strategies that focus on the improvement of current expertise in areas such as targeting and 
segmenting and product distribution and marketing exploration strategies where current expertise is 
not sufficient and new knowledge and skills are needed. Based on data from 96 product innovation 
projects from the Dutch food processing industry, the authors find that a strong firm-level market 
orientation facilitates a complementarity of high levels of marketing exploration and marketing
12 A similar dichotomy is presented by Jaworski et al. (2000).
13 Their use of subjective product innovation portfolio success measures triggers the authors to include an 
alternative interpretation of this finding. They argue that a reasonable explanation of the negative effect of the 
interaction of responsive and proactive market orientation on product innovation performance also lies in the 
possibility 'that firms that have a high score on both orientations are more 'market sensitive' and therefore are 
likely to set very high performance goals and thus less likely to achieve them' (Atuahene-Gima et al. 2005: 476).
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exploitation project strategies which results in improved new product financial success at two 
distinct points in time. On the contrary, firms with a weak market orientation engaging in both 
strategies show a significant reduction in new product financial performance. Because the majority 
of really new projects leverage some existing firm expertise (Nelson and Winter 1982) and therefore 
combine exploration and exploitation strategies, this study provides evidence that market 
orientation has the potential to positively influence really new product innovation as well. A study by 
Callahan and Lasry (2004) investigates and confirms the importance of customer input in the 
development of most really new products. Data were analyzed from 55 new products that are 
successfully introduced in the computer telephony integration industry. Based on the judgments of 
managers that were responsible for the introductions of the new products, the authors find that the 
importance of customer input for developing really new products increases with the market newness 
of the product up to a point and then drops off for a market newness that is very high. For 
technology newness, customer input keeps increasing with increasing technology newness of the 
product without dropping off. Furthermore, a study by Atuahene-Gima (2005) posits that a firm's 
market orientation is a precursor for capability building and that it effects resource allocations to 
focus on both exploiting existing capabilities and building new ones. It is argued that market 
knowledge is a resource with which managers can uncover current capability deficiencies in the firm 
and emerging market opportunities that may require the development of new capabilities. Based on 
data from 227 electronics firms from China, the author finds that a market orientation indeed has a 
positive influence on exploiting existing product innovation capabilities and exploring new ones. He 
also finds that really new product innovation performance is enhanced when capability exploration is 
matched with a lower level of capability exploitation and vice versa. Thus, besides a strong market 
orientation, successful really new product innovation seems to stem from an act of combining old 
and new, not necessarily from the combination of a novel technology and a novel market solution. 
Finally, Baker and Sinkula (2007) aimed to investigate to what extent market orientation facilitates a 
balanced product innovation portfolio. Based on data from 243 U.S. firms from a wide variety of 
industries the authors find that incremental product development is the most prioritized type of 
product innovation, but that a strong market orientation increases the priority placed on really new 
product innovation resulting in a more balanced product development portfolio. Hence, the study's 
results imply that a market orientation does not lead firms to over-prioritize customer-led 
approaches.
Summary
Based on the empirical evidence presented in this section, it appears that a market orientation does 
not stifle really new product innovation. Literature, in fact, presents evidence that a market 
orientation supports this type of innovation, specifically the kind that does not heavily diverge from 
markets that are familiar to the firm. The question remains how an organization can influence the 
generation, dissemination and utilization of market information in the context of really new product 
developments. In other words: 'what are the organizational antecedents of market oriented really 
new product innovation?'
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2.3.3 Organizing for market oriented really new product development
Specifically the 'behavioral branch' of market orientation has researched the topic of organizational 
antecedents to the generation, dissemination and utilization of market information. Partly based on 
general market orientation frameworks, such as Jaworski and Kohli (1993) and Kirca et al. (2005), we 
will classify several organizational antecedents of market oriented really new product innovation into 
four broad categories: marketing function, senior management factors, market information 
generation methods, cross-functional integration.
Marketing function
The marketing function of the firm is uniquely positioned to perform marketing activities which are 
critically important to implementing many business processes within most organizations (Day 1994a; 
Homburg et al. 1999; Rust and Moorman 1999; Webster 2002).
An often cited problem in researching the marketing function is its lack of organizational 
homogeneity in structure, responsibilities and terminology (Webster 2002). Whereas standard 
textbooks usually present marketing as a monolithic task and function, in most organizations the 
marketing function is a fragmented phenomenon, rarely structured within one single function, and 
performed by numerous organizational departments (Krohmer et al. 2002). Following scholars such 
as Workman (1998), this research regards the marketing function as the organizational groups and 
functional specialists that connect 'the market' with other relevant functional groups in product 
development such as research and manufacturing. These groups often go by the names of 
'marketing', 'sales', 'product management', 'strategy', 'business development', 'market research', 
and 'commercial development'. The marketing function connects the customer to product design by 
bringing an 'outside-in' perspective to the table (Day 1994a). This specific perspective is what 
provides the marketing function with a specialized knowledge or skill base and puts it in the center of 
market oriented really new product innovation (Rust and Moorman 1999; Verhoef and Leeflang 
2009).
In order to structure the marketing function to maximize performance, two extreme approaches 
have been proposed: a functional marketing organization and a marketing process organization (Rust 
and Moorman 1999: 181). A functional marketing organization 'refers to the concentration of 
responsibility for marketing activities (knowledge and skills) within a group of specialists in the 
organization'. Benefits of this approach are enhanced efficiency and the ability to develop specialized 
distinctive knowledge and skills. The risks related to this approach, as reported by Rust and Moorman
(1999), include coordination challenges between distinct functions, inter-functional conflict, 
functional myopia, and overspecialization. A marketing process organization 'refers to the dispersion 
of marketing activities (knowledge and skills) across the organization'. A marketing process 
organization overcomes much of the risks that are associated with a functional market organization, 
and several authors notice a trend of abandoning marketing as function and embracing a marketing
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process organization (Nath and Mahajan 2008; Webster 1992)14. However, other work points to the 
value of specialized knowledge and skills in cross functional settings such as product innovation. 
Based on data from 92 product innovation projects, Moorman and Miner (1997), for example, 
demonstrate that higher specialized knowledge has a positive impact on product development 
creativity in conditions of high environmental turbulence. Additionally, Dougherty's (1990) 
qualitative work on market knowledge creation in product innovation suggests distinct stages that 
involve building unique departmental knowledge and then moving to an integrative view that cuts 
through departments. Looking further into this issue, Rust and Moorman (1999) propose a balanced 
perspective of an overall market orientation and a specialized marketing function. Based on 330 
responses from managers across six business functions these authors find that a specialized 
marketing function contributes to product innovation performance beyond that explained by a firm's 
overall market orientation. This finding is extended by Verhoef and Leeflang (2009). Based on data 
from 296 respondents from Dutch firms these researchers find that a market orientation and a firm's 
marketing department simultaneously influence each other. Market oriented firms tend to have 
stronger marketing departments, while influential marketing departments induces a stronger market 
orientation.
Some researchers have specifically focused on the role of a specialized marketing function in the 
context of really new product innovation. Qualitative insights from twelve breakthrough innovation 
projects that all originated from corporate research labs of major corporations reveal that involving 
marketing specialists is not always a widespread believe (McDermott and O'Conner 2002; O'Connor 
1998). In these studies, several teams relied on full time scientists or engineers for connecting with 
the market. Although these individuals were all highly respected by the other team members, they 
had little knowledge of marketing tasks and often had difficulties with this role. Workman's 
qualitative research (1998; 1993) demonstrates that the limited role of functional marketing 
specialists in really new product innovation is specifically observable in high-tech firms. This author 
proposes and illustrates three interrelated reasons that underlie this finding: (1) The need for 
technical expertise to understand innovation opportunities; (2) technology oriented cultures of high­
tech firms; (3) and the narrow definition of the marketing function in these firms. Although a 
specialized marketing function often has a limited influence in high-tech product innovation, it is 
argued that its involvement can increase product innovation performance. R&D specialists seem to 
be cognitively biased towards collecting and processing market knowledge that relates to what a 
product should do and what customers want, and give less attention to the number of potential 
customers and whether these customers value the product that much, that an idea forms a viable 
business opportunity (Dougherty 1990). A specialized marketing function can assist in generating 
complementary knowledge on the size of a market opportunity or can act as facilitator in knowledge 
exchange processes between research and customers. Additionally, the function can play a role in 
market development by bringing in complementary knowledge on (potential) partners, such as
14 Other research, however, does not confirm this trend. For example, in their field observations, Workman et 
al. (1998: 35) did not find evidence that firms are eliminating marketing departments or abandoning functional 
organizational forms.
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distributors and suppliers of complementary products, or perform market communication activities 
(Becker and Lillemark 2006). Finally, Veryzer (2005) undertook a mixed method study, involving a 
survey, field observations and in depth interviews, looking into the roles of marketing and industrial 
design in really new product development across a wide variety of firms. Findings from this research 
underwrite the positive impact of a specialized marketing function on really new product 
development performance.
Thus, based on the research presented above, it can be argued that the level of specialization of 
the marketing function in really new product development might influence the level of orientation 
towards the market and therefore new product performance.
Senior management factors
Senior managers play a critical role in shaping organizational values and orientations (Webster 1988). 
This section will focus on two closely related antecedents of market oriented really new product 
innovation that can be attributed to senior managers: senior management emphasis and senior 
management willingness to take risks (Jaworski and Kohli 1993).
General research on market orientation has indicated that senior management emphasis in 
communication and action on the generation, dissemination and utilization of market information 
has a strong influence on actual organizational market orientation. The meta-analysis of Kirca and 
colleagues (2005) shows the robustness of this relationship by using both bivariate and multivariate 
statistics. However, in the context of product innovation, senior management can over-emphasize a 
specific type of market orientation, which in turn effects product innovation efforts and performance 
differently (Atuahene-Gima 2005; Atuahene-Gima et al. 2005; Li et al. 2008a). Over-emphasizing 
reactive market orientation, most likely, distracts from really new product innovation, while over­
emphasizing proactive market orientation does not support incremental product innovation. One of 
the elements by which senior management directly articulates its emphasis is the degree of strategic 
mission rigidity. This construct refers to the degree to which the organization's mission is defined 
narrowly, is inflexible, discourages activities outside the scope of current products and markets and is 
difficult to change (Mone et al. 1998). When a strategic mission is rigid it focuses on strategies and 
activities that are well suited for stable conditions but are difficult to change when new opportunities 
arise. A rigid strategic mission, therefore, creates a context in which innovativeness and information 
search in new areas is more likely to be suppressed. In contrast, when a strategic mission is more 
flexible, strategies and activities are more open to change and adaptation. Christensen and Bower
(1996), for example, have shown that several disk drive producers could not commercialize emerging 
technologies that benefited new markets because their rigid strategies, which focused on existing 
markets and customers, did not allow for investing resources in researching new markets. In a similar 
vein, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) have studied the role of senior management cognitions in the 
development of new competences. They show how two prevalent strategic beliefs among Polaroid 
Corporation's senior managers hindered the company to enter the market for digital cameras in spite 
of its leading-edge digital imaging capabilities. On the one hand the belief in the primacy of 
technology led the firm to heavily invest in research on digital imaging. On the other hand, their
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strategic mission was restricted by the belief of Polaroid's senior management that their company 
could not make money on hardware (digital cameras) but only on consumables (film). This belief 
severely impeded market information gathering in this area and actual commercialization of their 
digital technologies.
There is some evidence that a flexible strategic mission should be complemented by the 
willingness of senior management to implement innovative strategies and therefore take risks. Based 
on responses from marketing and non-marketing managers of 222 business units that were cross­
checked by 230 additional responses from American Marketing Association members, Jaworksi and 
Kohli (1993) have found that senior management aversion towards risk has a negative effect on 
market information utilization. This finding supported earlier expectations that responding to market 
developments entails some level of risk and that if senior managers are unwilling to assume these 
risks the organization is less likely to be responsive to changing customer needs. Thus, senior 
management willingness to take risks is closely related to a positive attitude towards change and 
learning (Day 1994a). However, taking risks by focusing on change enhances the possibility of failure 
(Levinthal and March 1993). By using two wave panel data of U.S. manufacturing firms, Danneels 
(2008) found that developing marketing skills to generate knowledge from new markets is enhanced 
when there is a certain tolerance for failure. Thus, promoting taking risks by senior management 
should be complemented by some tolerance for failure. Similar observations were made in the 
qualitative work on market learning in a wide variety of product development projects by Adams et 
al. (1998). These authors have shown that market information processing in really new product 
innovation projects was enhanced when senior management rewarded taking risks and did not place 
undue blame on failure.
In general, literature provides some evidence that market oriented really new product innovation 
is supported by senior management emphasis on both responsive and proactive market orientation, 
via the expression of a flexible strategic mission. Additionally, senior management should 
demonstrate some willingness to take risk which is complemented by a certain tolerance for failure.
Market information generation methods
In market oriented really new product development, a well performing marketing function links a 
project to the market and generates market information (Day 1994a). However, as was discussed 
earlier, market information can come in different dimensions (Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver and 
Slater 1990). In the context of product innovation, research, generally, distinguishes between two 
dimensions of market information: segment information and customer need information (Adams et 
al. 1998; Veldhuizen et al. 2006). Segment information refers to information on market segment size, 
growth rate and turbulence, and stakeholders such as competitors, distributors, and regulating 
groups, which can influence customer behavior. Customer need information refers to the 
understanding of specific customer needs and wants, which are divergences between the existing 
and the desired customer situation (Holt et al. 1984).
Segment information can be totally new to the firm, or an update of current understanding. 
Additionally, customer needs information also comes in two forms: expressed and latent (Narver et
54
Theoretical background
al. 2004)15. Expressed needs are needs that the customer is aware of and has little difficulties in 
expressing, such as an existing product in a different color. In contrast, latent needs can be defined as 
needs of which the customer is unaware. These needs are not less 'real' than expressed needs, but 
they are not in the consciousness of the customer. They are not directly based on existing products 
and do not emerge to the conscious level until a solution is presented (Holt et al. 1984). For example, 
at the start of the development of computers, the needs for their benefits were latent needs.
Different types of product innovation seem to need different types of market information which 
require different types of market information generation methods (Deszca et al. 1999; Hamel and 
Prahalad 1994; Janssen and Dankbaar 2008; Leonard 1995; O'Conner and Veryzer 2001; O'Connor 
1998; Veryzer 1998a; Veryzer 1998b). Thus, the type of generation methods in use, potentially, 
influences the course of a product innovation project. Based on the existing literature we will discuss 
the impact of different generation methods by using archetypes of four different product innovation 
project categories (figure 2.2). Besides 'continuities', all archetypes fall into the really new product 
innovation category.
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Figure 2.2: Different categories of product development projects
Continuities represent the situation of incremental product innovation. These projects focus on 
small updates of existing products. To initiate this type of product innovation it is proposed that 
developers should update their current understanding of a specific market segment. Specifically an 
analysis of secondary data on the immediate threats by competitors seems to have a positive effect 
in these projects (Atuahene-Gima 2005; Noble et al. 2002). Additionally, organizational members 
should collect primary data and update their knowledge on expressed customer needs (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt, 1986; 1994). Because reference products already exist in the market, customers can 
easily recognize their own needs and express suggestions for improvements. These suggestions can 
be generated by using traditional market research methods such as focus groups and surveys 
(Leonard 1995; Slater and Narver 1998). In situations of incremental product innovation, 'learning
15 We realize that dichotomies are often oversimplifications and rather pragmatic. However, for this overview 
an oversimplification is not critical.
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before doing' is the norm and the large majority of the market information that is necessary for 
introducing a new product into the market is generated in the initiation phase of the product 
innovation process (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986; Lynn et al. 1996). In other words, there is little 
need for additional market information generation during actual development and 
commercialization.
Tech-discontinuities represent the situation of really new product innovation which highly diverges 
from a firm's current technology base, but is focused on known market segments. When initiating 
these projects, it is proposed that organizational members should update their current 
understanding of a specific market segment by looking further into the future. Suitable methods, 
which often rely on secondary data, include extrapolating trends, science and technology mapping, 
and scenario analyses (Leonard 1995; Schoemaker 1995; Wheelwright and Clark 1992). Furthermore, 
developers should generate primary data on future needs of customers. In these cases, traditional 
market research methods are of limited use because relationships between needs and potential 
solutions become obscure. Future needs are often latent because customers have limited capabilities 
to see through the eyes of the technologist and do not know what solutions, functions and enhanced 
futures a technology might offer (Leonard, 1995). Uncovering these needs requires market research 
methods that allow for deeper experiential interaction with customers such as the lead user 
approach (von Hippel 1986), emphatic design (Leonard, 1995), customer visits (Slater and Mohr 
2006), and customer immersion sessions (Deszca et al. 1999). By using these methods organizational 
members get to know customers' working practices so well that they become able to anticipate 
unspoken needs. Under the 'learning by doing' logic these market research methods should be 
complemented by collaborating with customers to test prototypes to refine market information in 
the later phases of the product innovation project (Leonard 1995; Lynn et al. 1996; O'Connor 1998; 
Veryzer 1998a; 1998b). Since developers cannot exactly communicate the full potential of a product 
without a reference product, such real-life technological designs can act as powerful boundary 
spanning objects to gather preliminary customer feedback and modify offerings based on new 
insights. Testing prototypes affords the first true opportunity to 'prove out' the product idea and 
design in a real life setting. In testing prototypes the range of customers involved is necessary limited 
Because the organization cannot work intensively together with all customers it has to make choices 
what customers to involve (Danneels 2003).
Really new product development projects that fall into the market-discontinuities category are 
based on technology that is known to the firm but focuses on market segments that are new to the 
firm. To initiate these projects, it is proposed that developers should look into unserved market 
segments made up by totally new potential customers (Hamel en Prahalad 1994; Narver and Slater 
1998). Examples are technology transfers from military to commercial applications (Danneels 2002). 
To develop information on the new segments, organizational members can use secondary data, such 
as market research reports, or visit trade fairs (Danneels 2002). Developers should also build up new 
contacts to generate primary data on customers needs (Leonard 1995). In these instances, potential 
customer needs are latent because users have a need but are incapable of imagining a solution 
because they are unaware of the technological potential that can be offered by the firm. Data has to
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be gathered by using experiential interaction with potential customers, such as customer visits where 
technologies are demonstrated. Again these methods should be complemented by prototyping in the 
later stages for the same reasons as mentioned in tech-discontinuities situations.
Tech/market-discontinuities situations represent projects with a high divergence from both a 
firm's current technology and market base. In these projects, technological potential and market 
need have to coincide in both time and place for the necessary synergy to occur (Leonard 1995). 
Developers may try to force this coincidence by presenting totally new products to the outside world. 
However, this remains risky business (Leonard 1995). To initiate these projects organizational 
members can develop a perspective of the future by relying on general societal trends. Methods that 
suit this situation are comparable to the ones recommended for tech-discontinuities without the 
strong focus on specific segments. Besides anticipating the future, developers in these projects can 
take a more active role by trying to create the future (Deszca et al. 1999; Hamel and Prahalad 1994; 
O'Conner and Veryzer 2001). Methods such as 'back-casting' and 'visioning' start with an envisioned 
end-state and then move back to identify means to get there such as investments and activities. The 
key element of these approaches is a focus on 'what could be'. In tech/market discontinuities 
situations potential customer needs are latent as well. Potential customers are not able to ask for 
technologies that are non-existent in the marketplace. To generate customer information developers 
can experiment by confronting different customer groups with new technologies. Finally, prototyping 
is also necessary in the later stages of these projects (Leonard 1995).
This section argued that different product development projects need different market 
information generation methods to become market oriented projects. Without using a combination 
of techniques that allow for secondary data generation and techniques that can uncover latent 
(potential) customer needs via experimental customer interaction, it becomes much harder to 
successfully initiate and implement really new product innovations. It is argued that the level to 
which project members rely on the techniques mentioned above has an impact on market oriented 
really new product innovation success.
Cross-functional integration
The integration of the marketing function with other functions in the firm is widely regarded as 
beneficial for cross-functional activities such as product innovation. It specifically benefits the 
dissemination and usage of market information (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima 2007; Griffin and 
Hauser 1996; Kahn 1996; Kahn 2001; Kirca et al. 2005; Li and Calantone 1998; Madhavan and Grover 
1998).
Cross-functional integration can be broken down into collaboration and interaction (De Luca and 
Atuahene-Gima 2007; Griffin and Hauser 1996; Kahn 1996). Collaboration refers to the intangible and 
unstructured recognition by different organizational functions of their strategic interdependence and 
their need to cooperate for the benefit of the organization. It ensures the alignment of goals and 
some degree of mutual commitment. Interaction is about organizing information integration itself. 
While collaboration reflects the willingness to work together, interaction points to the structural 
mechanisms to put this willingness into action such as meetings or other ways of information
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exchange. Research on market orientation reflects the importance of these two elements. Under the 
label of 'interdepartmental factors' Kirca and colleagues (2005) have investigated the effects of 
interdepartmental conflict (i.e. lack of collaboration) and interdepartmental connectedness (i.e. 
interaction) on market orientation. Bivariate statistics showed that interdepartmental conflict 
diminished organizational market orientation, while interdepartmental connectedness enhanced it. 
The researchers were also able to include interdepartmental connectedness into their multivariate 
analyses. Findings from these analyses showed that this variable has a strong positive effect on 
organizational market orientation.
Despite the fact that researchers have highlighted mechanisms to improve cross-functional 
integration (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima 2007; Griffin and Hauser 1996; Olson et al. 1995), several 
organizational barriers for integrating market information across functions may exist. Well known 
potential barriers are cultural differences between marketing and other functions (Adams et al. 1998; 
De Ruyter and Wetzels 2000; Dougherty 1992; Griffin and Hauser 1996; Gupta et al. 1986; Rouzies et 
al. 2005; Workman 1993). Different functional backgrounds, various career paths, and diverse non­
integrated institutional contexts bring about belief systems, perceptions, attitudes and competences 
which are idiosyncratic, and as such difficult to integrate. A well documented example are the 
contrasting 'thought worlds' of managers in marketing with respect to those in research (Dougherty 
1992; Griffin and Hauser 1996). The former are usually oriented towards the short term, they see 
themselves as members of the company as a whole, focus on the market, and accept a degree of 
bureaucracy. The latter, instead, tend to focus on medium and long term results; share a sense of 
belonging that goes beyond the organizational borders to a wider scientific community, center their 
attention on science, and have low tolerances for bureaucracy. Naturally, these generalities do not 
apply to every marketing or research department, but rather indicate identifiable trends. These 
cultural differences can influence self-perception, relative power perception, and the sense of 
identity of a function, which in turn can give rise to the belief that achieving organizational goals is 
largely dependent on specific functional competences and behavior. One's own functional 
performance and processes are thought to be much more, or much less, important than those of 
other functions (Fisher et al. 1997; Franwick et al. 1994). These different thought worlds can limit 
market information integration because they create the perception that the advantages deriving 
from sharing knowledge are inferior to those associated with protecting it.
Turning to an information user perspective, supposing these users belong to other functional 
groups, two related potential barriers can be added: lack of trust in the data supplier, and a low 
perceived information value. Empirical evidence (Adams et al. 1998; Maltz and Kohli 1996; Maltz and 
Kohli 2000; Moorman and Zaltman 1993; Moorman et al. 1992) shows that trust in the data supplier 
influences market knowledge usage. It appears that the greater the trust of the potential user in the 
data source, the more the potential user will associate quality with information generated from 
those data. Both these variables, in turn, have a positive influence on the use of market information 
in decision making. The use of market knowledge also depends on the value that the information 
carries from a user's point of view. This value depends on the perception of accuracy of the 
generation methods, the ease of understanding, and the possibility to translate knowledge into
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action (Maltz and Kohli 1996; Menon and Varadarajan 1992; Sinkula 1990). When these variables are 
perceived as low, the perceived information value, and the probability of market knowledge use, will 
also be low.
There is some research that looks into the differences between incremental and really new market 
oriented product development in relation to cross-functional integration (Atuahene-Gima 2005; 
Griffin and Hauser 1996; Olson et al. 1995; Souder et al. 1998; Swink 2000). The general outcome of 
this research is that cross-functional integration is more important in situations of really new product 
development than it is for situations of incremental product development. The rationale behind this 
finding is that when a firm and its (potential) customers are relatively unfamiliar to each other and 
have little previous experience with a new product concept, the functional tasks involved in 
developing the concept and bringing it to the market are more challenging than in situations of a 
more straightforward modification of an existing product. As the difficulty of product development 
increases, so does the interdependence of different functional specialists involved in the project. The 
result is a greater need for cross-functional exchanges of ideas, information and other resources. On 
the contrary, a small number of scholars have highlighted benefits of less integration between 
functional specialists in the context of really new product innovation. Moorman and Miner (1997), 
for instance, demonstrate that higher specialized knowledge had a positive impact on organizational 
product development creativity in conditions of high environmental turbulence. Furthermore, 
Berchicci and Tucci (2008) present a qualitative analysis of the development of a highly innovative 
bike-concept in which they find evidence of 'groupthink' (Janis 1982) towards new market 
information which had a negative effect on project performance. These latter authors argue that a 
development organization can work so closely together that it develops its own set of values, and 
adopts or rejects new information based on the level of congruency with these values. This risk 
seems specifically relevant in uncertain tasks such as knowledge integration in really new product 
development. In performing this task, managers often lack 'hard numbers' in making decisions and 
consequently are more likely to rely on intuition and rule of thumb. These heuristics seem more likely 
to reflect one's beliefs, emotional commitments and ideology, increasing the risk of buffering of new 
information that is not compatible with the group's core values.
In sum, it can be argued that, generally, cross-functional integration, which consists of both cross­
functional collaboration and interaction, is beneficial for the dissemination and usage of market 
information in really new product innovation and therefore for its performance. However, a small 
group of studies has highlighted possible negative effects of cross functional integration, such as a 
decrease in creativity and the development of groupthink.
2.3.4 Summary
Overall, the marketing literature is well positioned to participate in the initial understanding of how 
firms could resolve the market learning paradox in the course of really new product innovation 
projects. We presented that a firm's market orientation, which largely refers to processing 
information on customer needs, has the potential to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of 
really new product innovation. This statement is specifically true for the types of product innovation
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that do not heavily diverge from markets that are familiar to the firm. This section also discussed four 
broad categories of organizational antecedents of market oriented really new product innovation: 
marketing function, senior management factors, market information generation methods, and cross­
functional integration. It was proposed that to develop a marketing orientation in really new product 
innovation, an organization's senior management should express a flexible strategic mission and 
demonstrate some willingness to take risk which is complemented by a certain tolerance for failure. 
Furthermore, a specialized marketing function should be present in the project, project members 
should make use of experiential interaction with (potential) customers, and the marketing function 
should have some level of integration with other relevant product innovation functions. However, in 
line with the product development literature, the marketing literature uses a relatively high level of 
abstraction and has little evidence to offer on how firms resolve the market learning paradox in the 
course of single really new product development projects.
The next chapter presents an integration of the three streams of literature that were discussed in 
this chapter. Together they form the input for developing a conceptual framework that can guide 
detailed empirical data analyses on how organizations resolve the market learning paradox in the 
course of single really new product development projects.
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3 Towards a conceptual framework
This chapter describes our choices on theoretical perspectives, concepts, and relationships between 
concepts in constructing a conceptual framework. This framework will be used as starting point for 
empirical analyses. In developing the framework, we consider the knowledge and organizational 
learning stream of literature as focal research stream. As a consequence, we also use its terminology. 
For instance, we use the terms 'generation', 'integration' and 'market knowledge', to point to 
knowledge dynamics instead of the 'generation' and 'dissemination' of 'market intelligence', and the 
'responsiveness' to it as is used by the marketing literature. First an outline of concepts and several 
working assumptions are discussed. In conclusion we present a schematic overview of the conceptual 
framework.
3.1 Market learning in really new product innovation
In this section, we define the central concepts 'really new product innovation', 'exploration in market 
learning', and 'exploitation in market learning' and clarify several working assumptions that resulted 
from studying the existing literature (table 3.1).
Based on the literature that was discussed in the previous chapter, we define really new product 
innovation as 'the development of a product that is underpinned by, at least, some knowledge that is 
new to the firm'. Following the accumulation of work on product innovation processes (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1986; Hauser et al. 2006), really new product innovation is seen as an organizational 
process consisting of three process steps: the initiation of a new product idea (the front end), the 
actual development of the product (the middle), and its commercialization (the back end). Although it 
is acknowledged that really new product development often follows a process that is less structured 
and non-linear, we still will use a linear approach for conceptualization. A linear approach is relatively 
simple, generally accepted, and it provides a sufficient basis for anchoring the multifaceted 
phenomenon of resolving the market learning paradox in product innovation. Indeed, support for 
such reasoning can be found in the literature. Gobeli and Brown (1993), for instance, suggest that 
although there is often lack in structure, clustering innovation activities into stages gives a common 
and practical format for discussing problems and solutions. Likewise, Veryzer (1998a) argues that 
although really new product innovation seems to be an inherently messy process, from a certain 
perspective there is still a logical progression in how it is managed.
Furthermore, based on reviewing studies from the product development literature (Eisenhardt 
and Tabrizi 1995; Lynn et al. 1996; Moorman and Miner 1997; Song and Montoya-Weiss 1998), we 
assume that development organizations active in effective and efficient really new product 
innovation will use 'learning by doing' as the overall working strategy. Although some planning may 
still be favorable, the basic orientation is experimental. The underlying idea is that in the situation of 
really new product innovation, where the product innovation outcome is largely unknown, it is not 
helpful to plan extensively. Rather maintaining flexibility and learning quickly through improvisation 
and experience yield effective performance.
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Table 3.1: Defining really new product innovation and market learning
Concept Definition Product
development
literature
Organizational 
knowledge and 
learning literature
Marketing literature
Really new
product
innovation
The development of 
a product that is 
underpinned by, at 
least, some 
knowledge that is 
new to the firm
Three main phases: 
initiation, 
development, and 
commercialization; 
'Learning by doing' 
as working strategy
Exploration in
market
learning
The generation of 
market knowledge 
that is new to the 
firm and its 
integration in the 
product 
development 
project
The generation of 
knowledge that is 
new to the firm and 
its integration in the 
product development 
project
The generation and 
dissemination of 
market intelligence 
and the
responsiveness to it by 
the development 
organization
Market intelligence 
can have multiple 
dimensions such as 
segment and customer 
need information
Exploitation 
in market 
learning
The updating of 
market knowledge 
that exists in the 
firm and its 
integration in the 
product 
development 
project
The updating of 
knowledge that exists 
in the firm and its 
integration in the 
product development 
project
The generation and 
dissemination of 
market intelligence 
and the
responsiveness to it by 
the development 
organization
Market intelligence 
can have multiple 
dimensions such as 
segment and customer 
need information
Additionally, the marketing literature has addressed that project effectiveness and efficiency can 
be enhanced when the development organization and other organizational members are oriented 
towards the market (Atuahene-Gima 2005; Atuahene-Gima et al. 2005; Baker and Sinkula 2007; 
Callahan and Lasry 2004; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004; Narver et al. 2004). In the context of 
product innovation, market orientation can be captured by three process steps: the generation of 
intelligence from the market, its dissemination throughout the organization, and the responsiveness 
to it by the development organization. In the terminology of organizational knowledge and learning, 
that we decided to put central in the framework, this behavior is similar to marketing learning which 
is described as the two step process of the generation of market knowledge16 from the environment
16 In our view, because market knowledge refers to a firm resource instead of a firm capability, it is clearly a 
form of 'know-what' and not of 'know-how'.
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and its integration in the product development project (Allen 1971; Ancona and Caldwell 1992; 
Atuahene-Gima and Murray 2007; Grant 1996b; Li and Calantone 1998).
Mainly based on further insights from the organizational knowledge and learning literature, we 
take a detailed perspective and focus on changes in knowledge resources that underpin really new 
product innovation. We assume that market learning in the course of successful really new product 
innovation projects entails two types of learning: exploration and exploitation. Exploration in market 
learning refers to 'the generation of market knowledge that is new to the firm and its integration in 
the product development project'. Exploitation, in contrast, is about 'updating market knowledge 
that already resides in the firm and integrating it in the product development project'. Although 
some might argue that really new product development is by definition a sole act of exploration, this 
research follows scholars claiming that both types of learning are necessary in this process 
(Atuahene-Gima 2005; Cheng and Van de Ven 1996; Danneels 2002; Katila and Ahuja 2002; 
Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004; McGrath 2001). It is assumed that the majority of really new 
product ideas combine knowledge resources that already reside in the firm with knowledge that is 
newly generated. In these cases, existing knowledge provides the necessary absorptive capacity to 
use new knowledge. Still, even if really new product ideas are purely based on exploration, we 
assume that exploitation is needed as well: the newly generated knowledge has to be refined and 
developed to the extent that the product is ready for market introduction (Cheng and Van de Ven 
1996; McGrath 2001). Hence, to successfully generate really new product ideas, develop the really 
new product, and introduce it into the market, it is maintained that organizations need to build up 
market knowledge that is new to the firm (i.e. exploration) and update the market knowledge base 
that was already developed (i.e. exploitation). The two types of market learning fulfill 
complementary roles in the context of really new product development projects (Moorman and 
Slotegraaf 1999).
Finally, building on joint insights from the marketing literature and research on organizational 
knowledge and learning, it is assumed that market knowledge in successful really new product 
innovation is a diverse knowledge resource that includes, at least, two loosely coupled knowledge 
dimensions: market segment knowledge and customer need knowledge (Adams et al. 1998; Turner 
and Makhija 2006; Veldhuizen et al. 2006). Based on this assumption, it is deemed possible that 
development organizations can combine exploration and exploitation across market knowledge 
dimensions in a single period in time. For instance, exploration in market segment knowledge might 
be combined with exploitation in customer need knowledge in the project's initiation phase. 
Furthermore, taking the 'learning by doing' strategy and the need for additional market knowledge in 
the later process phases into account (Veldhuizen et al. 2006), we assume that it is also possible to 
combine exploration and exploitation over time (Gupta et al. 2006). For instance, in the same 
project, exploration in customer need knowledge in the initiation phase might be combined with 
exploitation on the same knowledge dimension in the development phase.
In sum, building up to our conceptual framework, we make the following four assumptions on 
market learning in really new product innovation:
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1. Really new product innovation is a process that can be subdivided into three phases: 
initiation, development, and commercialization, and a suitable working strategy is 'learning 
by doing'.
2. The effectiveness and efficiency of really new product innovation projects can be enhanced 
when the development organization is active in market learning, which refers to the 
generation and integration of market knowledge.
3. Market learning in really new product development consists of a combination of exploration 
and exploitation.
4. Because market knowledge can be a diverse resource having, at least, two dimensions, 
combining exploration and exploitation can take place in a single period in time (i.e. single 
product development phase) and over time (i.e. multiple product development phases).
3.2 Resolving the market learning paradox in product innovation
As argued before, firms have to combine exploration and exploitation in market learning to be 
successful in really new product innovation. However, this remains a difficult task. Exploration and 
exploitation represent fundamentally contradictory project strategies and are associated with 
different and inconsistent mental models, skills and processes (March 1991; Van de Ven et al. 1999). 
Combining these learning tasks represents a tension between old and new. It embodies a struggle 
between the comfort of the past and the uncertainty of the future. While exploration results in 
variation, exploitation benefits the selection and retention stages of the learning cycle (Zollo and 
Winter 2002). As such, market learning in really new product development projects presents a 
learning paradox: the simultaneous presence of contradictory elements (Lewis 2000; Poole and Van 
de Ven 1989; Quinn and Cameron 1988).
In this research, we assume that firms resolve the market learning paradox in the course of really 
new product innovation projects by putting ambidextrous marketing organizations in place (Duncan 
1976; Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). The empirical part of the research will be used to gain further 
insight into these organizational configurations. For developing our framework we use a 
configurational approach which maintains that organizations can be better understood via 
identifying distinct, internally consistent sets of dimensions than by seeking to uncover relationships 
between single elements (Short et al. 2008; Tidd 2001).
When analyzing the organization of marketing activities, one can look at various dimensions, 
including division of tasks, formalization, centralization, power, and cross-functional interaction 
(Workman et al. 1998). In a first attempt to identify core organizational design dimensions for 
ambidextrous marketing organizations, we rely on several broad organizational concepts that can be 
put forward when combining the three streams of literature that were discussed in the previous 
chapter (Table 3.2). We further assume that we will be able to detail these concepts based on our 
empirical analyses. A similar approach, for instance, was adopted to develop the well-known Miles 
and Snow (1978) typology. The final result of these authors was partly based on theories on strategic 
choice and enactment, and partly based on the authors' qualitative research in the textbook industry 
(Ketchen 2003).
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Table 3.2: Defining organizational concepts
Concept Definition Product
development
literature
Organizational 
knowledge and learning 
literature
Marketing literature
Marketing
function
The organizational 
task(s) of the 
project member(s) 
that link(s) a really 
new product 
development 
project to 'the 
market'
The marketing 
function is part of 
the development 
organization
The marketing function 
can be integrated in, or 
differentiated from, the 
mainstream organization
A specialized 
marketing function is 
beneficial for 
achieving a market 
orientation
Senior
management
involvement
The involvement of 
senior management 
in market learning 
in the context of a 
really new product 
development 
project
The performance 
of really new 
product 
development is 
enhanced when 
senior
management 
uses a
combination of 
support and 
control
To support combining 
exploration and 
exploitation, senior 
management
• develops an overall 
strategic intent;
• integrates exploration 
and exploitation;
• implements supporting 
strategies and systems;
• promotes 
ambidextrous ideas 
that emerge bottom 
up.
To support market 
oriented really new 
product development, 
senior management
• articulates a flexible 
strategic mission;
• shows willingness to 
take risks, and 
combines that with 
a certain tolerance 
for failure.
Market
knowledge
generation
Practices used to 
generate market 
knowledge in the 
context of a really 
new product 
development 
project
Knowledge generation is 
supported by practices 
that
• establish inter-firm 
connections;
• enhance inter-firm tie 
strength;
• develop shared 
language and 
narratives between 
firms.
To support market 
oriented really new 
product development, 
project members 
should
• mix primary and 
secondary data 
generation 
techniques;
• experimentally 
interact with 
(potential) 
customers.
Market
knowledge
integration
Practices used to 
integrate market 
knowledge in the 
context of a really 
new product 
development 
project
Knowledge integration is 
supported by practices 
that
• establish intra-firm 
connections;
• enhance intra-firm tie 
strength;
• develop shared 
language and 
narratives between 
functions.
The dissemination and 
usage of market 
intelligence in the 
context of a really new 
product development 
project is supported by 
cross-functional 
integration
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In the following sections we will discuss four organizational concepts that, assumingly, are 
important features of ambidextrous marketing organizations: marketing function, senior 
management involvement, market knowledge generation, and market knowledge integration.
Marketing function
Marketing function is defined as 'the organizational task(s) of the project member(s) that link(s) a 
really new product development project to the market'17. Essentially, this concept is about 
organizational structure. Based on the marketing literature and studies in the field of organizational 
knowledge and learning, we assume that the marketing function in ambidextrous marketing 
organizations can further be detailed by its levels of specialization and integration in the mainstream 
organization.
Findings from the marketing literature point in the direction that development organizations that 
include a specialized market function will be more active in market learning than their counterparts 
that rely on non-specialists (Becker and Lillemark 2006; Rust and Moorman 1999; Veryzer 2005; 
Workman 1998; 1993). Additionally, based on findings from the research in the field of organizational 
knowledge and learning, there are basically two structural options for organizations to become 
ambidextrous. The first option is to develop a unit for exploration that is structurally differentiated 
from the mainstream organization and to combine this with tactical integration mechanisms (Benner 
and Tushman 2003; Christensen 1997; Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). The second option is to keep the 
exploration unit structurally integrated in the mainstream organization and mix this with tactical 
differentiation mechanisms (Adler and Borys 1996; Adler et al. 1999; Ghoshal and Bartlett 1994; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; McDonough and Leifer 1983; Sheremata 2000). Based on the literature, 
we do not have a theoretical rationale on what form to expect for ambidextrous marketing 
organizations in the context of really new product innovation. For now, we assume both options to 
be equally feasible.
Senior management involvement
Senior management involvement refers to 'the involvement of senior management in market 
learning in the context of a really new product development project'. In this case, senior 
management is a group of organizational managers who are involved in strategic product planning 
and the allocation and control of product innovation resources, but are not, like project members, 
involved in day-to-day project activities. In most cases these managers belong to the top 
management team of the organization or are their direct reports such as product managers. In 
essence, senior management involvement is about organizational leadership.
Based on insights across the three streams of literature that were studied, we assume that the 
characteristics of senior management (non)involvement will have an impact on an organizational 
marketing organization becoming ambidextrous. The product development literature, for instance,
17 'Project member(s)' refers to the organizational employees that are part of the development organization 
and are therefore active in day-to-day product innovation activities. In this research we also refer to them as 
'functional specialists'.
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has shown that a right balance of senior management support and control has a positive impact on 
implementing really new product innovation (Bonner et al. 2002; Brown and Eisenhardt 1995; 
Cardinal 2001; Lewis et al. 2002; Swink 2000). In turn, the marketing literature has underlined that 
senior management's emphasis on both responsive and proactive market orientation, via the 
expression of a flexible strategic mission, and willingness to take risk, complemented by a certain 
tolerance for failure, supports market oriented really new product innovation (Adams et al. 1998; 
Atuahene-Gima et al. 2005; Christensen and Bower 1996; Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Kirca et al. 2005). 
Finally, the literature on organizational knowledge and learning regards senior managers as playing 
an important role in resolving organizational learning paradoxes and fostering organizational 
ambidexterity. In situations where units for exploration and exploitation are highly differentiated, 
this literature argues that senior management should develop an overall and compelling strategic 
intent that justifies the importance of both exploration and exploitation. Furthermore, senior 
management should have a large stake in integrating exploration and exploitation across the two 
separate units (O'Reilly and Tushman 2008; Smith and Tushman 2005; Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). 
Also when employees who are responsible for exploration are more integrated in the mainstream 
organization, it is argued that senior management involvement is important. As key leaders in 
organizations they should put in place strategies and systems that shape the exploration and 
exploitation behavior of individuals (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1994; Smith 2006) or play a more catalytic 
role, in which they promote ambidextrous ideas that emerge bottom up (Floyd and Lane 2000; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004).
Market knowledge generation
Market knowledge generation is defined as 'practices used to generate market knowledge in the 
context of a really new product development project'. It refers to what practices are used to take the 
first step in a market learning cycle. Based on indications from the marketing and organizational 
knowledge and learning streams of literature, we assume that the practices that are (not) used to 
generate marketing knowledge have an impact on a marketing organization becoming ambidextrous.
For market knowledge generation in really new product innovation, specifically the marketing 
literature has recommended that organizations should mix primary and secondary data generation 
techniques to collect information on market segments and customers. In particular it is 
recommended that development organizations should use experiential interaction with (potential) 
customers because it is this interaction that will yield marketing knowledge that is new to the firm. 
This interaction requires a non-competitive attitude towards knowledge sharing from the focal firm 
and its (potential) customer. It should take the form of using experiential market research 
techniques, such as 'emphatic design' or testing product prototypes. These can cross cognitive 
boundaries and transfer knowledge that is often highly tacit in nature (Hamel and Prahalad 1994; 
Leonard 1995; Lynn et al. 1996; O'Connor 1998; Slater and Mohr 2006; von Hippel 1986). 
Additionally, the literature on organizational knowledge and learning has argued that knowledge 
generation from the organizational environment benefits from implementing practices that can 
establish connections, enhance tie strength, and develop a shared language and narratives between
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firms (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Hansen 1999; Inkpen and Tsang 2005; Lane et al. 2006; Nahapiet 
and Ghosal 1998).
Market knowledge integration
Market knowledge integration is defined as 'practices used to integrate market knowledge in the 
context of a really new product development project'. It refers to what practices are used to take the 
second step in a market learning cycle: the integration of market knowledge with other relevant 
knowledge resources in product innovation. Based on indications from the marketing and 
organizational knowledge and learning streams of literature, we assume that the practices that are 
(not) used to integrate marketing knowledge have an impact on a marketing organization becoming 
ambidextrous
The marketing literature has argued that market knowledge integration is, generally, supported by 
cross-functional integration. In turn, cross-functional integration can be achieved by installing 
practices that enhance cross-functional interaction, such as meetings or other ways of information 
exchange, and cross-functional collaboration (Atuahene-Gima and Murray 2007; De Luca and 
Atuahene-Gima 2007; Griffin and Hauser 1996; Olson et al. 1995). Additionally, the literature on 
organizational knowledge and learning has argued that knowledge integration inside the firm 
benefits from practices that can establish connections, enhance tie strength, and develop a shared 
language and narratives between functions (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Hansen 1999; Inkpen and 
Tsang 2005; Nahapiet and Ghosal 1998; Szulanski 1996).
In sum, building up to our conceptual framework and based on joint insights from the streams of 
literature that were discussed in the theoretical background, we assume that the core organizational 
design dimensions for ambidextrous marketing organizations in the context of really new product 
innovation are, at least, made up by the concepts: marketing function, senior management 
involvement, market knowledge generation, and market knowledge integration. Furthermore, it is 
taken into account that, just as the exploration/exploitation nature of learning processes, also the 
ambidextrous marketing organization can change in the course of a product innovation project.
3.3 The conceptual framework
A schematic overview of the conceptual framework which will guide empirical analyses is presented 
in figure 3.1. Based on the review of the existing literature it is assumed that market learning in 
successful really new product innovation consists of combining exploration and exploitation in the 
course of the product innovation process. Furthermore, it is assumed that organizations can only 
deal with this paradoxical requirement if they install ambidextrous marketing organizations. These 
marketing organizations are organizational configurations which are, at least, made up of the broad 
and interrelated concepts of marketing function, senior management involvement, market 
knowledge generation, and market knowledge integration. We will detail these concepts based on 
our empirical analysis. Figure 3.1 illustrates our assumptions in a schematic overview.
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Ambidextrous marketing
Combining exploration 
and exploitation in 
market learning in the 
course of a really new 
product development 
project
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework
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4 Methodology
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the research design and outline of the empirical study. The 
first section explains what research strategy is most appropriate in which situations. Then it concludes 
that case study research is appropriate for this research and looks deeper into the nature of this 
strategy and how it is used in this research. Subsequently, the research setting, case selection, data 
collection, coding and data analyses, and presentation of findings are discussed. Finally, this chapter 
focuses on the rigor of this research.
4.1 Choosing a research strategy
Yin (1994) distinguishes several major research strategies that are used in social science: 
experiments, surveys, archival analysis, histories, and case studies. Even though each method has its 
distinctive characteristics, there are often areas of overlap amongst them. Consequently, the 
endeavor in choosing a research strategy is to avoid gross misfits. Although there are no universal 
answers on when to use what research strategy, the literature provides several guidelines.
In general, surveys and archival analysis on quantitative data are advantageous when research 
aims to describe the prevalence of a phenomenon, to be predictive about certain outcomes, and to 
answer questions about the relative empirical importance of constructs (Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007; Yin 1994). In contrast, 'how' and 'why' questions usually focus on explaining a phenomenon 
which will most likely lead to the use of histories, case studies, and experiments. Such questions 
often deal with operational links that have to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or 
incidences (Bonoma 1985; Lee 1999; Yin 1994).
In addition, the phenomenon of interest is of importance (Yin 1994). Assuming that 'how' and 
'why' questions are the focus of study, a further distinction between histories, case studies, and 
experiments is largely based on the extent of access and control the researcher has to the events 
under study. Histories fit situations in which there is little access and control. This strategy deals with 
historical events or 'dead' pasts. No relevant informants are alive to report on the phenomenon and 
researchers must rely on documents and artifacts as the main sources of evidence. The case study is 
preferred in examining contemporary events in situations where there is no significant need or desire 
for control over behavior. The case study relies on many of the same techniques used in histories but 
adds two potential sources of evidence: direct observations and systematic interviewing. Therefore, 
its unique strength is to deal with a full variety of evidence, beyond that what is available in the 
conventional historical study, which allows for a holistic portrayal of the phenomenon under study. 
Experiments are the method of choice when the researcher studies contemporary events and wants 
to have significant control over behavioral events. Experiments can take place in a laboratory or a 
field setting where behavior is manipulated in a direct, precise and systematic manner.
Finally, for some 'how' and 'why' questions that relate to contemporary events in which there is 
no significant need or desire for control over behavior, the choice of research strategy is somewhat 
ambivalent (Bonoma 1985; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Yin 1994). While the reasoning presented
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above points to a case study strategy, sometimes a survey or archival analysis of quantitative data is 
the preferred methodology. A rule of thumb is the availability of theory. If the research question can 
be answered based on well developed theory, a survey or archival analysis might fit. If existing 
theories either do not address the research question at all or do so in a way that is inadequate, a 
case study may be appropriate. Thus, if much is already known, or if what is unknown is very explicit, 
experience can be gained via limited interactions with research subjects. However, if little is known, 
or if issues are vague or complex, more extensive interaction may be required to gain necessary 
experience (Calder 1994).
Based on the guidelines presented above, we have decided to use a case study strategy for this 
research. First of all, this research answers a 'how' question to explain the event of resolving the 
market learning paradox in product innovation. Additionally, this research studies a complex 
phenomenon (i.e. organizational learning) that takes place in a complex and dynamic social setting 
(i.e. product innovation in established firms). Looking into such multifaceted events benefits from 
extensive interaction with research subjects by which event sequences can be clarified, overlapping 
causal factors disentangled, and contexts can be taken into account (Langley 1999; Lee 1999; 
Pettigrew 1990). Finally, because there is little detailed research on how firms resolve the market 
learning paradox in product innovation a primary motivation for this study is to contrast pre-existing 
understandings with observed empirical events to re-conceptualize and extend existing theories.
4.2 Definition and background of case study research
This section focuses attention on the definition and background of case study research, which is the 
strategy of choice in this research. We will briefly discuss its definition and forms, and the role of 
theory.
Case studies: definition and forms
Until now, we have progressed without a formal definition of case study research. In adopting a 
definition Yin (1994: 13) provides insights. This author formulates the scope of this strategy as 
follows: 'A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context'. Case studies should be seen as a comprehensive research strategy with specific 
approaches towards data collection and data analysis. They are not limited to a certain data 
collection method and can include in-depth interviews, archival data, questionnaires, and 
observations.
In general, a distinction is made between conducting single or multiple case studies (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner 2007; Yin 1994). The main factors determining this choice are the purpose of research, 
the research questions, and research conditions. Single cases are often chosen because they are 
unusually revelatory, extreme exemplars, or opportunities for unusual research access (Eisenhardt 
and Graebner 2007; Yin 1994). An example is Weick's (1993) well-known use of the extreme case of 
lost sensemaking of fire-fighters in the disaster at Mann Gulch. Dyer and Wilkens (1991) add that a 
single case study focuses attention on the unique and typical characteristics of the particular social 
scene. While single cases can richly describe the existence of a phenomenon, multiple case studies
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typically provide a stronger base for robust theory building and theory extension (Eisenhardt 1991; 
Glaser and Strauss 1967; Yin 1994). Multiple cases can be considered as discrete experiments to 
serve as replications, contrasts and extensions of theoretical insights. Moreover, involving multiple 
cases contains lower risk that data are insufficient when a specific case does not live up to 
expectations.
This research is concerned with combining and extending theory, rather than focusing attention on 
a very unique social scene or situation. Therefore, based on the discussion presented above, we have 
chosen to carry out multiple case studies18.
Case studies and the role of theory
The role of existing theory in case study research heavily depends on the nature of the research 
question (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). If the research question is phenomenon-driven, the 
researcher has to frame the research in terms of importance of the phenomenon and the lack of 
plausible existing theory. In these situations existing theory plays a limited role and, at the extreme, 
propositions draw on data alone, resulting in 'grounded theory' (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Somewhat 
more focus is achieved by a priori specification of some concepts of potential importance (Eisenhardt 
1989). If these constructs remain important as the research progresses emerging theories have a 
firmer grounding. However, the downside of this approach is that it may tip over to a premature 
specification of relationships which may bias and lim it eventual findings.
In situations of theory-driven research questions, the researcher has to frame the research within 
the context of more specific theory. In these contexts, a theoretical framework plays a more 
prominent role in a sense that it has more impact in guiding empirical work than in phenomenon- 
driven research. Empirical data gathered through case studies is used to re-conceptualize and extend 
existing theory (Burawoy 1991). In contrast with the grounded theory approach, the researcher 
examines the literature relevant to a specific problem area, and employs the empirical data to fill in 
its gaps, reveal its flaws, elaborate its meaning, and extend its coverage.
Our research is rather theory-driven. Theory on market orientation and product development is 
enriched with theory on organizational knowledge and learning. Within the boundaries of these 
theories, a conceptual framework is developed based on several theoretical assumptions. Empirical 
data from the case studies is used to refine this framework and extend insights on how firms resolve 
the market learning paradox in the course of really new product development.
4.3 Research setting
This section discusses the research setting, which is the chemical industry. It focuses on the 
motivation for choosing a single industry and why the chemical industry was chosen. It also provides
18 Additionally, because our work is concerned with theory combining and extension aiming at laying the 
groundwork for testing propositions across cases, it is related with a rather objective view on case study 
research. This view is different in terms of research activities, goals, and epistemology than the perspective 
that sees case study research as strategy to give 'thick descriptions', emphasize the social construction of 
reality and focuses on revealing how extant theory operates in particular examples (Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007; Gibbert et al. 2008).
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information on the industry background. This section is partly based on literature and partly based 
on in-depth interviews with seven industry experts that were interviewed on the nature of the 
industry (table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Consulted industry experts
Role in the industry Years of experience in the industry
R&D manager of multinational 30+
Director business development of multinational 18
Director European trade organization 30+
Operational manager research consortium 5
Editor-in-chief Dutch trade journal 10
Consultant 12
Consultant 30+
Motivation
The research setting of the study is limited to the context of the chemical industry. Although the 
choice of a single industry limits the generalizability of the results, it also reduces problems that arise 
when sampling from different industries. Different industries increase extraneous sources of variance 
which have to be controlled for when examining firm level phenomena (Bass et al. 1978). Specifically, 
the central elements in this study, such as organizational innovation processes and the nature of 
knowledge resources, have proven to differ substantially across industries (King and Zeithaml 2003; 
Pavitt 1984; Souitaris 2002; von Krogh et al. 1994). The need for controlling extraneous sources of 
variance can distract from identifying a robust set of firm-level variables, specifically when samples 
are small such as in case study research. Additionally, working with data from single industries is not 
uncommon in research on market oriented innovation and has led to relevant insights (see e.g. Bruni 
and Verona 2009; De Wit et al. 2007; Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 2004; Sorescu et al. 2003).
The chemical industry was chosen as research setting because it is an important manufacturing 
industry. Its European sales figure was 333 billion Euros in 2007 (CEFIC 2009) (1.2% of total GDP), and 
it enables innovation in wide variety of downstream value chains (König et al. 2006). The industry is 
relatively established with defined boundaries which increased the likelihood that a comprehensive 
inventory of knowledge resources could be identified (King and Zeithaml 2003). Additionally, really 
new product innovation is of high strategic importance in this industry, which is highlighted by the 
chemical industry being subject to some classical product innovation studies (Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt 1993; Rothwell 1972). Finally, working together with (potential) customers in product 
innovation is essential for bringing new chemical products to the market. In a lot of product 
categories, new chemical products are specialties that have to be tailored to specific customer needs. 
Moreover, the role of marketing in product innovation, relative to research, has increased in recent 
decades. The chemical industry has moved from 'high' to 'medium' tech in industry classifications 
(Hatzichronoglou 1997; Mizik and Jacobson 2003), has increased its attention towards finding new 
applications for existing technologies (König et al. 2006), and has become more focused on product 
quality and customer satisfaction (Walsh and Lodorfos 2002). As one of the industry experts put it:
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'The general shift that I see in our company, is a shift from research and production knowledge towards 
knowledge on different product applications.'
Industry background
The chemical industry is a capital intensive process industry which creates and transforms chemical 
substances to provide the market with functionally advantageous non-assembled products. It is 
dominated by large multinationals, has its roots in Europe, and is over a hundred years old (Barnett 
and Clark 1996; Cesaroni et al. 2004; Mahdi et al. 2002; Pisano 1997; Stobaugh 1988; Van Gils 2010).
At its foundation, growth was mainly based on developments in organic chemistry. Firms that 
mastered this general purpose technology diversified into product markets such as pharmaceuticals, 
explosives, and photographic materials (Hofmann and Budde 2006). The next wave of development 
was heavily supported by progress in polymer chemistry which started in the 1920s (Cesaroni et al.
2004). Polymer chemistry provided a common technology base to develop six distinct new product 
markets: plastics, fibers, rubbers, elastomers, surface coatings, and adhesives.
During the 1950s and 1960s, the industry showed strong expansion (Arora and Gambardella 1998). 
The demand for chemical products grew rapidly as a result of increasing substitution of natural 
products. Plastics, in particular, replaced products such as paper, wood, or cotton in many 
applications, as they were cheaper and easier to process. Additionally, chemical companies began to 
spread outside their home markets and true multinational organizations began to emerge.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, many firms in the industry were confronted with excess 
capacity. Demand leveled-off and concerns about 'limits to growth' suggested that feedstock (i.e. oil) 
was running out (Achilladelis et al. 1990; Walsh and Lodorfos 2002). Additionally, on the supply side, 
the growth rate of technological opportunities based on traditional chemistry slowed down. It 
became harder for companies to grow faster than the average manufacturing industry, and many 
were forced to control costs (Arora and Gambardella 1998). The chemical industry entered an era of 
rationalization and restructuring, and lots of firms narrowed their business portfolios. Western firms 
moved out of their commodity markets and increased their focus on product quality and customer 
satisfaction in a limited number of markets (Walsh and Lodorfos 2002).
Merger and acquisition activities still continue today. They are mainly driven by the need of 
established players to focus on the most promising parts of their portfolios and create shareholder 
value (Hofmann and Budde 2006). These moves are complemented by geographical expansion 
making chemicals a truly global industry with world-scale oligopolies (Arora et al. 2004). The industry 
in its contemporary form can be roughly divided into three strategic groups 19,20: (1) firms that are
19 We restricted the chemical industry to the C20 NACE code. In our view, the chemical industry does not 
include the petrochemical arms of the large oil companies because developing and producing chemicals can 
not be considered as their core business. The same argument holds for food processing, pharmaceutical, and 
downstream chemical or material processing firms.
20 Very large corporations, such as BASF, DOW Chemical, and DuPont, are often active in more than one 
strategic group.
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focusing on commodity chemicals and materials (e.g. LyondellBasell); (2) firms that focus on specialty 
chemicals and materials (e.g. DSM); (3) and firms that focus on agrochemicals (e.g. Monsanto).
What will the future bring for the chemical industry? Spitz (2003) argues that it is possible that it 
becomes tomorrow's steel industry with only a few players left. Also tomorrow's textile industry is 
mentioned, which comes with the migration from industrialized countries to Asia and the Middle 
East. Several European initiatives (e.g. ECMSA's scenarios 2010, a vision for the UK chemicals 
industry, and CEFIC's European Chemicals Industry Scenarios Horizon 2015) have taken place to build 
up a vision for the industry. All these initiatives identify product development and innovation as one 
of the most important drivers for a positive future of the European chemical industry (Heinzelbecker
2005). Concerning technology-based product innovation, that has always been the main focus of the 
chemical industry, new opportunities are rising along the lines of emerging fields such as 
biotechnology, and nanotechnology. Additionally, non-traditional types of product innovation, such 
as finding new applications for existing product technologies and adding services, have gained 
attention (König et al. 2006).
4.4 Case selection
This section discusses case selection. It focuses specific attention on defining the unit of analysis, 
selecting organizations, and the selection of really new product innovation projects as main cases.
Unit of analysis
The main unit of analysis is the really new product innovation project in chemical firms. This small 
unit of analysis helps to focus data collection because it allows for studying well defined 
organizational events (Yin 1994). However, really new product innovation projects are not viewed in 
this study as self-containing units of analysis, but as visible arenas for the interaction between old 
and new organizational market knowledge. Thus, dynamics in organizational resources are placed 
under a magnifying glass by studying market learning in individual projects. As Pettigrew (1990: 269) 
put it, the research focuses on both 'vertical and horizontal organizational levels of analysis and the 
interconnections between those levels through time'. This approach is not uncommon. Comparable 
studies focusing on the interface between product innovation projects and the organization are, for 
instance, Leonard-Barton (1992), and Danneels (2002; 2007).
Selecting organizations
We started case selection by compiling a list of chemical companies and contact details using 
membership lists of trade organizations (e.g. VNCI in The Netherlands), research consortia (e.g. DPI in 
The Netherlands), and the European Industrial Research Management Association. Selection criteria 
were that the companies (1) had a significant presence in The Netherlands, Germany or Belgium for 
reasons of accessibility; (2) had a significant size (over 100 million Euros in sales revenue). After 
negotiating access, we were able to work with six chemical companies. Because prior research has 
shown that most marketing and product innovation activities take place at the level of the business
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unit (Adler et al. 1999; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Piercy 1985; Workman et al. 1998), one business 
unit, instead of the corporate level21, was selected as organizational context The size of these 
business units ranged from 270 to 4,800 million Euros in annual sales revenue with an average size of 
1,300 million Euros.
Selecting really new product innovation projects as cases
The second step in case selection was selecting really new product innovation projects as main cases. 
With regard to case selection, Eisenhardt (1989: 545) suggests that a 'number between 4 and 10 
cases usually works well'. When fewer than 4 cases are selected it is often difficult to develop 
convincing theory but with more than 10 cases there is a substantial risk to end up with data 
overload.
Instead of random or stratified sampling from a population as is common in large-scale hypotheses 
testing research, case study sampling is often based on theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser and Strauss 
1967; Yin 1994). As mentioned above, we were interested in studying how mature firms resolve the 
market learning paradox in the course or really new product innovation projects. To arrive at general 
answers, a wide variety of really new product innovation projects was required. Based on theory 
(Abernathy and Clark 1985; Garcia and Calantone 2002; Tushman and Smith 2002) and the in-depth 
interviews with industry experts discussed above, three really new product categories were 
developed alongside a technology and market axis. In combination these categories cover the total 
available really new product space.
As a process industry, the chemical industry is characterized by the interrelated nature of product 
and process technology (Barnett and Clark 1996; Pisano 1997). Changes in one or both of these types 
of technology can have a significant impact on product properties. Therefore, regarding the 
technology axis, both are considered. Product technology refers to the chemistry that underlies a 
product, such as the structure of molecules, while process technology refers to process control, such 
as the temperature of a reaction. The market axis focuses on the application market, which refers to 
the downstream application in which the product is used, such as a specific vehicle part. Really new 
product categories are defined relative to the underlying product/process technology and the market 
application of existing business unit products (figure 4.1).
21 All companies in the research are multi-divisional.
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Figure 4.1: Three distinct really new product innovation project categories
The first category is labeled Tech-discontinuities. The product innovation projects in this category 
are based on product and/or process technologies that are new to the business unit and are focused 
on existing application markets. The second category contains Market-discontinuities. Projects in this 
category are based on the business unit's existing product and process technologies and focus on 
new application markets. The final category, Tech/market discontinuities, refers to projects that are 
based on both new technologies and focus on new application markets.
Concerning sampling, we followed the logic of contrary replication and replication (Yin 1994). Our 
aim was to study one project in each category (i.e. contrary replication) in three business units of 
different organizations (i.e. replication). We also aimed to study projects of which the output was 
just before market introduction, or had been introduced into the market less than two years ago. The 
rationale for this second requirement was that studying long finished projects would reduce the 
chances of contacting suitable respondents and the ones that could be contacted might have severe 
problems of remembering the details of the project (Huber and Power 1985). These requirements 
proved not completely feasible in the time available. Three initial business units, Alpha, Beta, and 
Gamma, could deliver seven projects which were studied in parallel. Then we filled the gaps with 
three additional projects from three other business units. The total sample consisted of ten projects 
in six business units of six different chemical firms (figure 4.2).
The outputs of these projects, the actual products, had been introduced into the market less than 
three years ago (Heat, Green, Gears, Diffuse, Additive, Anti-resist, Foam, Dye) or were close to market 
introduction (Anti-tracking and Bond). Because it is not easy to set up really new product innovation 
projects in mature organizations (Dougherty and Hardy 1996), financial success can take several 
years after market introduction (Sorescu et al. 2003), and many new product ideas eventually fail to 
be launched into the market (Barczak et al. 2009; Cooper 2001), we considered market introduction 
as an intermediate measure for effective really new product innovation. From this perspective, at 
least, eight of the ten projects under study could be considered successful at the start of our study.
Tech 
discontinuities (1)
Tech/market 
discontinuities (3)
Continuities 
(not addressed in 
this study)
Market 
discontinuities (2)
Known Unknown
Market
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4.5 Data collection
Case studies can accommodate a rich variety of data sources such as interviews, archival data, and 
observations. If the research studies more than one case and phenomena under study are of 
strategic nature, as in the case of product innovation, interviews often become the primary data 
source of choice (Eisenhardt and Graeber 2007). This research is no exception. Data on really new 
product innovation projects and their interactions with the business unit in which they took place 
were mainly collected by interviewing key actors involved.
We used two semi-structured interview protocols to collect data (appendices A and B). The first 
protocol was used in interviews with multiple respondents that were knowledgeable about general 
aspects of the business units, such as its products, structure, innovation strategy, processes, and 
systems, but had limited involvement in day-to-day activities of the projects under study. The 
majority of these interviews were held with middle and upper management. Using multiple 
respondents provided the opportunity to mitigate potential biases of any individual respondent by 
allowing information to be confirmed across several sources (Goldon 1992; Huber and Power 1985). 
The second interview protocol was used to collect specific project data from informants that had 
been, or were still, active in day-to-day project activities. These interviews contained both general 
and more specific questions and were based on the conceptual framework that was presented in 
chapter three. The initial questions focused, as Pettigrew (1987) has suggested, on the content (what 
was it about) and the context (why did it come about) of the project which were followed by 
questions focused on the process (how did it take place). In most cases, a single question ('Could you 
please describe how the project developed over time?') was enough to trigger the main process 
story. After this initial story, we followed up with in-depth questions, focusing on specific dates, 
working practices, milestones, events, and outcomes. Similar to studies as Ancona and Caldwell 
(1992) and Danneels (2002), some accounts were retrospective and some were of current events. 
We interviewed multiple respondents with different functional backgrounds per project. This 
approach allowed for developing rich stories, since different respondents typically focus on 
complementary aspects of major decisions (Dougherty 1990). Since there was no list of people that
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had been or were involved in the projects under study, the selection of respondents was based on 
information provided by other respondents. We finished data collection when additional data 
resulted in limited additional understanding (Eisenhardt 1989; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Lee 1999).
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the interviews. Both interview protocols allowed for expansion, 
illustration and digression. Respondents ranged from business managers to front-liners and the 
interviews lasted between 50 minutes and 2.5 hours. Sometimes notes were taken and all interviews 
were taped and transcribed verbatim, resulting in over 700 single spaced pages of transcript. We 
emphasized discussing facts, which are less subject to both cognitive biases and impression 
management (Huber and Power 1985; Miller et al. 1997). All interviews were held by the author 
personally and were followed up with clarifying e-mails and telephone calls when needed. Although 
most interviews were carried out on-site, six project interviews had to be held by telephone because 
key informants were located more than 500 kilometers away, which reflects the global nature of the 
industry. The author was in contact with respondents and had several site visits over a total period 
of, at least, one year, which allowed for tracking some project developments over time.
We supplemented interview data with internal and external archival data, such as new product 
proposals, product innovation protocols, product announcements, product catalogs, strategy 
overviews, annual reports, presentations, press releases, web pages, biographies, and business press 
articles, as much as possible, resulting in additional data of 120 pages per business unit and 90 pages 
per project on average.
Overall, the combination of two types of interviews and archival data collection enabled a rich 
understanding of the market learning in the projects and provided the opportunity for data 
triangulation (Jick 1979; Schwenk 1985), which counter-balances the weaknesses of one method with 
the strengths of another.
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Table 4.2: Interviews of the research
Interviews Business Unit (Protocol I) Interviews Project (Protocol II)
Business
unit
Job title Duration
(min.)
Project Job title Duration
(min.)
Alpha • Business Manager
• VP Corporate Technology
• R&D Manager
• Global Marketing 
Manager
90
90
110
70
Heat
(Alpha)
• General Product Manager
• Application Development 
Manager
• Product Developer
90
70
90
Gears
(Alpha)
• Business Development 
Manager
• Senior Research Scientist
100
50
Bond
(Alpha)
• Application Development 
Manager
• Business Development 
Manager
• Business Development 
Manager
90
70
70
Beta • Business Manager
• Global Marketing 
Manager
• Innovation Manager
• Innovation Manager
• R&D Manager
90
60
70
70
150
Anti-tracking
(Beta)
• Technical Service and 
Development Manager
• Sales Manager
• Senior Research Scientist
90
70
90
Anti-resist
(Beta)
• Business Manager
• Research Scientist
• Project Manager
90
80
70
Gamma • Global Marketing 
Director
• General Manager Global 
Technology
• Financial Analyst
135
110
70
Dye
(Gamma)
• Marketing Project Manager
• Technologist
• Application Development 
Specialist
100
50
80
Foam
(Gamma)
• Industry Manager
• Project Manager
• Commercial Manager
100
60
60
Delta • Technology Deployment 
Manager
80 Green
(Delta)
• Business Manager
• Business Development 
Manager
• Research and Technical 
Manager
70
80
100
Sigma • Head of New Business 
Development and 
Innovation
• R&D Manager
100
90
Diffuse
(Sigma)
• Head of Technology and 
Product Development
• Product manager
120
80
Theta • Manager New Markets 70 Additive
(Theta)
• Business Manager
• Key Account Development 
Manager
• Senior Research Associate
80
130
100
Total 16 respondents 1455 Total 28 respondents 2330
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4.6 Coding and analyzing data
When using case studies to build, extend, or integrate theory, often some overlap exists between 
studying existing theory, data collection, coding, and analysis (Burawoy 1991; Eisenhardt 1989). 
Literature provides conceptual frameworks to aid in the collection and interpretation of data, while 
data analysis can point to other relevant literature. While this 'controlled opportunism' is considered 
appropriate in order to take 'advantage of the uniqueness of a specific case and the emergence of 
new themes to improve resultant theory' (Eisenhardt 1989: 541), it can easily lead to data overload 
(Pettigrew 1990). In order to make sense of the data and avoid developing overly complex theory, we 
used several steps in coding and further analyses of the data (Eisenhardt 1989).
Coding
The first step in coding has been analyzing data from single cases. The aim was to get familiar with 
each case as a stand-alone entity. These analyses allowed for a unique case description. We 
thoroughly read transcripts and documents on the organizational context and the really new product 
innovation project and divided the information into meaningful fragments (Miles and Huberman 
1994). These fragments were coded (i.e. labeled with a few words to indicate the meaning of the 
fragment)22. Initially, we coded fragments in two ways. First, when a fragment referred directly to a 
concept of the conceptual framework, such as 'senior management involvement' or 'market 
knowledge', it was coded as such. Second, new codes were developed when fragments did not fit the 
conceptual model, such as the 'the level of investment'. After this initial coding, we focused on each 
individual concept and developed more detailed codes, such as different types of 'senior 
management involvement'. Eventually our data could be captured by the set of concepts that we 
now briefly discuss.
The content of market learning (i.e. market knowledge) could be described as a multi-dimensional 
construct consisting of four dimensions: segment knowledge, product usage knowledge, application 
need knowledge, and customer knowledge. Segment knowledge refers to knowledge on market 
segment size, growth rate and turbulence, and stakeholders such as competitors, distributors, and 
regulating groups, which can influence customer behavior. Product usage knowledge refers to 
knowledge on how a product is used by customers and knowledge on how a product behaves in 
downstream manufacturing processes. For example, if an organization has a long history of selling a 
specific engineering plastic it probably has developed deep knowledge on how the product behaves 
in a variety of downstream manufacturing processes and what processing properties are specifically 
valued by customers. In contrast, if a new product is under development there is a limited product 
history and the organization has no product usage knowledge. It has to develop that knowledge by 
engaging in customer tests in the course of the product development trajectory. Application need 
knowledge is about knowledge on customer needs and wants a product should satisfy in specific 
applications and refers to specific application requirements. For example, if an organization has a 
long history of selling engineering plastics that are used in a specific vehicle part it probably has
22 For coding and data handling we used the qualitative data analysis package NVivo.
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developed deep knowledge about heat resistance and mechanical properties requirements for 
products used in this part. In contrast, if the downstream application is new to the firm it has limited 
knowledge on its requirements at the start of a product innovation trajectory. The organization has 
to develop that knowledge by discussions with (potential) customers and customer tests in the 
course of a product development trajectory. Product usage knowledge is distinct from application 
need knowledge. In a product development project, organizational members can target applications 
that are familiar to the firm (i.e. familiar application need knowledge) with a technology, or product, 
that is newly developed (i.e. unfamiliar product usage knowledge). In another product development 
project, in contrast, organizational members can use products or technologies that were already 
introduced in the market by means of earlier projects and target unfamiliar applications. Finally, 
customer knowledge does not refer to knowledge on customers needs and wants, but relates to 
additional knowledge related to customers, such as contact information, knowledge on the 'decision 
making unit' and knowledge on the innovation strategy of customers.
In this research, product usage knowledge, application need knowledge, and customer knowledge 
relates to business-to-business customers of chemical organizations such as downstream 
manufacturers. For instance, if product usage knowledge is mentioned this is about the usage of the 
chemical product by a downstream manufacturer. Table 4.3 presents and overview of the four 
market knowledge dimensions and the differences between exploitation and exploration on each 
dimension
Table 4.3: Market knowledge dimensions and the differences between exploitation and exploration
Segment Product usage Application need Customer
Answers the 
question
'What market 
segment is 
focused on?'
'What
product/technology is 
used?'
'What applications 
are targeted?'
'What downstream 
parties are 
(potentially) buying?'
Exploitation 
in market 
learning
Market learning 
related to a 
market segment 
that is already 
defined by the 
firm
Market learning 
related to the 
deployment of firm 
products/technologies 
that are already used 
in the market
Market learning 
related to
applications that are 
familiar to the firm
Market learning 
related to customer 
contacts that are 
familiar to the firm
Exploration in
market
learning
Market learning 
related to a newly 
defined market 
segment
Market learning 
related to the 
deployment of 
technology that is new 
to the firm and not 
used in the market
Market learning 
related to
applications that are 
new to the firm
Market learning 
related to potential 
customers that are 
new to the firm
Next to distinguishing between four dimensions of market knowledge, based on our empirical data 
we could also further detail the four concepts of ambidextrous marketing organizations (i.e. 
marketing function, senior management involvement, market knowledge generation and market 
knowledge integration). This refinement is briefly presented in table 4.4.
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Table 4.4: Refinement of the concepts of the ambidextrous marketing organization
Concept Description
Marketing function
• specialist(s) Organizational employee(s) that perform(s) the marketing function is/are specialized in 
the sense that establishing an interface with the market is part of his/her/their formal 
job description.
• Low task focus The marketing function as a whole is highly integrated in the mainstream organization.
• High task focus The marketing function as a whole is less integrated in the mainstream organization.
Senior management involvement
• Directing Results directly from the organization's innovation strategy and relates to initiating the 
generation and integrating of market knowledge at the start of a product innovation 
project. It refers to senior managers giving concrete assignments to employees at a 
lower hierarchical level to update market knowledge on specific dimensions.
• Framing Results directly from the organization's innovation strategy and relates to initiating the 
generation and integration of market knowledge at the start of a product innovation 
project. When framing, senior management does not give concrete assignments but 
articulates a, less specific, strategic direction that can trigger the generation and 
integration of market knowledge. Framing is the articulation of the business unit's vision 
of what it wants to achieve beyond the near future.
• Supporting Refers to the allocation of human and financial resources to carry out necessary market 
analyses and acting as sounding board for project members in the development and 
commercialization phases of the product development project.
• Controlling Refers to tracking progress in market analyses, detecting deviations from original plans, 
and taking action when it is deemed necessary.
Market knowledge generation
• Market scanning Generating marketing knowledge in the initiation phase of a product development 
project by using desk research in combination with visiting conferences or trade-fairs 
and/or visiting existing customers.
• Collaborating 
with customers
Generating market knowledge in the development and commercialization phases of a 
product development project by collaborating with customers to test and discuss 
prototypes.
• Using framework Structuring market knowledge generation in the initiation phase by using a formalized 
'market assessment' process that supports project members with market mapping and 
segmentation tools to collect and interpret new market information.
• Hiring segment 
specialist(s)
Hiring (a) new employee(s) in the development and commercialization phases that has/ 
have extensive knowledge on the market segment that the firm is entering by carrying 
out the product innovation project.
Market knowledge integration
• Using the 
hierarchy of 
authority
Senior managers collect market knowledge, including the knowledge that is generated 
by employees that are acting on a lower hierarchical level, and other relevant product 
innovation knowledge in the initiation phase of a project, and integrate it by developing 
the business plan.
• Using internal 
organizational 
network
Employees acting on a relatively low hierarchical level use their internal organizational 
network to integrate market knowledge with other relevant product innovation 
knowledge in the initiation phase of a project.
• Having recurrent 
team meetings
Recurrent meetings between project members with different functional backgrounds to 
discuss progress and insights, and synchronize work in the development and 
commercialization phases of a project.
• Discussing 
prototypes
Project members from different functional backgrounds discuss prototypes in the 
development and commercialization phases of a project.
• Using cross­
functional 
implementation 
framework
Project members from different functional backgrounds use a cross-functional 
implementation framework, such as a Stage-Gate methodology, in the development and 
commercialization phases of a project.
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Further analyses
During coding we generated preliminary notes of insights that emerged on relationships between 
concepts and a chronological case description was made per case. This description was fed back for 
review by several respondents. In addition, we collaborated with two additional researchers that 
worked in the same research group but had only limited involvement in the research project. Based 
on the interview data and some working definitions of emerging constructs we asked each of the two 
researchers to develop a schematic description of one case. Resulting differences in perspective were 
discussed among the total group of researchers until consensus was reached.
The cases were then compared with each other. The rationale behind this step is that cross-case 
searching tactics force researchers to move beyond initial impressions (Eisenhardt 1989). We focused 
on similarities and differences between cases within separate project categories and compared them 
with cases from other categories. Significant discrepancies and agreements were noted and further 
investigated.
Based on the analytical steps described above, we refined the initial conceptual framework. To 
further sharpen this framework and test its validity, it was systematically compared with evidence 
from each case and with existing literature (Eisenhardt 1989). Iterating back and forward between 
theory, the refined conceptual framework, and data resulted in the final set of organizational 
configurations to resolve the market learning paradox in the course of really new product 
development projects.
4.7 Presentation of findings
The challenge in presenting multiple case study research is to stay within spatial constraints while 
simultaneously conveying both the emergent theory and the empirical evidence supporting it 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). The tactic that is used in this research is to present the theory in 
sections. The following three chapters will provide descriptions and analyses of all individual cases. 
Each of these chapters presents the cases of a specific really new product category. Thus, we 
deliberately will present the findings in such a way that they provide the most insight into the 
separate cases. As a consequence, a general description of a specific business unit in which a project 
took place will sometimes be presented in two chapters. For example, projects Heat and Gears were 
both carried out in business unit Alpha but will be discussed in two separate chapters. Accordingly, 
the general characteristics of Alpha will also be described in these two chapters.
Each chapter will describe three or four cases. Each case description will start with a general 
overview of the project and the business unit in which it was carried out. Subsequently, the 
description follows the framework that was presented in chapter three. We will focus attention and 
present evidence on how market learning took place during the product innovation trajectory and 
how the four elements of the organizational configuration were put into practice. We will also 
describe the nature of additional concepts if these emerged during data analyses. Each chapter will 
conclude with an overall comparison of projects from a specific project category.
Next to individual case descriptions, a cross-case comparison will be presented in an additional 
chapter. This chapter is crafted around the concepts of the revised conceptual framework. Since
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multiple-case study research only retains relationships that are replicated among a significant 
number of cases, cross-case comparisons are often less detailed than single case descriptions 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). This research is no exception. The cross-case comparison that will 
be presented in the additional chapter is more parsimonious than the individual case descriptions. 
However, because it is based on insights that were found across cases, it is more robust.
4.8 Rigor of the research
Scandura and Williams (2000: 1263) have reminded us that: 'w ithout rigor, relevance in management 
research can not be claimed'. In the following section we will discuss how we undertook enhancing 
the rigor of our research.
Four criteria are commonly used to assess the rigor of field research (Campbell 1975; Gibbert et al. 
2008): internal validity, construct validity, external validity, and reliability. Internal validity refers to 
the causal relationships between variables. The issue at stake is whether the researcher provides a 
powerful and compelling causal argument. Construct validity refers to the quality of the 
operationalization of relevant concepts. As such, it focuses on the extent to which a study 
investigates what it claims to investigate. External validity is about the generalizability of the study23. 
This criterion is grounded in the belief that theories must be shown to account for phenomena not 
only in the setting in which they are studied, but also in other settings. Finally, reliability refers to the 
absence of random error, enabling other researchers to arrive at the same results if they conduct the 
research along the same steps. It should be emphasized that the three validity criteria are not 
independent of each other. As Gibbert and colleagues (2008: 1468) state: 'w ithout a clear theoretical 
and causal logic (internal validity), and without a careful link between the theoretical conjecture and 
the empirical observations (construct validity), there can be no external validity in the first place'.
Several researchers have provided measures for meeting these criteria in case study research 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994; Eisenhardt and Graeber 2007; Gibbert et al. 2008). Table 4.3 presents the 
measures that we took to meet the criteria mentioned above.
23 Neither single nor multiple case studies allow for statistical generalization (Numagami 1998; Yin 1994). This 
does not mean, however, that case studies are devoid to generalization. Instead of statistical generalization, 
which generalizes from empirical observations to a population, case studies should be subject to analytical 
generalization, which generalizes from empirical observations to theory (Yin 1994).
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Table 4.5: Measures to enhance case study rigor
Criteria Measures Research phase
Internal
validity
Conceptual framework with relationships explicitly derived from 
literature (Gibbert et al. 2008)
Pattern matching of cases within and between product innovation 
categories and with existing theory (Yin 1994; Eisenhardt 1989; 
Gibbert et al. 2008)
Explanation of differences between patterns (Yin 1994)
Design 
Data analyses
Data analyses
Construct
validity
Conceptual framework as a priori specification of concepts 
(Eisenhardt 1989)
Triangulation through multiple sources of evidence, and multiple 
informants per case (Yin 1994; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; 
Gibbert et al. 2008)
Description of data collection circumstances (Gibbert et al. 2008) 
Reviews by key informants and peers (Yin 1994; Gibbert et al. 2008)
Design 
Data collection
Data collection 
Data analyses
External
validity
Selection of multiple cases based on theoretical rationale (Eisenhardt 
1989; Gibbert et al. 2008)
Details on research setting (Gibbert et al. 2008)
Design
Design
Reliability Development and documentation of interview protocols (Yin 1994; 
Gibbert et al. 2008)
Developing a case study database with all available protocols, 
interview transcripts, archival data and notes (Yin 1994; Gibbert et al. 
2008)
Design
Data collection /  
analyses
A significant level of internal validity was reached by developing an initial conceptual framework 
that was derived from existing theory and presented causal relationships. Additionally, we compared 
the causal relationships that were found with other cases from the same product innovation 
category and with cases from other categories and successfully attributed differences to several 
concepts. We dealt with construct validity by a priori specification of potentially important concepts 
based on existing literature, including multiple sources of evidence (interviews and archival data) and 
multiple informants per case, providing a description on how we collected data, and allowing for 
reviews by key informants and peers. Enhancing external validity (i.e. analytical generalization) was 
achieved by a theoretically based selection of cases, and discussing the chemical industry as research 
setting. Finally, a significant level of reliability was reached by developing and documenting interview 
protocols, and developing a case study database.
4.9 Summary
This chapter discussed the research strategy and the outline of the empirical study. This research 
adopted a multiple case study strategy to re-conceptualize and refine theory on market oriented
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product innovation. Empirical data were collected in the research setting of the chemical industry. 
Although this study investigated the interaction between market learning and organizational 
configurations, the product innovation project served as main unit of analysis. Ten projects from 
three really new product innovation categories were researched. These projects were carried out in 
six business units of six different multinational chemical firms. Data were mainly collected by using 
in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants. Main steps in data analyses were a single 
case analysis, a comparison of findings between different cases in the same category, and a 
comparison of findings between cases from different categories. These steps will also be used to 
present findings. Finally, the chapter described the measures that were taken to enhance the rigor of 
the research.
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5 Tech-discontinuities: Heat, Anti-tracking, and Green
This chapter describes the findings on cases that fall into the 'tech-discontinuities' project category. 
These projects are based on product technology and/or process technology that is unknown, or new, 
to the organizations in which they are carried out and are focused on application markets that are 
already known to the firm24. Successively, the chapter presents the findings on cases 'Heat' (Alpha), 
'Anti-tracking' (Beta), and 'Green' (Delta). Case descriptions are structured around the concepts that 
were presented in the conceptual framework in chapter 3. The chapter is concluded with an overall 
comparison.
5.1 Heat (Alpha)
Alpha is a business unit of a multinational chemical company and a global player in the engineering 
plastics industry. Important end markets of Alpha's products are the automotive, electrical and 
electronics (E&E), and the packaging industries. Companies in these end markets use Alpha's 
materials to fabricate their own products which they sell to the general public. In 2008, the business 
unit had around 760 million Euros in annual sales and employed about 1,650 people (table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Key numerical data Alpha 2002-2008 (based on annual reports)
Alpha 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Sales (mln. Euro)
EBIT (operating profit) 
EBIT/sales ratio (%) 
Employees
R&D expenses (mln. Euro) 
R&D/sales ratio (%)
579
36
6.2
1,190
26
4.5
566
29
5.1
1,204
26
4.6
624
46
7.4
1,158
24
3.8
705
87
12.3
1,273
27
3.8
735
118
16.1
1,242
31
4.2
807
98
12.1
1,462
38
4.7
761
58
7.6
1,649
42
5.5
Alpha has a matrix organization. The main activities are divided into three regions and four global 
product lines. Each product line has a business manager and three regional product managers. The 
product lines have their own R&D. Additionally, there are regional development and sales teams that 
focus on important multi-product end-markets such as automotive and E&E. Figure 5.1 presents a 
simplified organizational chart. Recently, Alpha has introduced a new product: Heat.
24 In all cases in this chapter, the underlying technology is not only new to the firm but also 'new to the world'. 
In the terminology of Garcia and Calantone (2002) these are product innovation projects with a 'macro-level' 
technology discontinuity. Hence, the tech-discontinuity category does not involve cases in which an 
organization bought or licensed-in a particular product and/or process technology.
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Figure 5.1: Simplified organizational chart Alpha (based on interviews and Alpha's website)
General outline of project Heat
Project Heat was carried out in one of Alpha's four globally operating product lines. Among other 
applications, the plastic of this product line is used in engine components of vehicles, so-called 
'under the bonnet' (UTB) applications. As a project, Heat was developed in Europe and required a 
medium level of investment. Significant technological research had to take place but the new 
product could be manufactured in existing plants. The project fits the 'tech-discontinuities' category 
because new technology was used to target familiar market applications.
In 2003, it was recognized by the product line that their general grade of plastic would not meet 
future (5+ years) heat resistance requirements of UTB applications. The need for efficient 
combustion in engines, driven by EURO 5 and EURO 6 regulations, would result in engine designs 
with higher operating temperatures. At these temperatures the general grade would melt. At the 
same time, an ongoing research program to build fundamental knowledge on failure mechanisms of 
their plastic under high heat reached a technical breakthrough. This research program was a joint 
effort of Alpha's R&D department and the corporate research organization of the chemical 
multinational. The product line initiated a number of small research assignments to develop a 
perspective on how long it would take to develop a new grade of plastic based on this breakthrough. 
Based on these research assignments, the European product manager decided to write an official 
product development proposal. This request was approved by the product development leadership 
counsel of the product line in 2005, which started a more formalized plastic grade development 
trajectory. The grade development trajectory consisted of several rounds of technical testing and 
dealing with issues of manufacturability. The grade development trajectory brought the number of 
polymer recipes down from about 25 to two. In June 2006, Alpha managed to develop collaborations 
with several engine part producers and two European automotive OEMs25. From that point onwards, 
Alpha had to achieve several technical approvals at the OEMs for which it had intensive contacts with 
its development partners. From 2007 onwards, achieving technical approvals was accompanied by 
achieving commercial approvals. In 2008 the new grade of high temperature plastic was nominated
25 OEM = Original Equipment Manufacturer. In the context of the automotive industry, OEMs are, for instance, 
Volkswagen and Renault.
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to be used in a next generation vehicle program which was introduced in October that year. At that 
time, several new technical approval trajectories with other OEMs had already started.
In general, Alpha regards project Heat as a successful project. The new product could be 
introduced into the market and generated spin-off projects. It was developed in a relatively short 
period of time and spending was only a bit more than budgeted. Table 5.2 presents Heat's key 
characteristics with the corresponding case study evidence.
Table 5.2: Key characteristics Heat
Characteristics Case study evidence
Project category: 
Tech-discontinuity
'...first member of the next generation family of grades.' press release 
'The project involves a new underlying chemistry' Product manager 
'Let's say, (Heat ed.) is really a new grade, a new type of material for existing 
applications. (Heat ed.) is the fruit of our research people' Marketing manager 
'In this project we commercialized a technical breakthrough' Product developer
Investment level: 
Medium
'..the production, polymerization and compounding, does not change' Product manager 
'The basic polymer stays the same. Otherwise you have to build a new factory. That's 
really big money' Business manager
'We had to invest a significant amount of money to develop the product' Product 
developer
Market learning
Project Heat was focused on a market segment (automotive UTB), applications (turbo-charger and 
air/fuel system components) and customers (engine part producers and automotive OEMs) that 
were already known to Alpha. Consequently, it already had significant market knowledge on these 
dimensions at the start of the project. In contrast, because the grade of plastic was new to the 
market, Alpha had limited product usage knowledge. It had to learn about product usage by 
exploratory probes of different prototypes in the market during the development and 
commercialization phases of the project.
Exploration and exploitation in market learning were combined across market knowledge 
dimensions in the development phase, and over time. Sufficient market knowledge was generated 
and market knowledge integration occurred without any considerable problems (table 5.3).
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Table 5.3: Market learning Heat
(phase) (period) Case study evidence
Knowledge Learning
dimension Type
(Initiation) ('03-'05)
Segment Exploitation '(Alpha's ed.) products are used for over 10 years in this segment' Alpha's 
website
.(Heat ed.) was born from studying market trends' Product manager
'We learned that temperature requirements were going up due to
governmental regulations' Product developer
Application Exploitation 'We already have running business in these applications.' Product manager 
'We identified the market trend and asked our application developers to visit 
OEMs to identify future application requirements' Product manager 
'When you develop that engine part out of several pieces you get weld lines 
that break at a certain temperature' Product developer
Customer Exploitation 'Account-managers were already in contact with OEMs.' Product manager 
'We already know all 10 tier 1 automotive suppliers in this segment' Marketing 
manager
'We identified the market trend and asked our application developers to visit 
OEMs to identify future application requirements' Product manager
(Developm.) ('05-'07)
Application Exploitation 'The OEMs also did application tests. These results were shared with us' 
Product manager
Product Exploration 'Because we only did internal testing with the new grade, we really needed 
these real-life product tests to validate our remaining recipes' Product manager
Customer Exploitation 'We know who is most important in this market segment, so internally we 
selected a set of potential partners. Then we tried to convince these customers 
to work with us on this project' App. development manager 
'The further we went (in the product innovation trajectory ed.) the more we did 
with the customer' Business manager
(Commerc.) ('07-'08)
Application Exploitation 'Later we had to achieve commercial approvals for the new product in 
certain applications at OEMs..' Product manger
'In 2008 we received the first approval from an automotive OEM. Our new
Product Exploitation ► material is used next to the existing material' Product developer
'In 2008 we were trying to get commercial approvals with (automotive 
OEM ed.). That worked out well, and they are going to use this new
Customer Exploitation j product in a small engine part' App. development manager
Marketing function
The central role in the market learning within project Heat was in the hands of European application 
development of the product line (R&D). Application developers were marketing specialists in the 
sense that interacting with customers on technical issues was part of their official task description. 
This function was supported in its market learning efforts by European product management in the 
project's initiation phase.
The task focus of the application developers involved in project Heat was relatively low. They were 
involved in both exploration and exploitation and had other task next to project Heat such as 
developing incremental updates of existing products and answering customer questions. In other 
word, these application developers were highly integrated in the mainstream organization (Table 
5.4).
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Table 5.4: Marketing function Heat
(phase; period) 
Marketing function
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'05) 
Application 
development /  
Product 
management
'Product management and global marketing is great to think about segment trends
and their quantification... application development focuses on specific application
needs of customers' Marketing manager
'We (product management ed.) had recognized a market trend and we asked the 
application developers to visit automotive OEMs to generate application 
requirements' Product manager
'We are connected to the market via (application development manager ed.)' Product 
developer
'Besides this project I am also responsible for answering general customer questions 
that fall within the automotive UTB segment' App. development manager
(Developm. and
commercialization
'05-'08)
Application
development
'Application developers talked with project members of the customer....they talked
about the test results of testing prototypes' Product manager
'Application developers... have multiple responsibilities next to this project. That is
why it is important to keep track on priorities' Product manager
Senior management involvement
Several senior managers of Alpha were involved in the market learning of project Heat. They were 
present in the Global Product Team which consists of the business manager, the global marketing 
manager, the R&D manager and the product managers of the product line. During initiation, 
specifically the European product manager directed updating application need and customer 
knowledge based on an initial update of his own segment knowledge which provided an impetus to 
start project Heat. During development and commercialization, senior managers employed a mixture 
of support and control. Support concerned facilitating project members by means of resources and 
freedom to be active in the day-to-day market learning activities of this rather uncertain project. 
Control referred to tracking progress in market analyses, detecting deviations from original plans, 
and taking action when it was deemed necessary (table 5.5).
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Table 5.5: Senior management involvement Heat
(phase; period) 
Senior management 
involvement
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'05) 
Directing
'I asked our application developers to collect future application requirements' Product 
manager
'Before we started this project, it was quite clear in our product line that we would
encounter future shortcomings with our current product. Therefore the initiation of
this project came from all sides. The actual decision to collect future product needs
was directed by the Global Product Team' App. development manager
'One of our strategic focus points is to adapt our current products for future market
requirements. This implies that you need some level of pro-activeness' Product
developer
(Developm. and
commercialization
'05-'08)
Support /  Control
'For important projects, like this one, we have monthly review meetings. to see if we 
are on track, if we need to adjust the plan' Product manager 
'Project members have a full mandate within certain boundaries' Product manager 
'For developing the product, we received a significant amount of freedom from senior 
management' Product developer
'If you put the application developers and the technologists of the customers together 
you have good collaboration and they can fine-tune forever. Therefore there is my role 
to keep a focused discussion that is driven by business goals' Product manager 
'.m y product managers are responsible for steering the innovation process'. Business 
manager
Market knowledge generation
For project Heat, market knowledge was mainly generated by desk research and visiting conferences 
(segment knowledge), and visiting existing customers (application need knowledge, and customer 
knowledge) during the initiation phase. In the development and commercialization phases, market 
knowledge generation (application needs knowledge, product usage knowledge, and customer 
knowledge) took place by testing prototypes in collaboration with direct and indirect customers 
(table 5.6).
Table 5.6: Market knowledge generation Heat
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
generation
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'05) 
Desk research /  
Conferences /  
Customers contacts
'I visited conferences and industry meetings where the automotive world presents
future ideas on an ongoing basis... these visits, combined with studying trend reports,
were important sources of information' Product manager
'I talked to customers to uncover specific application requirements which were used to 
develop the product development proposal' App. development manager
(Developm. and
commercialization
'05-'08)
Collaboration with 
customers
'We were able to use our development partners to get market feedback during 
development' Product manager
'..w e had a really good collaboration when we tested prototypes. We had contact 
with them every 1.5 months' Product manager
'.w e  worked intensively together with several automotive OEM's and tier 1 
automotive suppliers to test prototypes and explain our new product' App. 
development manager
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Market knowledge integration
For project Heat, market knowledge integration in the initiation phase was carried out through the 
hierarchy of authority. The European product manager had a main stake in developing the business 
case based on his own (updated) segment knowledge and knowledge from application development 
managers and other functional specialists such as researchers. During development and 
commercialization, employees made use of recurrent face-to-face meetings involving multiple 
functions. They also used discussing prototypes to cross cognitive boundaries between different 
functional specialists. Finally, the use of an organization-wide used cross-functional project 
implementation framework (i.e. PTO tool), which brought common language and awareness of 
different responsibilities across the team, also supported market knowledge integration (table 5.7).
Table 5.7: Market knowledge integration Heat
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
integration
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'05) 
Hierarchy of 
authority
' . I  collected all information from different functional specialists and wrote the 
product development proposal' Product manager
(Developm. and
commercialization
'05-'08)
Recurrent meetings 
/  Prototypes /  
Implementation 
framework
'(In this project ed.) coordination between different functionalities when developing 
the new product took place by having recurrent meetings' App. development manager 
'We had multifunctional review meetings to discuss project issues' Product manager 
'In development, we discussed prototypes. We went from 25 recipes to 15, to 5, and 
eventually we tested two recipes with the customer..' Product manager 
'Every six weeks we had very constructive meetings involving research and marketing 
to discuss project progress' Product manager
'When we started working together with customers we recorded that in the PTO tool, 
which is used in discussions on project progress and setting priorities' App. 
development manager
5.2 Anti-tracking (Beta)
Beta is a business unit of a multinational chemical company. It manufactures and sells a high 
performance fiber in product forms such as powder, pulp and filament yarn. Important end markets 
are automotive and defense industries. Companies in these end markets use Beta's materials to 
fabricate their own products which are sold to other companies, governments and the general 
public. Beta has offices and sales agents all over the world. In 2007, the business unit had several 100 
million Euros in annual sales and employed about 1,000 people (table 5.8).
Table 5.8: Key numerical data Beta 2002-2007 (indices, 2002 = 100; based on annual reports)
Beta 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sales 100 124 145 158 173 181
Employees 100 107 110 115 125 130
R&D expenses 100 117 125 133 150 133
For application development and sales, Beta has organized eight globally operating sales/ 
marketing groups. Each of these groups targets a specific market segment with a set of product
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forms. Additionally, Beta has its own research department. Recently, the organization has set up a 
small marketing support function to develop and support cross-group marketing initiatives and 
innovation. Figure 5.2 presents a simplified organizational chart. At this moment, Beta aims to 
introduce a new product: Anti-tracking.
Figure 5.2: Simplified organizational chart Beta (based on interviews and Beta's website)
General outline of project Anti-tracking
Project Anti-tracking was mainly carried out by the research department and one of the eight sales/ 
marketing groups of Beta. This sales/marketing group focuses on the fiber optic cables segment (i.e. 
communication cables), where Beta's yarn is sold as reinforcement material. As a project, Anti­
tracking was developed in Europe and required a medium level of investment. Research had to take 
place but no major plant adaptations were necessary because Beta decided to work with an external 
converter for manufacturing purposes. The project fits the 'tech-discontinuities' category because 
new technology was used to target a familiar market application.
In a specific type of fiber optic cables, which can be installed by using an existing high voltage 
power pylon infrastructure, the following problem may occur. Installation alongside high voltage 
power lines results in electromagnetic fields that can give rise to significant voltage gradients along 
the length of the cables. If the surface of the cable becomes partly dry and partly wet because of 
sunshine and moisture, these gradients can induce a current along the cable. Over time, these 
currents, which produce sparks, can leave tracks that damage the cables (i.e. dry band arcing) and 
disturb the transmitted signals. A customer of Beta (a cable producer with leading technology), had 
solved the dry band arcing problem by, among other things, impregnating Beta's yarn26 with a semi- 
conductive gel which is bought from a third party. This gel reduced the currents with 30%, which 
significantly increased the lifetime of the cables. However, Beta's customer thought it could further 
improve the situation when Beta applied the gel in an additional manufacturing step. Both parties 
already talked about this issue at the end of the nineties but these talks did not lead to a 
collaborative project. In 2002, both parties found the time to look into this issue again, which 
resulted in the initiation of the Anti-tracking project. Based on the gel provided by Beta's customer, 
Beta's research department was able to come up with an own material. Instead of gel-based, this
26 Beta's yarn is used as reinforcement material and lies in between the cable outer sheath material and the 
optic fibers.
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material was oil-based and therefore better applicable. The development phase started when Beta's 
customer tested cables with the oil-based product on lab scale together with a German university in 
2005. After some iterative testing, results were promising and Beta produced a batch of anti-tracking 
yarn together with a German converter who applied the oil to the yarn. This yarn was used by Beta's 
customer to manufacture several kilometers of cable, which happened without any significant 
problems. In November 2006, Beta and its customer jointly presented a paper on these 
developments at an industry conference. The cable world, however, was not that impressed because 
the majority of cable producers already used a solution that was well accepted by their customers, 
the network operators. It appeared to Beta, that their proposed launching customer had relatively 
higher cable requirements than the average cable producer. In April 2007, the organization that 
owned Beta's customer sold this business unit to another cable producer. This party had other 
priorities and decided not to promote the anti-tracking development. Beta focuses on continuing 
developments with other cable producers and has started a market research project to develop 
insights on the fiber optic cable value chain together with a consultant. In 2008, the project was still 
in the development phase.
In general, Beta regards project Anti-tracking as a technical success. However, commercial success 
is still lacking. This mainly had to do with focusing on one customer and the change in this customer's 
situation in 2007. Table 5.9 presents the project's key characteristics with the corresponding case 
study evidence.
Table 5.9: Key characteristics Anti-tracking
Characteristics Case study evidence
Project category: 
Tech-discontinuity
A patent application for the Anti-tracking yarn was filed in June 2007 Patent application 
'Delivering yarn with a bit of finish for this segment is standard, but focusing on semi­
conductivity is new. We never did that and therefore this is a new product' Researcher
Investment level: 
Medium
'This project was not done under a specific work order.. despite the fact that it was 
reasonably large..' Application developer
'We did not know how much we should sell. If you don't have a good answer to that 
question, the company is not going to invest in a new production facility. Therefore we 
used an external converter in this project..You first have to prove yourself' Researcher 
'We also had to invest money in the cable tests at (German university ed.), which was a 
significant sum for our marketing/sales group' Sales manager
Market learning
Project Anti-tracking was focused on a market segment (fiber optic cables), applications (a specific 
type of cable) and customers (cable producers) that were already known to Beta. Consequently, it 
already had significant market knowledge on these dimensions at the start of the project. In contrast, 
because the product was new to the market, Beta had limited product usage knowledge. It had to 
generate this knowledge by exploratory probes of initial versions of the anti-tracking yarn in the 
market during the development phase.
Until 2008, exploration and exploitation in market learning were combined across market 
knowledge dimensions in the development phase. Beta did not update segment knowledge during 
project initiation which resulted in a commercialization problem. It tried to address that in the
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development phase by working together with a consultant. The integration of market knowledge on 
the remaining dimensions with other relevant knowledge occurred without any considerable 
problems (table 5.10).
Table 5.10: Market learning Anti-tracking
(phase) (period) Case study evidence
Knowledge Learning
dimension Type
(Initiation) ('02-'05)
Application Exploitation '.w e  already make yarn which is used as reinforcement in this type of cables' 
Application developer
'..we measured the electrical conductivity of their cables and used this measure 
as research target' Researcher
Customer Exploitation 'We have a long history in this market segment and know most of the players.' 
Application developer
'This project is focused on an existing customer of Beta' Researcher 
' We had meetings with this customer and agreed upon a joint project' 
Application developer
'We visited them (the customer ed.) several times' Sales manager
(Developm.) ('05-'08)
Segment Exploitation 'Beta is active in this market segment since it emerged, some two decades ago' 
Beta's website
Together with (consultant ed.) we are further researching the segment, 
specifically focusing on network operators' Application developer
Application Exploitation '.th e  customer made cables at lab-scale and production scale and we received
feedback' Application developer
'.w e  saw how they made the cables' Researcher
'.w e  increased our knowledge on the dry band arcing problem' Sales manager
Product Exploration 'Until then, the recipes were made in our lab... we never had put so much oil
on our yarn so there were tests in the customer's plant to see if they could 
work with it' Application developer
'We had to test our initial recipes at the customer, who made cables with our 
impregnated yarn'
'.w e  wanted to do a field-test to see if it worked in practice..This is also 
crucial to develop credibility in the market' Researcher
Customer Exploitation 'Cables were tested at the customer' Researcher
'Cables were tested at the customer....we physically went there' Application 
developer
'The new owner of our customer had other priorities.' Sales manager 
'I also talked to the researchers and purchasers at (customer ed.)' Sales 
manager
Marketing function
The central role in the market learning of project Anti-tracking was in the hands of the sales manager 
of the fiber optic cables sales/marketing group. In this function, he was supported by an application 
developer who works in the same group. Both functions were marketing specialists in a sense that 
interacting with customers was part of their official task description.
The task focus of the marketing function involved in project Anti-tracking was relatively low. They 
were involved in both exploration and exploitation and had other tasks next to this project, such as
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supporting the running business by selling and answering customer questions. In other words, the 
marketing function was highly integrated in the mainstream organization (table 5.11).
Table 5.11: Marketing function Anti-tracking
(phase; period) 
Marketing function
Case study evidence
(Initiation '02-'05) 
Sales /  Application 
development
'I am responsible for the fiber optics segment... have sales responsibility and do
pricing and contracts......and new products with customers' Sales manager
'I joined my sales colleague when he visited the customer' Application developer
(Developm. '05-'08) 
Sales /  Application 
development
'We (sales/marketing group ed.) visited the customer to be present when prototype 
testing took place' Application developer
'The (sales/marketing group ed.) is my middleman...test results and feedback passes 
through them' Researcher
Senior management involvement
Specifically two senior managers of Beta were involved in the market learning that took place in 
project Anti-tracking: the research director, who was part of the management team, and the 
sales/marketing group manager.
Most of the work for project Anti-tracking was carried out by using general research and sales 
support resources. Although the research department and the sales/marketing group had to report 
to the research director how these resources were spent, he had limited involvement in controlling 
them. The sales/marketing group manager had a stake in initiating the project. Because the sales 
manager had just taken up this job and had to settle in, the group manager suggested starting new 
conversations with Beta's customer on the dry band arcing problem. Additionally, in the 
development phase, extra investments were needed to carry out the tests at the German university. 
These investments needed specific approval by the research director. Based on a rough estimation of 
the total available market, approval was received (table 5.12).
Table 5.12: Senior management involvement Anti-tracking
(phase; period) 
Senior management 
involvement
Case study evidence
(Initiation '02-'05) 
Directing
'.conversations on this subject with the customer were dead at that time (2002
ed.)... because I was new in the group, our (sales/marketing group ed.) manager asked
me to pick up the conversations again.' Sales manager
(Developm. '05-'08) 
Support /
(Limited ) control
'.w e  could work within the budget that was set aside for general sales support' Sales 
manager'
'. . I  worked on this project within the general budget reservations for 'finishes for
cables'...which is discussed with the research director once per year' Researcher
'.w e  provide the management team (the directors ed.) with quarterly reports' 
Researcher
'.research provides quarterly reports and I write these on a monthly basis..based on 
these data, the management team did not stop m e.' Application developer 
'Costs for the test at (university ed.) were relatively high. The research director had to 
sign a separate request before we received these resources' Sales manager
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Market knowledge generation
During the initiation phase, application need and customer knowledge for project Anti-tracking was 
generated by customer visits. In the development phase Beta collaborated with a customer for 
testing purposes, which generated product usage, application need, and customer knowledge. In this 
phase Beta also worked together with a consultant to generate segment knowledge (table 5.13).
Table 5.13: Market knowledge generation Anti-tracking
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
generation
Case study evidence
(Initiation '02-'05) 
Customer contact
' We had meetings with this customer and agreed upon a joint project' Application 
developer
'We visited them (the customer ed.) several times' Sales manager
(Developm. '05-'08) 
Collaboration with 
customer /
Working with 
consultant
'.together with (customer ed.) we tested our product....first on lab-scale, and later in a
manufacturing environment' Application developer
'.w e  had a very open communication with (customer ed.)' Researcher
'We worked together with (consultant ed.) to develop a perspective on how to position
our product and convince network operators' Application developer
Market knowledge integration
For project Anti-tracking, market knowledge integration in the initiation phase was mainly carried 
out by functional specialists using their internal organizational network. During the development 
phase, functional specialists had recurrent meetings and discussed prototypes. The sales manager 
and application developer worked in the same building. Although the researcher operated from 
another building, he was located in the same city (table 5.14).
Table 5.14: Market knowledge integration Anti-tracking
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
integration
Case study evidence
(Initiation '02-'05) 
Internal 
organizational 
network
'I have contact with the (sales/marketing group ed)......they approached me to think
about solving the dry band arcing problem from a 'yarn finishing' perspective' 
Researcher
(Developm. '05-'08) 
Recurrent meetings 
/  Prototypes
'..we had meetings with research for information sharing when something came up. 
However, these were not structured as in project meetings, but rather ad hoc' Sales 
manager
'..in house, we developed several versions of the product' Researcher
'.W e  (research and marketing/sales group ed.) discussed several product versions'
Application developer
5.3 Green (Delta)
Delta operates as a business unit of a multinational chemical company that is active in the fields of 
engineering plastics and chemicals. Delta is a global player in chemicals but has a main focus on 
Europe. Important end markets for Delta's products are the pulp and paper and the chemical 
industries. Companies in these markets use Delta's chemicals to fabricate or process their own
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products which they sell to downstream companies and the general public. For some products, Delta 
is one of the market leaders, for other products it is a smaller player. The organization has the most 
commoditized product portfolio of all participating businesses in this research, hence the relatively 
low R&D/sales ratio. In 2008, the business unit had around 800 million Euros in annual sales and 
employed about 2,300 people (table 5.15).
Table 5.15: Key numerical data Delta 2002-2008 (based on annual reports)
Delta 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Sales (mln. Euro) 526 535 613 659 727 805
EBIT (operating profit) 40 40 63 69 81 62
EBIT/sales ratio (%) 7.6 7.5 10.3 10.5 11.1 7.7
Employees 2,024 1,891 1,919 1,912 2,015 2,331
R&D expenses (mln. Euro) 7 6 6 7 9 10
R&D/sales ratio (%) 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
Delta is subdivided into two businesses based on differences in product offerings. Both businesses 
have a global scope and a department that is responsible for the combined task of sales and 
marketing. Although the core of sales and marketing activities lies in Europe, sales/marketing 
managers are located around the globe. Delta has a separate R&D department that works for both 
businesses (figure 5.3). Recently, Delta has been working on project Green.
Figure 5.3: Simplified organizational chart Delta (based on interviews and Delta's website)
General outline of project Green
Project Green was mainly carried out by the research department and one of the businesses of Delta. 
As a project, Green was focused on changing the feedstock and process technology of a specific 
chemical, which could potentially influence its properties. Green was situated in Europe, significant 
research and development had to take place, and investments were high. The project fits the 'tech- 
discontinuities' category because new technology was used to target familiar market applications.
One of the businesses of Delta is producing a chemical which is for 80% used in a specific type of 
resin. The feedstock for this chemical is propylene. In 2003, demand for the resin, and therefore for 
the chemical, was rising and the market waited for new investments in manufacturing facilities. 
However, these were difficult to justify with rising propylene prices and low market prices. At the 
same time, the market for bio-diesel, which was introduced in the 1990s, started to grow. The 
business manager of the Delta business heard from a trader that a byproduct of bio-diesel could be 
used for producing the chemical, instead of using propylene. This was an opportunity to come up 
with a cheaper and more sustainable product and started the initiation phase of the project. After 
some initial market research, the business manager discussed this insight with an R&D manager who
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started looking into this alternative route to manufacturing the chemical. Mid 2003, lab trials took 
place and in October a first patent was filed. In July 2004, the development phase started with the 
decision to build a small pilot plant on a manufacturing site in France. In 2005, after a period of trials, 
some initial product was send from the pilot plant to a small group of resin producers for testing 
purposes. No significant property differences were encountered. In May 2005, several additional 
patent applications took place. This period also marked the start of a study to justify investments for 
a plant of 10 kilotons (Kt) per annum based on the new technology on the French manufacturing site. 
Important information that had to be compiled for this business plan was information on 
developments of the new feedstock over the coming years, market developments, and a competitor 
and investment analysis. The executive committee of Delta's parent company agreed on the 
investments. Early 2006, the announcement was made that a new 10 Kt plant was to be built on the 
manufacturing site in France. A 14 months timeframe was applied, and the plant was scheduled to 
open the first half of 2007. April 2007 marked the start of production from the new plant and the 
commercialization phase. Samples were sent to customers for validation. Customers that had short 
qualification processes started ordering the new product in June of that year. Besides 
commercialization, Delta worked on a plan for developing a 100 Kt. plant in Asia were demand for 
the chemical was rising. In September 2007, Delta announced that this plant would be built in 
Thailand.
In general, Delta regards project Green as a successful project. The new product could be 
introduced into the market, and the realization of the new plant occurred quite fast and without 
delay. Because its new production process pulls out of the oil chain and is based on renewable 
feedstock, which is a hot topic in the industry, project Green gained a lot of media attention. 
Additionally, it won a corporate innovation award and three external prizes. Table 5.16 presents its 
key characteristics with the corresponding case study evidence.
Table 5.16: Key characteristics Green
Characteristics Case study evidence
Category:
Tech-discontinuity
'In 2008, 36 patents were filed and several of them granted in different parts of the 
world' Investor's presentation
'It is an existing application and a totally new production process, which is based on a 
new feedstock' R&D manager
'This new technology has lots of advantages, economically, environmentally, and it gave 
us a new marketing tool' Business development manager
'The chemical reaction was quite old, but putting this technology on an industrial scale 
was new and difficult' Business manager
Investment level: 
High
'For (the multinational ed.) it is one of the three major projects' R&D manager
'At the end of the business plan was the conclusion where we asked for several millions
for developing this type of process' Business development manager
'We needed to get not only the approval from (Delta's ed.) director but also from the
executive committee from the whole organization because it was a 2 million+ project'
R&D manager
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Market learning
Project Green was focused on a market segment (chemical), application (resin) and customers (resin 
producers) that were already known to Delta. Consequently, it already had significant market 
knowledge on these dimensions at the start of the project. Exploration and exploitation in market 
learning were combined across dimensions in the development phase and over time. Delta updated 
its segment knowledge in the initiation phase and again in the development phase when compiling 
the business plan to ask for resources to build a plant. Application need and customer knowledge 
were updated during all three product innovation phases. In contrast, because of the renewed 
underlying technology and feedstock, which could potentially influence product properties, Delta had 
limited product usage knowledge. It had to generate this knowledge by exploratory probes of 
product samples during development and an update of this knowledge during commercialization. 
Market knowledge integration occurred without any considerable problems (table 5.17).
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Table 5.17: Market learning Green
(phase)
Knowledge
dimension
(period)
Learning
Type
Case study evidence
(Initiation)
Segment
Application
Customer
('03-'04)
Exploitation
Exploitation
Exploitation
'..w e are already selling in this market segment' R&D manager 
'We were very active in business intelligence....trying to understand what 
competitors were doing, where the market was going and also the legislation 
aspect of it' Business manager
'Roughly 80% of our product we sell in this (resin ed.) application' R&D 
manager
'In the beginning we collected information on the developments in this (resin 
ed.) application' Business manager
'We wanted to target the same customers as usual' Business manager
'We contacted our customers and tried to gain knowledge on how they saw the
future' Business manager
(Developm.)
Segment
Application
Product
Customer
('04-'07)
Exploitation
Exploitation
Exploration
Exploitation
'The business plan had estimations on developments in market volumes and
prices for our product market.... It also included a competitor analysis based on
patent data' Business development manager
'For the business plan, we also gathered information on developments in the 
(resin ed.) field.' Business development manager
'.customers had to switch. Although the quality is the same, the product is 
based on different chemistry' R&D manager
'We sent some samples from the pilot plant to customers for testing purposes. 
This was a purified product, but not representative for the purification grade 
that we wanted to achieve, but better than nothing' R&D manager 
' .we started sending some samples in advance from the pilot plant in
2006....... to check if we were not making mistakes....we also wanted to learn
about the marketing effects of green products, maybe there is a value added 
there..' Business manager
'We tried to do testing at our key accounts' Business development manager 
'.w e  learned that some of our customers, for example in the aeronautic value 
chain, have longer qualification processes than others' R&D manager
(Commerc.)
Application
Product
Customer
(2007)
Exploitation
Exploitation
Exploitation
"1 'Some customers have already qualified the product in the (resin ed.) 
r application in 2007 and bought it from mid-2007 onwards.' Business 
development manager
Marketing function
Sales/marketing managers played a central role in the market learning of project Green in all three 
product innovation phases. Specifically in the initiation phase, the business manager of the Delta 
business in which project Green was carried out was also heavily involved. All these employees were 
marketing specialists in the sense that interacting with the market was part of their official task 
description.
The task focus of the sales/marketing managers involved in project Green was relatively low. They 
were involved in both exploration and exploitation and had other tasks next to project Green such as 
selling and answering customer questions. Therefore it can be argued that in project Green the 
marketing function was highly integrated in the mainstream organization (table 5.18).
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Table 5.18: Marketing function Green
(phase; period) 
Marketing function
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'04) 
Business manager /  
Sales/marketing 
managers
'The sales and marketing people are in charge of selling all, or several, products of the 
business' Business manager
' . I  am in charge of running this business which includes these innovative 
developments' Business manager
'I asked the (sales/marketing people ed.) to inform me on developments in the 
(segment ed.) and the (application ed.)' Business manager 
'The business manager talked with the trader about developments in the market 
segment' R&D manager
(Developm. and
commercialization
'04-'07)
Sales/marketing
managers
'The people in charge of the market chapter of the business plan, were from sales and 
marketing' Business manager
'For the market study....the information on (segment ed.) and (application ed.) was
gathered by the sales and marketing department' Business development manager 
'..sales/marketing provided samples to our customers' R&D manager 
'At the end, sales and marketing was involved in qualification and sales of the product' 
Business development manager
Senior management involvement
With regard to senior management involvement, specifically the business manager of the Delta 
business in which project Green took place was involved in the project and its market interactions. 
He acted as overall project initiator and project leader, directed attention, and provided resources. 
Because investments were large, several board members of the chemical multinational acted as 
project sponsor team after the business plan for building the plant was submitted and approved in 
the development phase. Besides these elements of support, also elements of control could be 
observed. During the project, project members reported developments in market interactions to the 
business manager. The business manager, in turn, had to report to the executive committee of the 
chemical multinational (table 5.19).
Table 5.19: Senior management involvement Green
(phase; period) 
Senior management 
involvement
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'04) 
Directing
'I asked the (sales/marketing people ed.) to inform me on developments in (market 
segment ed.) and the (application ed.)' Business manager
(Developm. and
commercialization
'04-'07)
Support /  Control
'I asked (Business development manager ed.) to join the team and coordinate writing 
the business plan' Business manager
'In a few months (R&D manager ed.) came back to me and said it could be 
promising....! put in money for lab tests and a first pilot plant' Business manager 
'All functions, also sales and marketing, reported to the business manager' Business 
development manager
'We have a multi-functional meeting every month with the business manager were we 
discuss progress' Business development manager
'.w e  had to receive a go from the executive committee of (chemical multinational ed.) 
for building the plant.we tried to be entrepreneurs but not cowboys. When spending
money (chemical multinational ed.) is cautious.....I also report progress to the
executive committee several times a year' Business manager
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Market knowledge generation
During the initiation phase, segment, application need, and customer knowledge for project Green 
was generated by desk research and visiting customers. In the development and commercialization 
phases, Delta collaborated with customers for testing purposes, which generated product usage, 
application need, and customer knowledge. Finally, in the development phase, Delta also used desk 
research in developing the business plan for building the 10 Kt plant (table 5.20).
Table 5.20 Market knowledge generation Green
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
generation
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'04) 
Desk research /  
Customer contacts
'.w e  tried to understand the market by gathering business intelligence on, for 
example, price predictions' Business manager
'The business manager talked with the trader about developments in the market 
segment.. ' R&D manager
'We studied price developments of the future feedstock to get a first perspective on 
feasibility' R&D manager
(Developm. and
commercialization
'04-'07)
Desk research /  
Collaboration with 
customers
'Data for the business plan for the 10Kt plant were generated by studying existing
reports on developments in the market segment.....It also included a competitor
analysis based on patent data' Business development manager 
'We tried to do testing at our key accounts' Business development manager 
'.w e  started sending some samples in advance from the pilot plant in 2006 to 
customers and gathered their feedback' Business manager
Market knowledge integration
For project Green, market knowledge integration in the initiation phase was mainly carried out 
through the hierarchy of authority. The business manager reviewed market insights, combined it 
with his own market knowledge and asked the R&D manager to look into the idea from a technical 
perspective. During the development phase, market knowledge was mainly integrated by using 
monthly recurrent project meetings. The business manager, R&D manager, and most of the other 
functional managers that participated in these meeting were all located at Delta's headquarters. 
When initial versions of the end-product could be produced, these meetings were accompanied by 
discussing samples (the equivalent of 'prototypes') (table 5.21).
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Table 5.21: Market knowledge integration Green
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
integration
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'04) 
Hierarchy of 
authority
'I have a functional link with the business manager which is very short. If there is a 
good idea we can work quickly, with support of the business...This was very important 
in this project' R&D manager
'After talking to the trader, the business manager asked me to look into alternative 
routes' R&D manager
'I asked (R&D manager ed.) to look into this.....we like to challenge each other..'
Business manager
(Developm. '04-'07) 
Recurrent meetings 
/  Prototypes
'After the business plan was approved we had these monthly meetings we call 'copile',
which is a steering meeting. Here the representatives of the departments met.....we
talked about problems and opportunities that we were facing, where we were and 
what we had to do' Business manager
'For this project, because of the size, we use the copile structure. This is a team
structure of 10 to 12 people from different departments, including sales and marketing
that meet once a month' Business development manager
'Based on discussions on the initial product from the pilot plant, which looked
promising, the project team decided to test some samples with customers' Business
manager
5.4 Overall comparison
This chapter discussed the findings on projects that fall into the 'tech-discontinuities' project 
category. Based on studying the accumulated data from three cases, Heat (Alpha), Anti-tracking 
(Beta), and Green (Delta), it was possible to uncover several similarities and differences between 
cases.
Similarities
In all three cases, project members leveraged and updated segment, application need, and customer 
knowledge that was already available in the business unit, and searched for new product usage 
knowledge. This combining of exploitation and exploration was specifically noticeable in the 
development phase of the product innovation process. From a marketing perspective, the challenges 
were to develop a segment foresight to direct product research in the initiation phase, validate 
prototypes in the development phase, and refine market knowledge in the commercialization phase.
What were the similarities in the configuration of the marketing organization that triggered and 
allowed project members to carry out this market learning behavior?
First of all, in all three cases rather specialized marketing functions (application development and 
sales and/or marketing managers) were involved. Furthermore, the task focus of the project 
members that performed the marketing function was relatively low in all three cases. They were 
involved in both exploration and exploitation and next to the projects under study they were also 
involved in other activities that supported the running business such as selling other products and 
answering customer questions. In other words, the marketing function was highly integrated in the 
mainstream organization. In all three cases, the business unit's senior management, specifically 
middle managers such as product or business managers, tried to influence market learning behavior 
by adopting multiple roles. In the initiation phase, they directed employees acting on a lower
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hierarchical level to generate specific market knowledge in an existing segment and application area. 
In the later phases of the product innovation project, senior managers supported market learning by 
providing resources to project members, expressing approval of their behavior, and acting as 
sounding board when necessary. Additionally, in all three cases the project members that performed 
the marketing function were able to contact existing customers in the initiation phase of the product 
innovation project and to develop collaborations in the later phases. Finally, in all three cases, the 
project members that performed the marketing function collaborated and interacted with other 
participating functional specialists without any considerable problems in the development and 
commercialization phases of the product development projects. Cognitive barriers between different 
functional specialists for knowledge integration were successfully mitigated. Important practices that 
were used to develop a shared language and narratives were face-to-face meetings and discussing 
new product prototypes.
Differences
The analysis revealed several modest differences between the organizational context of project Heat 
and project Green, specifically in the areas of the practices in use to generate and integrate market 
knowledge. Instead of using desk research, customer contacts, and conferences to generate market 
knowledge in the initiation phase of the product innovation project as was done in project Heat, 
project members in project Green merely relied on using desk research and customer contacts. With 
respect to market knowledge integration, an additional practice was used in project Heat. Besides 
face-to-face meeting and discussing product prototypes, team members used a cross-functional 
implementation framework, available within Alpha. This framework was used as 'boundary object' 
and decreased cognitive barriers between different functional specialists. Additionally, investment 
levels between Heat and Green were different. While project Heat required a medium level of 
project investments, for project Green these investments were higher. This explains why for project 
Green even top managers of the entire chemical corporation were directly involved, while for project 
Heat the involvement of senior management was limited to the middle and upper managers of 
Alpha. It could be argued that at some point in time, when investments for the 10Kt plant came up, 
Green grew beyond the responsibilities of Delta and became a corporation-wide affair.
The analysis revealed some larger differences between projects Heat and Green on one side, and 
project Anti-tracking on the other side. A main difference relates to market knowledge generation in 
the initiation phase of the product innovation project. Project members in Heat and Green carried 
out a broad scan of the environment, and developed a perspective to anticipate, and perhaps even 
shape the evolution of their market segment. They had discussions with several customers and 
complemented these insights with findings from secondary sources such as conference talks and 
reports. From the start, they were both sensitive to individual customer needs and to the macro 
forces that shaped these preferences. In contrast, project members in Anti-tracking were merely 
focused on a single customer when generating market knowledge, resulting in a very specific 
customer need focus. Only when it appeared that this single customer became less interested and it 
became difficult to commercialize the product, a broader perspective was taken. This perspective
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conveyed that the market segment, in general, did not experience the problem Beta's new product 
was trying to solve and that the product could only be introduced if it was able to bring the same 
results as the commonly used solutions against a lower price. It can be argued that the late timing of 
developing this market insight resulted in, at least, a delay in the commercialization of the new Beta 
product. As a sales manager of Beta put it:
'The point is, this project is going on for about seven years now, and there were not really moments that 
you had to look forward to, that you had to meet a milestone. When we were testing prototypes and we 
had to decide what alternatives we wanted to continue with, I think that was the most challenging part 
on the technical side. On the commercial side it was the understanding that our approach had not been 
right. What I just explained: We did not keep track of the broader market. We did not use a helicopter 
view to see if this was the way to go. This understanding actually came to light about two years ago when 
our customer, together with us, presented the new concept at a conference for the cable industry. The 
response of the audience was that they already had their solutions in place. They asked us to elaborate 
on the benefits in comparison to these solutions. We absolutely did not have an answer to that. You can 
say that was the biggest challenge...the biggest shock. That was the wake up call in the project. For this 
project we were so focused on this one customer, that we lost the overall scope...Actually it is quite 
bizarre'.
Besides the relatively limited use of market knowledge generation practices in project Anti-tracking 
by the employees that performed the marketing function during the initiation phase, are other 
elements from the organizational configuration to blame? Results show that, in general, Anti­
tracking was managed in a relatively informal way. Project meetings took place in an ad-hoc fashion 
and a lot of project investments could be realized by using non-specified resources, resulting in 
limited project visibility. This might be the reason that market learning activities experienced limited 
senior management control, and it took a while before project members became aware of their 
overly narrow market perspective.
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6 Market-discontinuities: Additive, Diffuse, Bond, and Gears
This chapter describes the findings on cases that fall into the 'market-discontinuities' category. These 
projects are based on market applications that are new to the organizations in which they are carried 
out and on product and/or process technologies that are already known to the firm. Successively, the 
chapter presents the findings on cases 'Additive' (Theta), 'Diffuse' (Sigma), 'Bond' (Alpha), and 'Gears' 
(Alpha). Case descriptions are structured around the concepts that were presented in the conceptual 
framework in chapter 3. The chapter is concluded with an overall comparison.
6.1 Additive (Theta)
Theta was a business unit of a global player that produces products for the cleaning market. The 
business started as producer of low molecular weight polymers in the 1960s. These were internally 
supplied to the main business that produced downstream products. In the 1970s, Theta diversified 
and began manufacturing and selling low molecular weight polymers in the coatings and inks market 
by itself. Customers in these markets have been using Theta's polymers as ingredient for inks and 
coatings, which are sold to downstream customers. In 2006, the company owning Theta restructured 
its businesses, and Theta was sold to a large chemical company. This company integrated Theta in 
one of its divisions. In 2005, Theta had around 273 million Euros in annual sales and employed about 
430 people (table 6.1).
Table 6.1: Key numerical data Theta 2002-2007 (based on annual reports)
Theta 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006# 2007
Sales (mln. Euro) 196 213 245 273 3,251 3,488
EBIT (operating profit) 23 28 25 28 250 270
EBIT/sales ratio (%) 11.7 13.1 10.2 10.3 7.7 7.7
Employees 500 500 430 430 6,900 5,500
R&D expenses (mln. Euro) 13 11 11 10 132 130
R&D/sales ratio (%) 6.6 5.2 4.5 3.7 4.1 3.7
# Figures of the division of the large chemical company in which Theta was integrated in 2006.
Although Theta had two global product lines, the organization was mainly focused on the U.S. and 
Europe. Each product line had its own marketing and sales department. Additionally, there was a 
central R&D department. Figure 6.1 presents a simplified organizational chart. Recently, Theta 
carried out project Additive.
Figure 6.1: Simplified organizational chart Theta (based on interviews)
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General outline of project Additive
Project Additive started in 1999. At that time the inks market was facing commoditization and 
Theta's plants were underutilized. Partly based on the advice of external consultants, Theta decided 
to put efforts in finding new application markets for their low molecular weight polymers. The 
organization put a value proposition team together to identify ideas that were present in the 
organization. This started the initiation phase. After scanning about a hundred ideas and carrying out 
some initial lab tests, several ideas looked promising. One of these ideas was fine-tuning the 
polymers so they could be used as additives to increase viscosity and improve the flow of plastics. A 
small team was put together to look deeper into this idea. Based on additional lab tests and market 
research reports this team tried to get knowledgeable about the plastics market by identifying 
different applications and large players. The team identified that their product had the potential to 
be used as plasticizer, flow modifier, and rubber modifier. They started contacting large plastics 
producers to discuss these ideas. This started the development phase in 2001. Early in this phase, 
Theta hired several business development people that had extensive experience in the plastics 
industry. Among them was the project leader for project Additive, which had become an approved 
project after the presentation of a business case at the start of the development phase. Interactions 
with plastic producers resulted in more knowledge about the plastics market segment. It appeared 
that some application ideas, such as plasticizers and rubber modifiers were dead ends because of 
relatively weak value propositions. However, together with potential customers, the project team 
also discovered new potential applications such as polymer dispersing and the extension of polymer 
chains. Specifically this last application appeared to attract attention. Instead of lowering the total 
polymer weight of plastics, several samples increased it resulting in, for instance, better mechanical 
properties. The team learned that while the application market for flow modifiers and polymer 
dispersants is large, it is very competitive and has low margins. In contrast, the application market for 
polymer chain extenders is smaller but emerging, has little competition, and has high margins. 
Gradually, the project team focused more and more on the chain extender application during 
development. After a period of trials at potential customers, the project team managed to move into 
a first commercialization trajectory in 2004. At that time, senior management had already reduced 
human and financial resources to the team because the business plan approval was based on the 
generation of sales in an earlier stage. From their perspective, it simply took too long to reach 
acceptable sales levels. With very little resources the team tried to commercialize its product with 
other plastic producers and develop the business in 2005 and 2006. In 2006 it became clear that 
Theta would be sold. Eventually, Theta's buyer (i.e. the large chemical company) decided to integrate 
the project into a specific divisional new business department which allows small start-ups to grow to 
a specific size.
Overall, project Additive required a medium level of investment. In general, Theta and the large 
chemical company see Additive as a relatively successful project. The product could be introduced 
into the market and generated spin-off projects. The project fits the 'market-discontinuities' category 
because familiar technology was used to target new market applications. Table 6.2 presents project 
Additive's key characteristics with the corresponding case study evidence.
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Table 6.2: Key characteristics Additive
Characteristics Case study evidence
Category:
Market-
discontinuity
'The case is that we use the exact same chemistry to develop the product than is used to 
produce the products for coatings and inks' Key account development manager 
'.th e  idea was to take the same products, make small adaptations, and use them as 
additives for thermoplastics' Key account development manager 
'..for (Theta ed.) it was more or less, how do I get more out of my existing product line' 
Head of new markets large chemical company
'.th e  product stayed within the technology, but focused on new market applications' 
Business manager
' ...we knew very well what type of resins we could make with this technology.we had
worked with this technology very, very broadly, so we were very convinced that we had a 
broad synthesis stage to make a lot of potential additives..We did not know what was 
specifically needed in the market place' Senior research associate
Investment level: 
Medium
'.there was significant funding...a few millions I think' Business manager
'No investments in a plant were needed, that is a lucky situation otherwise you talk about
a 10 million+ investment..that was a clear 'no go'' Business manager
Market learning
Project Additive was focused on a market segment (plastics), applications (chain extension, flow 
modifying, and dispersing) and customers (plastics producers and plastic recyclers) that were totally 
new to Theta. Consequently, it had to develop new market knowledge on these dimensions (i.e. 
exploration) and refine it (i.e. exploitation) during the product innovation trajectory. In contrast, 
because Theta's existing products were marginally changed, it already had product usage knowledge. 
It refined this knowledge (i.e. exploitation) during the product innovation trajectory.
Exploration and exploitation in market learning were combined across market knowledge 
dimensions (in a single product innovation phase) and over time. Significant market knowledge was 
generated and market knowledge integration occurred without any considerable problems (table
6.3).
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Table 6.3: Market learning Additive
(phase)
Knowledge
dimension
(period)
Learning
Type
Case study evidence
(Initiation)
Segment
Product
('99-'01)
Exploration
Exploitation
'The value proposition team was doing work on market studies' Senior research 
associate
'The initial thing was looking at the literature: what market segments use low 
molecular weight polymers.' Business manager
(Developm.)
Application
Product
Customer
('01-'04)
Exploration
Exploitation
Exploration
'We developed plasticizer prototypes...when companies evaluated them we 
learned that their performance was comparable with products in the market. 
Because our chemistry was more expensive we decided to focus more on other 
applications' Senior research associate
'After feedback from a potential partner, we converged to the chain extender 
having tremendous value..' Senior research associate
'..market feedback resulted in unexpected results: this is not a plasticizer, this 
is a dispersant. The people did not know what a dispersant was, or what you 
disperse..it was a little bit shooting in the dark' Business manager 
'In the beginning they had low molecular weight additives, which are typically 
used as solvents, or dispersants, or flow modifiers. It is a little bit different, but 
the idea is the same: getting lower polymer weight, lower viscosity and better 
flow.then they made a sample which increased viscosity, so the opposite 
approach.that was what potential customers really loved' Business manager 
'..In  the following months, we made contact with all the major plastic 
companies in North America, Europe and Korea' Senior research associate 
'It appeared difficult to work with PET recyclers. They do not have the key 
knowledge. If you go in with a very technical presentation, people do not know 
what to do. The recyclers are very much what you think the recyclers are. They 
are guys with a big truck buying scrap.' Business manager 
'Potential customers were approached to see if we could bring value..' Key 
account development manager
(Commerc.)
Application
Product
Customer
(2004)
Exploitation
Exploitation
Exploitation
L '.a t  that time (2004 ed.) we developed the first application specification 
and had some commercial trials' Senior research associate 
L 'In 2004 we could commercialize our product in the chain extender 
application with a potential customer that was working with a material
1 that was very new to them also_it helped that our product fitted that
well' Key account development manager
Marketing function
The central roles in market learning in project Additive were in the hands of several marketing 
managers and business development managers (3 on average) and the project leader. These project 
members were marketing specialists in a sense that interacting with customers was part of their 
official task description. Several employees, among which the project leader, were plastic experts 
that were hired by Theta in the development phase. Although the project leader and business 
development managers were active in both exploration and exploitation their task focus was 
relatively high. They were totally dedicated to project Additive and were freed from other 
responsibilities. In other words, they were differentiated from the mainstream organization (table
6.4).
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Table 6.4: Marketing function Additive
(phase; period) 
Marketing function
Case study evidence
(Initiation '99-'01) 
Marketing managers
'The value proposition team was formed by people of marketing, technical service, 
R&D...marketing was doing work on market studies' Senior research associate 
'.they put people aside and assigned them to look at new market segments' Business 
manager
(Developm. and 
commerc. '01-'04) 
Project leader /  
Business 
development 
managers
'What really made a difference was the new man leading these efforts (project leader 
ed.).he knew how to open doors. In the following months, he made contact with all 
the major plastic companies in North America, Europe and Korea' Senior research 
associate
'Except for this leader, who was new to the organization, we had a sales and a 
marketing person in the team..very early we started activities in Europe with (Key 
account development manager ed.) and with a business development manager in 
Asia...All people were totally dedicated to this project and freed from other activities' 
Senior research associate
'We had a team of about ten people that was totally dedicated to plastic additives...My 
function basically was market research, selling, and some product management' Key 
account development manager
Senior management involvement
The top managers of Theta were, to some extent, involved in Additive's market learning. During 
initiation, they framed the search for new market knowledge by emphasizing the strategic choice to 
look into new market segments where existing Theta products could fit. During development and 
commercialization, they supported the team by allocating human and financial resources after they 
had approved the business plan's market analyses and return on investment predictions. However, 
they also controlled market learning. The project leader had to report on a monthly basis and when 
return on investments took longer than expected, Theta's top diminished team resources by forcing 
several business developers to return to their original functions in the existing product lines. This 
move accelerated the sole focus on the chain extender application.
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Table 6.5: Senior management involvement Additive
(phase; period) 
Senior management 
involvement
Case study evidence
(Initiation '99-'01) 
Framing
'The strategy was to enlarge the application area of (Theta's ed.) products.' Key 
account development manager
'.they (top managers of Theta ed.) put people aside and assigned them to look at new 
market segments...they had to stay within the technology but could basically look into 
whatever market they wanted, it could be food, diapers, tires, cars.' Business 
manager
'(Theta) set up a new business organization...to develop a third leg to its business' 
Senior research associate
(Developm. and
commercialization
'01-'04)
Support /  Control
'..we had full support from the top of the organization..to bring people together and 
setting up a plastics application lab' Senior research associate
'We had full support of the leadership of the company..but every move we made was 
very well scrutinized..we had meetings with the executive team every month where 
we gave updates. Beyond that we had our budget monitored extremely 
closely...because the company wanted to make sure continuous support meant 
something' Senior research associate
'.Because we did not meet our financial targets, people from the team were sent back 
to the 'normal' business. They (senior management Theta ed.) reduced the marketing 
resources available to the team' Key account development manager
Market knowledge generation
In the initiation phase, market knowledge was generated and refined by doing desk research on the 
plastics segment, focusing on the use of low molecular weight polymers. In the development and 
commercialization phases, market knowledge was mainly generated and refined by collaborating 
with potential customers to test prototypes. Additionally, market knowledge generation was 
accelerated by hiring several segment specialists who had deep experience in the plastics field, which 
was a new market segment for Theta (table 6.6).
Table 6.6: Market knowledge generation Additive
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
generation
Case study evidence
(Initiation '99-'01) 
Desk research
'Initially it was paperwork....buy a market study on low molecular weight polymers and 
where they are going into.' Business manager
(Developm. and
commercialization
'01-'04)
Collaboration with 
potential customers 
/  Hiring segment 
specialists
'..some team members talked to potential customers to discuss product prototypes' 
Senior research associate
'..we managed to get very close with potential customers...we had either partnerships, 
joint developments, or close relationships' Senior research associate 
A joint application patent was filed for in 2003, involving Theta and a customer patent 
'..I was hired because they did have limited marketing competences in this field. I have 
worked for over 20 years in developing plastics' Key account development manager 
The project leader that was hired had 20+ years of experience in the plastics field press 
release
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Market knowledge integration
For project Additive, market knowledge integration in the initiation phase occurred by the value 
proposition team using their internal organizational network to collect ideas. Later on, during 
development and commercialization, recurrent team meetings were used, and prototypes were 
discussed. The team also used a cross-functional project implementation framework, brought in by 
the project manager, which was very influential in the organization. The use of this framework 
resulted in common language and awareness of different responsibilities across the team providing 
additional support for market knowledge integration (table 6.7).
Table 6.7: Market knowledge integration Additive
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
integration
Case study evidence
(Initiation '99-'01) 
Internal 
organizational 
network
'The value proposition team tried to develop ideas by talking to people across the 
company.' Senior research associate
(Developm. and
commercialization
'01-'04)
Recurrent meetings 
/  Prototypes /  
Implementation 
framework
'We (technical and marketing people ed.) were working as a team...with official 
meetings and joint potential customer visits' Senior research associate 
'We made and discussed a lot of samples internally, to find out if we could bring any 
value in these applications.' Senior research associate
'The project leader used a 'market driven innovation' style..we did not only push the 
technology, but also discussed potential product concepts' Senior research associate 
'.very early they had business development people on board...they had a philosophy 
of 'market driven innovation' which was some kind of book describing a stage-gate 
development process that was very influential in (Theta ed.)' Business manager
6.2 Diffuse (Sigma)
Sigma is a business unit of a multinational chemical company. The core product of Sigma is a 
transparent engineering plastic invented by the chemical multinational and introduced into the 
market in the late 1930s. Major market segments for the product are furniture, interior design, and 
glazing. Sigma's products, in sheet form, are mainly sold via distributors and downstream fabricators 
who sell their products to other organizations and the general public. The organization operates 
worldwide but has a core focus on Europe. In 2005 and 2007, the chemical multinational 
restructured its portfolio and pooled several business units together. In 2008, Sigma had around 
1,400 million Euros in annual sales and employed about 4,000 people (table 6.8).
Table 6.8: Key numerical data Sigma 2002-2008 (based on annual reports)
Sigma 2002 2003 2004 2005# 2006
A
2007 2008
Sales (mln. Euro) 301 279 320 894 967 1,442 1,397
EBIT (operating profit) 42 31 41 103 111 120 43
EBIT/sales ratio (%) 14.0 11.1 12.8 11.5 11.5 8.3 3.1
Employees 843 755 835 2,271 2,467 4,108 4,026
R&D expenses (mln. Euro) 10 9 10 28 27 40 40
R&D/sales ratio (%) 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.9
# Figures after restructuring in 2005
A
Figures after restructuring in 2007
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In 2003, Sigma operated with four product lines, of which two were defined based on production 
technology and two were focusing on a specific market segment. Additionally, it had a separate sales 
organization and a central R&D department. Figure 6.2 presents a simplified organizational chart. 
Recently, Sigma carried out project Diffuse.
Figure 6.2: Simplified organizational chart Sigma (based on interviews and Sigma's website)
General outline of project Diffuse
Project Diffuse was mainly carried out by a business developer and a product manager of one of the 
product lines of Sigma. As a project, Diffuse was developed in Europe and required a low level of 
investment. Relatively little technical development work had to take place and the product could be 
manufactured in existing facilities. The project fits the 'market-discontinuities' category because a 
familiar product was used to target a new market application.
In the mid-90s, Sigma developed and introduced a specific sheet for the light management market 
segment. This sheet has specific colorless light diffusing particles that cause light to diffuse forward 
and was specifically engineered for edge-light applications. It accepts light through its edges and 
redirects it to the surface for bright uniform illumination. The sheet is used in panels for airports, 
shopping malls, restaurants, and bus stops. In 2002, a business developer made some incremental 
adaptations to the product in response to customer feedback which caused renewed internal and 
external attention for this type of sheet. In 2003 Sigma's sales organization was approached by a 
potential customer who showed interest in the sheet, which started the initiation phase of the 
project. This organization was a multinational that, among other products, develops and sells traffic 
safety solutions. Sigma's sales organization established the contact between the potential customer 
and Sigma's business developer. The business developer met with the potential customer to discuss 
ideas which started the development phase. After some additional meetings, the business developer 
found out that the potential customer was working on an innovative license plate system. The novel 
feature was that the license plate was no longer lit by an external source, but by light-emitting diodes 
(LEDs) that emit light into a small light diffusing transparent panel with on top of that a newly 
developed transparent license plate. The idea was that Sigma would supply the light diffusing 
transparent panel. After a period of testing with different samples and using a mathematical model 
developed by Sigma in 2002, the two parties found a suitable sheet thickness. Meanwhile the 
potential customer managed to develop the other parts of the license plate system and to set up a 
supply chain in 2005, which marks the start of the commercialization phase. In the same period, 
Sigma's business developer handed the project over to a product manager, because he moved to a
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position for Sigma's operations in another region. Sigma's potential customer introduced the new 
license plate system in 2006, which also started sales of Sigma's sheet in this application.
In general, Sigma regards project Diffuse as a success. Its sheet could be introduced in this 
application and the project resulted in a positive return on investment. However, Sigma's customer 
clearly overestimated the sales growth of the new license plate system, and the project resulted in 
limited spin-off projects in the same application area. Table 6.9 presents the key characteristics of 
project Diffuse with the corresponding case study evidence.
Table 6.9: Key characteristics Diffuse
Characteristics Case study evidence
Category:
Market-
discontinuity
'.w e  had gained a business opportunity in a new specialty application, where our 
existing material had some specific features which were of benefit for the customer' 
Product manager
'We were already selling this product... and the license plate system was a new
application for us' Business developer
Investment level: 
Low
'We did not need new machines, and could very easily implement it in our production 
process' Business developer
'I did not need so much investments and resources for this project..it would be more 
difficult if I needed, let's say, one million Euros to develop a product' Business developer 
'.b u t generally speaking, it was a smaller project so there was not a real need for a strict 
project set-up, like a project team and stage-gate and things like that' Product manager
Market learning
Project Diffuse was focused on a market segment (light management) that was already known to 
Sigma. Additionally, the organization already had significant product usage knowledge. In contrast, 
Sigma had to develop and refine new customer and application need knowledge in the development 
and commercialization phases. The integration of market knowledge that was generated occurred 
without any considerable problems (table 6.10).
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Table 6.10: Market learning Diffuse
(phase)
Knowledge
dimension
(period)
Learning
Type
Case study evidence
(Initiation)
Segment
Product
(2003)
Exploitation
Exploitation
'Lighting was already a defined market segment where we sell our products' 
Business developer
'We always worked on lighting applications in the past.' Head of NBD and 
innovation
'I tried to look at the volume and development of the market for edge-lit 
material for signage' Business developer
'Edge-lit signage is not new to the market, but it is a trend' Product manager 
'We already had a good position with our existing product in the field of 
lighting applications' Product manager
'In the advertising industry they mainly use our sheets in three standard sizes. ..I 
developed a mathematical model by which we could adapt our product recipes 
to the sheet size to achieve optimal performance (in 2002 ed.).We received a 
positive market feedback to that (in 2003 ed.)' Business developer
(Developm.)
Application
Product
Customer
('03-'05)
Exploration
Exploitation
Exploration
'In the early phases, the contact person at (customer ed.) was only one guy. In 
this stage he was working on small illuminated signs, but I did not really know 
what the application was because he did not open it to me...to be honest I do 
not think that, at that time, he already decided to work on a license plate 
system' Business developer
'We learned that developing the light transparent license plate was more 
difficult than creating the lighting unit' Business developer 
'.w e  had gained a business opportunity in a new specialty application, where 
our existing material had some specific features which were of benefit for the 
customer.' Product manager
'Development started when (business developer ed.) was focusing on product 
details...what were the desired incremental modifications in the formulation to 
enhance properties. I actually continued with the results of these trials' Product 
manager
'They needed it in a specific shape, so we produced sheets and laser-cut them 
in specific shapes...There where several design back and forths to come to the 
right product' business developer
'(Customer ed.) was not a customer at that time' Business developer 
'At the start I visited this guy (at the customer ed.), and he had a small 
laboratory and was working with students...but at some point in time the 
customer really wanted to commercialize this license plate system' Business 
developer
(Commerc.)
Application
Product
Customer
('05-'06)
Exploitation
Exploitation
Exploitation
V 'After the trials I was discussing specifications such as guarantees and 
performance defect values and so on' Product manager
'.they were also asking about pricing' Product manager
'Let me see. ..I can find an e-mail here from (product manager ed.) to
(customer ed.) on pricing and so on. At that time they were already in the
V phase to make a real product for it and put it in production' business 
developer
'At the time around specification, other people from (customer ed.) became 
involved. I think more than 60% of the communication was with this guy 
(that started the project at the customer ed.) and for a minor part we had
V contact with the product managers and specification people at the customer' 
Product manager
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Marketing function
During initiation and development, the central role in market learning for project Diffuse was in the 
hands of the business developer. Mainly because the business developer changed jobs in 2005, this 
central role came into the hands of a product manager from one of Sigma's product lines in the 
commercialization phase. Both employees were marketing specialists because interacting with 
customers was part of their official task description. The task focus of the business developer was 
relatively low. He focused on both exploration and exploitation in project Diffuse but was also 
involved in other Sigma projects, some of them focused on incremental product updates. Also the 
product manager had additional (routine) tasks next to project Diffuse. Thus, both employees were 
highly integrated in the mainstream organization.
Table 6.11: Marketing function Diffuse
(phase; period) 
Marketing function
Case study evidence
(Initiation and 
developm. '03-'05) 
Business developer
'We call 'product management' the marketing of our organization. Besides the heads
of the project lines I was a fifth player in marketing, involved in new business
development for all the product lines' Business developer
'I would say I had five other projects next to this one, most of them focused on
technical improvements of existing products' Business developer
'I was in direct contact with (customer ed.) there was no sales involved' Business
developer
(Commerc. '05-'06) 
Product manager
'At the time of the project I did product management and marketing in one of our 
product lines....I was responsible for specialty applications' Product manager 
'At that time I took over the project from (business developer ed.), and continued the 
contact with (customer ed.) . '  Product manager
'Let me see. ..I can find an e-mail here from (product manager ed.) to (customer ed.) on 
pricing and so on'. Business developer
Senior management involvement
To some extent, the senior management team of Sigma was involved in the market learning that 
took place via project Diffuse. First of all, they framed the strategic direction by asking employees to 
focus on new specialty applications in the light management segment. Additionally, they provided 
the resources that supported the business developer and the product manager to carry out the 
project. Although senior management was aware of the project, specifically when it was transferred 
from the business developer to the product manager, they had little involvement in controlling its 
progress. One of the reasons for that was that the project did not require substantial investments 
(Table 6.12).
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Table 6.12: Senior management involvement Diffuse
(phase; period) 
Senior management 
involvement
Case study evidence
(Initiation 2003) 
Framing
'It was really the strategy of the organization to focus on new specialties where our 
products could fit. In these applications there is a specific value for the customer' 
Product manager
'..lighting applications have always been an organizational focus point' Product 
manager
'Light applications are a strategic focus' Business developer
'We want to focus more on specialties..We always worked on 'light' and it is also a 
current focus point. We are only a small business line with limited resources, it makes 
sense to focus' Head of NBD and Innovation
(Developm. and
commercialization
'03-'06)
Support /  (Limited) 
control
'I had the resources and freedom to pursue this opportunity (project diffuse ed.).my
policy was starting it up and present it when it is running... it would be more difficult
if I needed, let's say, one million Euros to develop a product' Business developer 
'.b u t generally speaking, it was a smaller project so there was not a real need for a 
strict project set-up, like a project team and stage-gate and things like that' Product 
manager
'Higher management was informed..but there was no major management decision 
necessary where usually higher management is involved such as specific investments' 
Product manager
Market knowledge generation
During the initiation phase, segment knowledge and product usage knowledge were updated by 
presenting at trade fairs and by desk research on sales figures. In the development and 
commercialization phases, Sigma collaborated with the customer to generate and update application 
need, product usage, and customer knowledge (table 6.13).
Table 6.13: Market knowledge generation Diffuse
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
generation
Case study evidence
(Initiation 2003) 
Trade fairs /  Desk 
research
'The renewed product that we introduced in 2002 was well accepted. From our sales 
department I knew we were going to raise sales with about 25% in 2003 ' Business 
developer
'From attending trade-fairs we knew that ultra-slim displays really were a trend in the 
light management market' Product manager
(Developm. and
commercialization
'03-'06)
Collaboration with 
potential customer
'We had some back and forth development, working with (customer ed.) Business 
developer
'.(business developer ed.) had already developed more or less some solutions 
together with (customer ed.) when I started the next phase: going into production' 
Product manager
'.fo r example my colleague had a very close relationship with (customer ed.) to 
develop this license plate system' Head of NBD and Innovation
Market knowledge integration
For project Diffuse, market knowledge integration in the initiation phase was mainly carried out by 
using the internal organizational network. During the development and commercialization phases,
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this integration took place by using recurrent meetings, which were accompanied by discussing 
customer feedback on prototypes (table 6.14).
Table 6.14: Market knowledge integration Diffuse
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
integration
Case study evidence
(Initiation 2003) 
Internal 
organizational 
network
'I was not contacted directly by (customer ed.). They knew about the product and they 
called our sales organization. Someone in our sales organization knew that I was 
working with this product, so they came to me. I made the contact and it stayed with 
me' Business developer
(Developm. and
commercialization
'03-'06)
Recurrent meetings 
/  Prototypes
'Internally I had meetings with the lab who created the raw sheet and the people here 
in our customer lab who had the laser cutting equipment and who fabricated the 
different designs' Business developer
'I had meetings with people in production, our sales department when it was about 
pricing and payment terms, and some quality people concerning specifications' 
Product manager
6.3 Bond (Alpha)
Alpha is a business unit of a chemical multinational company and a global player in the engineering 
plastics industry. Important end markets of Alpha's products are the automotive, electrical and 
electronics (E&E), and the packaging industries. Companies in these end markets use Alpha's 
materials to fabricate their own products which they sell to the general public. In 2008, the business 
unit had around 760 million Euros in annual sales and employed about 1,650 people (table 6.15).
Table 6.15: Key numerical data Alpha 2002-2008 (based on annual reports)
Alpha 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Sales (mln. Euro)
EBIT (operating profit) 
EBIT/sales ratio (%) 
Employees
R&D expenses (mln. Euro) 
R&D/sales ratio (%)
579
36
6.2
1,190
26
4.5
566
29
5.1
1,204
26
4.6
624
46
7.4
1,158
24
3.8
705
87
12.3
1,273
27
3.8
735
118
16.1
1,242
31
4.2
807
98
12.1
1,462
38
4.7
761
58
7.6
1,649
42
5.5
Alpha has a matrix organization. The main activities are divided into three regions and four global 
product lines. Each product line has a business manager and three regional product managers. The 
product lines have their own R&D. Additionally, there are regional development and sales teams that 
focus on important multi-product end-markets such as automotive and E&E. Figure 5.1 presents a 
simplified organizational chart. Recently, Alpha has invested resources in project Bond.
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Figure 6.3: Simplified organizational chart Alpha (based on interviews)
General outline of project Bond
Project Bond was carried out in one of Alpha's four globally operating product lines. Among other 
applications, the plastic of this product line is used in automotive and E&E applications. The main 
developments in project Bond took place in Europe. However in the U.S., Alpha employees were 
active in similar efforts. Project Bond required a medium level of investment. Several employees 
were fully dedicated to the project but 'o ff the shelf' products were used. The project fits the 
'market-discontinuities' category because familiar technology was used to target new market 
applications.
In 2005, a manufacturer of golf shoes was interested in replacing the metal base of golf shoes 
spikes, which were over-moulded with rubber, with an engineering plastic that could resist the 
temperatures of the over-moulding manufacturing process. In its search for a supplier it contacted 
Alpha, which was advertising with its high temperature plastic. After doing some tests, it appeared 
that Alpha's material behaved remarkably well during the production process. This triggered Alpha to 
initiate a project that focused on replacing metal backbones of metal/rubber hybrid components by 
Alpha's material. The organization further framed the market segment of metal/rubber hybrid 
components by heavily focusing on automotive applications, where potential volumes are large and 
metal replacement for weight saving was high on the agenda. After some in-house tests and studying 
market research reports organizational members believed that they could bring value in anti­
vibration applications, such as strut mounts and exhaust hangers. They managed to convince 
potential customers to start testing programs with Alpha's engineering plastic instead of metal in 
metal/rubber anti-vibration applications which started the development phase in 2006. During this 
phase, in which Alpha collaborated with a group of potential customers, it learned that cheaper 
materials could also serve customer needs in lots of anti-vibration applications, and that it was very 
hard to move further in that direction. However, partly due to collaborative efforts with potential 
customers, other applications in the metal/rubber market segment were identified: window seals, 
and oil seals. After slightly changing the application scope, Alpha managed to get their material 
approved for an oil seal and a window seal application in projects that first tier automotive suppliers 
were doing with automotive OEMs, marking the start of the commercialization phase in 2008. In that
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same year the automotive OEMs planned to introduce their vehicles with Alpha's material in 2009 
and 2010. Additionally, several spin-off projects were under development.
In general, Alpha regards project Bond as a successful project. The product could be introduced 
into the market, and spin-off projects were realized. However, some respondents argued that it took 
relatively long to realize that anti-vibration was not the best application area to focus on. Table 6.16 
presents project Bond's key characteristics with the corresponding case study evidence.
Table 6.16: Key characteristics Bond
Characteristics Case study evidence
Category:
Market-
discontinuity
'The products we used were off the shelf products' App. development manager 
'..for (Bond ed.) we are using existing grades in new applications...we really started with 
limited market knowledge' Marketing manager
Investment level: 
Medium
' ... if you invest a couple of hundred thousand Euros, you want, at least, earn it back'
App. development manager
'The products that we use are off the shelf products' App. development manager
Market learning
Project Bond was focused on a market segment (automotive rubber/metal hybrid components), 
applications (anti-vibration, window seals, and oil seals) and customers (tier 1 automotive suppliers) 
that were all new to Alpha. Consequently, it had to generate and refine market knowledge on these 
dimensions during the product innovation trajectory. In contrast, because Alpha used existing plastic 
grades it already had some product usage knowledge. It refined this knowledge during the product 
innovation trajectory.
Exploration and exploitation in market learning were combined over time and across dimensions. 
Sufficient market knowledge was generated and market knowledge integration occurred without any 
considerable problems (table 6.17).
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Table 6.17: Market learning Bond
(phase) (period) Case study evidence
Knowledge Learning
dimension Type
(Initiation) ('05-'06)
Segment Exploration > ' . I  looked at what applications in automotive were interesting...then I tried 
to categorize them...and tried to search information on different 
producers...basically it was a market study focused on searching for 
► applications where our product grades potentially brought value' App. 
development manager
'.a t  the start we identified where to act and where our grades could bring
Product Exploitation
J
value. ..It is an interesting market, but with huge competition' Business 
development manager
(Developm.) ('06-'08)
Application Exploration ..at a customer we proposed an anti-vibration application...but ended up at
another division where they do sealing...which had more fit with our product'
Business development manager
Product Exploitation 'We came very close to meeting requirements with our grade in the prototype 
stage...but when we put it in the production process (of the customer ed.) it 
was only metal to pass.' Business development manager
Customer Exploration ..lots of times we got in contact with potential customers by cold calling, via
other contacts or searching for names on the automotive engineers
website...just trying to network into a company you don't know' Business
development manager
(Commerc.) ('08-'10)
Application Exploitation - 'In the window seal project, I talked to the customer and they postponed 
the vehicle introduction to June (2009 ed.) this year' Business development
Product Exploitation . manager
'At one customer we did tests and calculations and start delivering in
Customer Exploitation J 2010. i t  is not a prospect, but a project' Business development manager
Marketing function
Application development managers and business development managers played a central role in the 
market learning that took place via project Bond. All employees that were involved in the project 
were marketing specialists because interacting with customers was part of their official task 
description. Although these managers were active in both exploration and exploitation in market 
learning their task focus was relatively high. They were totally dedicated to project Bond and were 
freed from other responsibilities. In other words, they were differentiated from the mainstream 
organization (table 6.18).
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Table 6.18: Marketing function Bond
(phase; period) 
Marketing function
Case study evidence
(Initiation '05-'06) 
Application 
development 
managers
' . I  am only involved in (Bond ed.), but within this project there are some sub-projects 
at the application level' App. development manager
. I  do new business development in this product line..solely looking at innovative 
things, outside the current market segments.' App. development manager 
'.together with customers I look into applications that they want to carry out in 
plastics' App. development manager
(Developm. '06-'08)
Application
development
managers /  Business
development
managers
' . I  am paid by the product line to find new business and customers, focusing on (Bond 
ed)' Business development manager
'..App. development managers have a more technical focus, business development 
managers are focused on the market...but there is some overlap.. Business 
development manager
' . I  tried to contact several door seals manufacturers' App. development manager
(Commerc. '08-'10) 
Business 
development 
managers
'I delivered a lot of samples and calculations to get commercial approvals' Business 
development manager
'..If there is nobody assigned and we are not selling to this customer yet...I do the 
whole trajectory myself, including pricing' Business development manager
Senior management involvement
Several senior managers of Alpha were involved in project Bond. They were present in the Global 
Product Team which consists of the business manager, the global marketing manager, the R&D 
manager and the product managers of the product line. Specifically the European and U.S. product 
managers were involved. During initiation, they framed the search for new market knowledge by 
emphasizing the strategic choice to look into new market segments where existing high heat plastic 
grades could fit. During development and commercialization, these managers employed a mixture of 
support and control. Support concerned facilitating project members by means of providing 
resources and freedom to be active in the project's day-to-day market learning activities and acting 
as sounding board. The product managers controlled market learning by having monthly discussion 
with project members on progress in market interactions, detecting deviations from original plans, 
and taking action when it was deemed necessary. Finally, in 2008 project Bond became part of an 
Alpha-wide innovation program, which resulted in additional project resources. However, these extra 
resources were accompanied by an enforced focus on the oil seal application (table 6.19).
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Table 6.19: Senior management involvement Bond
(phase; period) 
Senior management 
involvement
Case study evidence
(Initiation '05-'06) 
Framing
'The strategy is to apply our existing grades as broadly as possible' App. development 
manager
'I do new business development in this product line...When I am reporting on new
application ideas to management, I already have done a feasibility analysis' App. 
development manager
'.W e  look for innovation by optimizing existing products...this means adapting them 
for applications in which they replace other materials such as metals' Interview 
Director Alpha in magazine, 2004
'We want to combine developing new grades for existing market applications and 
finding new applications where existing grades can be applied' Business manager
(Developm. and 
commercialization 
'06-'10)
Support /  Control
'I must have a valid argumentation when asking for resources from the product 
manager and research manager....they test me on that' App. development manager 
'Resources were provided by the product manager' Business development manager 
'Our reporting system from a formal standpoint is a monthly report on progress to the 
product manager' Business development manager
Market knowledge generation
During the initiation phase, segment knowledge was generated and product usage knowledge was 
updated by using desk research and visiting conferences to receive initial feedback on ideas and get 
in contact with potential customers. Although it was not available in the organization, the application 
development manager that carried out the marketing function also expressed his need for a 
framework to structurally generate market information in the initiation phase. In the development 
and commercialization phases, Alpha collaborated with several potential customers for testing 
purposes. These collaborations generated product usage, application need, and customer 
knowledge. Additionally, market knowledge generation was accelerated by hiring a new employee 
that was already a specialist within the newly defined market segment (table 6.20).
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Table 6.20 Market knowledge generation Bond
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
generation
Case study evidence
(Initiation '05-'06) 
Desk research /  
Conferences
'In the early stage we wanted to get knowledgeable about the market..we looked at 
overviews on what customers and manufacturers worked with rubber components' 
Application development manager
Application development manager presents at high performance plastics conference 
on high demanding metal-to-plastics replacements Conference proceedings 2005 
'I was actually in need of some structure to structurally collect market information. 
Some kind of innovation funnel. I could not use our usual project management 
framework because that only fits relatively simple product upgrades, not new business 
development things' Application development manager
(Developm. and 
commercialization 
'06-'10)
Collaboration with 
potential customers 
/  Hiring segment 
specialist
'.fro m  2006 onwards we got involved in several joint projects with potential 
customers...with investments from both sides...The customer is evaluating it or is 
making a tool for testing, and we invest in supplying the material' Business 
development manager
'.th e  other business development manager was just hired...he is coming from a 
potential customer...He was hired in 2008 to focus on E&E, but at the end it was really 
convenient to use his network for the oil seal application, because he is coming from 
such a company' Business development manager
Market knowledge integration
Because there was only one function (i.e. application development) involved in market learning 
during initiation, market knowledge was integrated with technological knowledge by a single 
employee. During the development and commercialization phases, market knowledge was mainly 
integrated by using recurrent project meetings involving different functional specialist. In some of 
these meetings, discussing prototypes and potential customer test results provided additional 
support for knowledge integration. Finally, the use of an organization-wide used cross-functional 
project implementation framework (i.e. PTO tool), which brought common language and awareness 
of different responsibilities across the team, also supported market knowledge integration (table 
6.21).
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Table 6.21: Market knowledge integration Bond
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
integration
Case study evidence
(Initiation '05-'06) 
Only one function 
involved in Bond
'I was working quite independently in the beginning-I am the project owner' App. 
development manager
'I have a double role, I do application development and business development' App. 
development manager
(Developm. and 
commercialization 
'06-'10)
Recurrent meetings 
/  Prototypes /  
Implementation 
framework
'We had team meetings involving business development and application development 
people where we set up value propositions and discussed applications' Business 
development manager
'Internally, we discussed prototypes with all people involved' Application development 
manager
'We used the PTO tool to define responsibilities and to keep track on the progress of 
sub-projects as a team' Application development manager
'-that part is probably the most structured part of program management, using the 
PTO tool...you have different phases: prospect, evaluation, technical approval, 
commercial approval and commercialization' Business development manager
6.4 Gears (Alpha)
Just as project Bond, project Gears was carried out in the high temperature plastic product line of 
Alpha. Therefore this section will leave out the description of Alpha and will start directly with the 
general outline of project Gears.
General outline of project Gears
Project Gears was initiated in 2003. At that time, Alpha's Asia Pacific organization was selling 
relatively more material than its European and U.S. counterparts. To some extent this was 
understandable because of the high concentration of E&E manufacturers in Asia. However, a closer 
look revealed that a significant number of downstream processors from Asia were using the material 
to develop gears which were used in the two-wheelers industry. These processors used the material 
because of its heat resistance, and wear and friction properties. This was an eye-opener, because the 
gears segment was not a focus area for Alpha at that time. The organization allocated resources to 
exploring the gears segment. In Europe, an application development manager started looking into 
what value Alpha's product could bring in the gears segment and categorized applications. 
Additionally, Alpha's senior management provided resources to set-up a gears research program 
involving a mechanical engineer from corporate research. These two employees had regular contacts 
and also kept contact with several application developers in Asia and the U.S. They narrowed down 
the gears segment to automotive gears, where potential volumes are high. Initial application areas 
were motor management gears, engine gears, electronic power steering (EPS) gears, and interior 
gears27. After two years of internal research, Alpha employees began focusing more on collaborating 
with potential customers. This period marks the start of the development phase in 2005. In Europe, a 
business development manager was hired with expertise in the gears segment. Alpha managed to 
get their material on the short list of several tier one automotive suppliers that were active in gears
27 Interior gears are gears that are used in interiors of vehicles, for example for adjusting seats.
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projects. However, it appeared that it was difficult to deliver value over other materials in EPS gears 
and the interior gears applications, which resulted in decreased attention for these areas. In contrast, 
the organization had more success with motor management gears and engine gears applications. 
Alpha realized technical approvals with several tier one automotive suppliers that were working in 
these fields, which started the commercialization phase in 2007. After achieving commercial 
approvals, Alpha managed to introduce its high temperature plastic grade in several motor 
management gears and engine gears applications in 2008. At that same time, several additional 
developments in the gears area were ongoing.
In general, Alpha regards project Gears as a successful project. The product could be introduced 
into the market, and spin-off projects were realized. However, it was also argued that not all 
expectations could be realized because the number of applications where Alpha's material makes a 
difference is smaller than initially expected. The project fits the 'market-discontinuities' category 
because familiar technology was used to target new market applications. Table 6.22 presents project 
Gears' key characteristics with the corresponding case study evidence.
Table 6.22: Key characteristics Gears
Characteristics Case study evidence
Category:
Market-
discontinuity
'.T here was not that much collaboration with R&D because the material was fixed. 
There is no significant newness in the material.Specifically the applications are new' 
Business development manager
'..in (Gears ed.) we use existing product grades..it is about new applications' Marketing 
manager
Investment level: 
Medium
' ... Our research program in wear and friction is backed by, let's say 100,000 Euro. Partly
for gears, partly for other stuff' Marketing manager
'For this customer, I think we invested 25,000 Euro' Business development manager
Market learning
Project Gears was focused on a market segment (automotive gears), applications (EPS gears, motor 
management gears, engine gears, and interior gears) and customers (tier 1 automotive suppliers) 
that were all new to Alpha. Consequently, it had to generate and refine new market knowledge on 
these dimensions during the product innovation trajectory. In contrast, because Alpha's existing 
plastic grades were used it already had some product usage knowledge. It refined this knowledge 
during the product innovation trajectory.
Exploration and exploitation in market learning were combined over time and across dimensions. 
Sufficient market knowledge was generated and market knowledge integration occurred without any 
considerable problems (table 6.23).
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Table 6.23: Market learning Gears
(phase)
Knowledge
dimension
(period)
Learning
Type
Case study evidence
(Initiation)
Segment
Product
('03-'05)
Exploration
Exploitation
'Initially, we wanted to get a feeling for the applications. What were segment 
trends and what were possible applications?' Researcher 
'After some time we were able to distinguish three different application areas 
in the segment...We wrote these down and we just had to build up knowledge 
in these' Business development manager
'I think the product line is still searching for the best market segments for their 
existing product grades. ..In this project, specifically the combination of heat 
resistance and wear and friction durability were the familiar building blocks to 
start with' Researcher
(Developm.)
Application
Product
Customer
('05-'07)
Exploration
Exploitation
Exploration
'One of the major limitations was lack of application knowledge...we had to
develop that by interactions with application-builders' Researcher
'.a fte r some development work we found that in a lot of EPS applications, our
material was not easily accepted because there was often too little difference
with competing materials that are cheaper' Researcher
'We used known materials for these applications' Business development
manager
Existing grades are recommended for the (gears ed.) segment Segment 
brochure
'You are active in a new segment, this means a lot of new customer contacts' 
Researcher
'If you only talk about (gears ed.), we learned that you not always get in touch 
with the right person at the buyers side...you have to talk about the whole 
actuator system' Business development manager
(Commerc.)
Application
Product
Customer
('07-'08)
Exploitation
Exploitation
Exploitation
\  'I also have a project at (customer ed.). In this project we worked together 
with the automotive OEM and the system supplier. We did all phases 
together and the vehicle will be introduced in 2010'. Business development 
y manager
'in this application, we are working now on the commercial aspects. The 
customer wants to introduce the product in 2009' Business development 
manager
Marketing function
An application development manager and business development managers played a central role in 
the market learning that took place via project Gears. These employees were marketing specialists 
because interacting with customers was part of their official task description. Although they were 
active in both exploration and exploitation their task focus was relatively high. They were totally 
dedicated to project Gears and were freed from other responsibilities. In other words, they were 
differentiated from the mainstream organization (table 6.24).
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Table 6.24: Marketing function Gears
(phase; period) 
Marketing function
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'05) 
Application 
development 
manager
'.based on technical and market data, the application development manager who did 
some preliminary work had concluded that this was something we should try' Business 
development manager
'.w e  have a world-wide team of marketing and technical people that are dedicated to 
(Gears ed.) Business development manager
(Developm. and
commercialization
'05-'08)
Business
development
managers
'I am business development manager and I am solely focused on the gears segment' 
Business development manager
'Business development is in between sales and R&D. I communicate to R&D what the 
market wants and with marketing and sales I discuss expectations' Business 
development manager
'I worked together with the business development manager, who is in touch with the 
market' Researcher
Senior management involvement
Several senior managers of Alpha were involved in project Gears. They were present in the Global 
Product Team which consists of the business manager, the global marketing manager, the R&D 
manager and the product managers of the product line. Specifically the global marketing manager 
was involved as project sponsor. During initiation, senior management framed the search for new 
market knowledge by emphasizing the strategic choice to look into the gears segment and look for 
applications where existing plastic grades could fit. During development and commercialization, 
these managers employed a mixture of support and control. Support concerned facilitating project 
members by means of providing resources and freedom to be active in the project's day-to-day 
market learning activities. Senior managers controlled market learning by having discussions with 
project members on progress in market interactions and detecting deviations from original plans 
(table 6.25).
Table 6.25: Senior management involvement Gears
(phase; period) 
Senior management 
involvement
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'05) 
Framing
'The product line allocated people to look into the gears segm ent.' Business 
development manager
'. t o  some extent, senior managers of the product line steer the business development 
managers' Researcher
We aim to apply gear experiences from Asia in Europe and the U.S. Analyst 
presentation Director Alpha 2004
(Developm. and
commercialization
'05-'08)
Support /  Control
'In these projects, there is some risk involved, but I think that is part of the learning 
process. Senior management is aware of that and I have full support' Business 
development manager
'The product manager together with other senior managers allocate resources, based 
on criteria such as market volume and potential for multiplication..sometimes the 
product manager is also involved in project meetings to discuss progress' Researcher 
The global marketing manager is sponsor of the (gears ed.) project Interview company 
magazine
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Market knowledge generation
During the initiation phase, segment knowledge was developed and product need knowledge was 
updated by using desk research and presenting at conferences to receive initial feedback on 
application ideas and get in contact with potential customers. In 2005, Alpha also partnered with an 
organization that provided an online intermediary environment, linking chemicals and plastics 
producers with downstream designers. With this organization they developed an online tool to get in 
contact and start co-development trajectories with potential customers. Other practices that were 
used in the development and commercialization phases were collaborations with potential 
customers for testing purposes. These collaborations generated product usage, application need, and 
customer knowledge. Additionally, market knowledge generation was accelerated by hiring a 
segment specialist (a business development manager) with experience in the gears segment (table 
6.26).
Table 6.26 Market knowledge generation Gears
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
generation
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'05) 
Desk research /  
Conferences
'We researched trends in the market, for example EPS is a trend that was developing
and is going to grow in the fu ture.' Researcher
'We gathered information by visiting conferences' Researcher
(Developm. and
commercialization
'05-'08)
Collaboration with 
potential customers 
/  Hiring segment 
specialist /  On-line 
tool
'In this application project we worked together with the system integrator (tier 1 
automotive supplier ed.) and the automotive OEM and tested prototypes..With 
another customer we developed an alternative processing step' Business development 
manager
'We work together with tier 1 automotive suppliers to support their projects and try to 
influence their choice of material..' Researcher
'..(Business development manager ed.) has a network in the gears world. That was 
really a useful addition' Researcher
'Myself, I have 20 years of experience in this w o rld .' Business development manager 
'This collaboration also includes a gear selector which is a unique interactive tool to
assist gear designers with the first steps of material selection... Thanks to their
impressive coverage of the OEM and design engineering industry (online service 
provider ed.) offers a great solution to accelerate the growth of our business' 
Marketing manager in press release collaboration with on-line service provider 2005
Market knowledge integration
For project Gears, market knowledge integration in the initiation phase took place by an application 
development manager using his internal organizational network. The application development 
manager asked mechanical engineers in corporate research to work on the project. Later on, during 
the development and commercialization phases, market knowledge was mainly integrated by more 
formal recurrent project meetings involving different functional specialists. In some of these 
meetings, discussing prototypes and potential customer test results provided additional support for 
knowledge integration. Finally, the use of an organization-wide used cross-functional project 
implementation framework (i.e. PTO tool), which brought common language and awareness of
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different responsibilities in different product innovation phases across the team, also supported 
market knowledge integration (table 6.27).
Table 6.27: Market knowledge integration Gears
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
integration
Case study evidence
(Initiation '03-'05) 
Internal 
organizational 
network
'Application development people from (Alpha ed.) approached corporate research 
with this application research project' Researcher
(Developm. and
commcercialization
'05-'08)
Recurrent meetings 
/  Prototypes /  
Implementation 
framework
'At the start of the project we had three to four meetings per year with the global 
team...Besides that we had local meetings related to specific applications...(Alpha ed.) 
and corporate research became very well connected' Researcher 
'We analyzed actual gears, had test-programs and discussed results in the team' 
Researcher
'Test results from the customer were also discussed with people from research' 
Business development manger
'(Alpha ed.) has a system, PTO, where all sub-projects are recorded. In this tool, 
different project phases are distinguished and progress is tracked' Researcher 
'In this project we recorded our sub-projects in the PTO tool' Business development 
manager
6.5 Overall comparison
This chapter discussed findings on projects that fall into the 'market-discontinuities' project category. 
Based on the accumulated data from four cases, Additive (Theta), Diffuse (Sigma), Bond (Alpha), and 
Gears (Alpha), some similarities and differences between cases can be highlighted.
Similarities
In all four cases, project members searched for new application need knowledge, while leveraging 
and updating market knowledge on one or more of the other market knowledge dimensions.
What were the similarities in the marketing organizations that triggered and allowed project 
members to carry out this specific market learning behavior? First of all, in all four cases rather 
specialized marketing functions were involved in market learning (application/business development 
managers, marketing managers, and product managers). Additionally, the employees that carried out 
these functions were involved in both exploration and exploitation. In all four cases, the business 
unit's senior management tried to influence market learning by adopting multiple roles. In the 
initiation phase, these managers framed specific strategic areas to update or search market 
knowledge. They either identified and articulated already defined market segments as focus area or 
they emphasized searching for new segments and new applications where existing products could fit. 
In the development and commercialization phases of the product innovation projects, senior 
managers supported market learning by providing resources to the project members and acting as 
sounding board when necessary. Additionally, in all four cases the project members that performed 
the marketing function showed the skills to carry out desk research on market segments in the 
initiation phase of the projects and to develop collaborations with customers for testing purposes in
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the later phases. Finally, in all four cases the organizational members that performed the marketing 
function were able to collaborate and interact with other participating functional specialists without 
any considerable problems in the development and commercialization phases of the product 
innovation projects. Because market knowledge integration happened without considerable 
problems in can be concluded that cognitive barriers between functional specialists that can hamper 
knowledge integration were successfully mitigated. Important practices used to develop a shared 
language and shared narratives were face-to-face meetings and discussing new product prototypes.
Differences
The overall comparison revealed small differences in organizational configurations between Additive, 
Bond, and Gears. These were specifically related to the practices in use to generate and integrate 
market knowledge. While project members in project Gears used an on-line tool to generate market 
knowledge in the later phases of the project, such a tool was not used in projects Additive and Bond. 
Considering market knowledge integration, employees involved in projects Additive and Gears made 
use of their internal organizational network in the initiation phase of the project. This practice was 
not used in project Bond because there was only one employee involved at the start of this project.
Larger differences could be observed when distinguishing between Additive, Bond, and Gears on 
one side and Diffuse on the other side. First of all, there was a difference in investment level. 
Additive, Bond, and Gears required a medium level of investment while Diffuse was in need of a low 
level of investment. Another difference relates to market learning behavior. While employees 
involved in Additive, Bond, and Gears focused on new directions on three market knowledge 
dimensions (segment, customer, and application need knowledge), employees involved in Diffuse 
focused on new knowledge on two market knowledge dimensions (customer and application need 
knowledge). In Additive, Bond, and Gears project members had to get familiar with market segments 
that were totally new to the organization while in Diffuse, project members acted within the borders 
of a familiar market segment. In the group of three cases, organizational members experienced the 
violation of their market segment frame of reference which forced them to admit the limits of 
prevailing understandings and practices. For example, the advice of consultants to look for other 
market segments in project Additive, and the realization of their product being used in several gears 
applications in project Gears triggered the identification of new potential market segments. A large 
part of these three projects consisted of just getting familiar with these newly identified market 
segments. As a researcher involved in project Gears put it:
'Specifically In the beginning we did not have developed ideas on gears or what they were. If you look at 
gears they look quite simple, but specifically the first years we really used to research what they could do. 
What are the specifics if you make them out of plastic? If you compare our material with steel it roughly 
has a factor 70 lower modulus and it is a factor 10 less strong. These are indications that you are in 
another stress-regime. This also implies that the functioning of plastic gears is different than the 
functioning of gears made out of steel. In the initial phases we really used the time to research...to get a 
feeling for applications and what is important. Where is our material successful and other materials
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fail.... I have learned that it is really important to speak the same language as the application builders.
They have to consider us as party that can offer added value....So volumes of applications are important
but not the only criterion. We also look for applications which we can use for multiplication, which we can 
use as 'sign' to attract other application developments'
This experience of identifying and learning about a completely new market segment could not be 
observed in project Diffuse. Additionally, several differences in the organizational configuration could 
be observed between the group of three cases and Diffuse. Senior management carried out control 
in the cases of Additive, Bond, and Gears, while limited control was carried out in Diffuse. It is likely 
that a reason for this was the difference in investment needs. Other important differences relate to 
the marketing function and market knowledge generation practices. Although in all projects the 
project members that carried out the marketing function were involved in both exploration and 
exploitation, a difference in focus could be observed between the group of three cases and Diffuse. 
In the group of three cases, employees responsible for the marketing function were totally focused 
on their specific project while their colleagues in Diffuse were also responsible for activities next to 
the project under study. In other words, the marketing function in the group of three cases was 
differentiated from the mainstream organization, while the marketing function in Diffuse, in contrast, 
was more integrated. Focusing on market knowledge generation practices an additional practice 
could be observed in the group of three cases when compared to Diffuse. While in the case of project 
Diffuse, employees solely relied on collaboration with a potential customer to generate market 
knowledge in the development and commercialization phases, the business units in the other three 
cases also added project members by hiring segment specialists.
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7 Tech/market-discontinuities: Anti-resist, Foam, and Dye
This chapter describes the findings on cases that fall into the 'tech/market-discontinuities' category. 
In these projects, project members focused on market applications and technologies that were new to 
the organizations in which the projects were carried out. Successively, the chapter presents the 
findings on cases 'Anti-resist' (Beta), 'Foam' (Gamma), and 'Dye' (Gamma). Case descriptions are 
structured around the concepts that were presented in the conceptual framework in chapter 3. This 
chapter is concluded with an overall comparison.
7.1 Anti-resist (Beta)
Beta is a business unit of a multinational chemical company. It manufactures and sells a high 
performance fiber in product forms such as powder, pulp and filament yarn. Important end markets 
are automotive and defense industries. Companies in these end markets use Beta's materials to 
fabricate their own products which are sold to other companies, governments and the general 
public. Beta has offices and sales agents all over the world. In 2007, the business unit had several 100 
million Euros in annual sales and employed about 1,000 people (table 7.1).
Table 7.1: Key numerical data Beta 2002-2007 (indices, 2002 = 100; based on annual reports)
Beta 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sales 100 124 145 158 173 181
Employees 100 107 110 115 125 130
R&D expenses 100 117 125 133 150 133
For application development and sales, Beta has organized eight globally operating sales/ 
marketing groups. Each of these groups targets a specific market segment with a set of product 
forms. Beta also has its own research department. Recently, the organization has set up a small 
marketing support function to develop and support cross-group marketing initiatives and innovation. 
Figure 5.2 presents a simplified organizational chart. Recently, Beta carried out project Anti-resist.
Figure 7.1: Simplified organizational chart Beta (based on interviews and Beta's website)
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General outline of project Anti-resist
Project Anti-resist was mainly carried out by the research department and one of the eight sales/ 
marketing groups of Beta. The sales/marketing group focuses on the tire market where Beta's 
filament yarn is used as reinforcement material in cap plies of tires. As a project, Anti-resist was 
developed in Europe and required a medium level of investment. Significant research had to take 
place but no major plant adaptations were necessary. Beta decided to work with an external 
converter for manufacturing purposes for the first few years. The project fits the 'tech-market- 
discontinuities' category because unfamiliar technology was used to target a new application in the 
familiar tire market
In 2004, the sales/marketing group decided to do a market study on the future needs of the tire 
industry. This started the initiation phase of project Anti-resist. After some desk research and 
interviewing customers Beta employees found out that for the coming years tire manufactures aimed 
to contribute to lower fuel consumption by reducing the rolling resistance of tires. Meanwhile Beta's 
research department was focused on improving the bonding of filament yarn to rubber by treating it 
with chemicals. While the bonding was not significantly improved, the researchers found a way to 
improve the hysteresis properties of rubber compounds which, potentially, could reduce the rolling 
resistance of tires. After some development work in 2004 researchers generated chemically modified 
chopped fiber that could be mixed with rubber compounds and significantly reduced hysteresis 
properties. However, this product did not behave well on a larger scale. Further developments led to 
a granule variant of the product which was easier to handle in a manufacturing process. At the end of 
2005, Beta started collaborations with several tire manufacturers to test the new product. Although 
the general feedback regarding reducing rolling resistance was positive, it appeared that some tire 
manufactures had difficulties using the product in their manufacturing process. This knowledge 
triggered the development of a second version of the product in 2006. The organization decided to 
simultaneously focus on the two product versions and project Anti-resist entered its 
commercialization phase in 2007. Beta started selling the first quantities in that same year. In 2008, 
larger tire manufacturers were still buying small quantities for further testing purposes. However, 
some smaller organizations already used Beta's product to produce bicycle tires.
In general, Beta regards project Anti-resist as a successful project. The product could be 
introduced into the market and several other tire manufacturers, besides the ones that were 
involved during development, showed interest and are testing the product. Table 7.2 presents 
project Anti-resist's key characteristics with the corresponding case study evidence.
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Table 7.2: Key characteristics Anti-resist
Characteristics Case study evidence
Category:
Tech/market-
discontinuity
'It is quite exciting, because it is a new application in an existing market segment, and we 
don't disturb our current application. We already sell yarn for reinforcing tires but now 
we are entering the business of modifying our product and mixing it with rubber. It is a 
compound, a marriage between the rubber and the fiber' Business manager 
'In this project a new product with a new name is introduced into the market. Developing 
finishes for applications is our daily work, but developing a totally new product is 
something else.' Researcher
'Several elements are covered by patent applications' Business manager
Investment level: 
Medium
'Before we decided to set up our own manufacturing process (before 2007 ed.), 
investments were not too high. We already produced the yarn and we had to treat it with 
chemicals' Business manager
Market learning
Project Anti-resist was focused on a market segment (tires) and customers (tire manufacturers) that 
were already known to Beta. Consequently, it already had significant market knowledge on these 
dimensions at the start of the project. In contrast, because the product and the application were new 
to the organization, Beta had limited product usage and application need knowledge. It mainly had to 
learn about product usage and application needs by exploratory probes of prototypes in the market 
place during the development and commercialization phases of the project.
Exploration and exploitation in market learning were combined across market knowledge 
dimensions in the development phase and over time in the development and commercialization 
phases of the product innovation trajectory. Sufficient market knowledge was generated and market 
knowledge integration occurred without any considerable problems (table 7.3).
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Table 7.3: Market learning Anti-resist
(phase)
Knowledge
dimension
(period)
Learning
Type
Case study evidence
(Initiation)
Segment
Customer
(2004)
Exploitation
Exploitation
'We started looking into the tire industry, because we knew the tire industry 
and it is easy to look there...we already had relationships because we were 
familiar with the market ' Business manager
'We interviewed three of our existing customers in 2004, which are the biggest 
three in the market and cover about 65%, and asked them what their future 
needs were' Business manager
(Developm.)
Application
Product
Customer
('04-'07)
Exploration
Exploration
Exploitation
'We learned that in compounding, tire manufacturers are using about 15 
ingredients' Business manager
' ... it occurred to us that rubber tires are complex compounds with several
ingredients. It is not one product that is mixed with our product, and then there 
is also the way of mixing that can cause differences in test results' Project 
manager
'Product specifications were hard to pin down, because this product is also new 
for the customer. But they had certain expectations, which we could meet with 
our product' Project manager
'We made some experimental product which we could send to customers. We 
could say we are testing tires. I think we needed that because in lab tests you 
can have 20% improvement, but in practice you maybe have 10%. What is seen 
in the lab cannot be translated to the tires. So you need practical test and we 
do not build tires. We needed some tire companies that we could collaborate 
with' Business manager
'We faced some problems when testing, because at some customers the 
compound was not well dispersed, but we solved that' Business manager 
'Very early on the (sales/marketing group ed.) wanted to confront customers 
with our prototypes, to get a market feedback. In the summer of 2005 we 
started delivering prototypes to them...This resulted in feedback that triggered 
the development of a new type of the product' Researcher 
'We tested our prototype product with customers and they thought it was 
attractive. However they also discovered some limitations. Based on that 
feedback we adapted the product and it is expected that this is going to be the 
main product type' Project manager
'Earlier we called the product 'modified fiber'. However we found out that the 
fiber people at our customers did not really understand the product. They told 
us we had to go to the materials groups of these companies' Business manager 
'We knew that tire manufacturers do not like working with chopped fiber 
because it is hard to mix...so we had to take some steps there' Researcher
(Commerc.)
Application
Product
Customer
(2007)
Exploitation
Exploitation
Exploitation
\ 'We commercialized our new product in this application with some partners 
and now (2008 ed.) we are trying to build that out' Business manager 
'To some extent we have frozen our end product and are in the middle of 
I  the market introduction phase at the moment. We have some commercial 
production for producers of bicycle tires, but manufacturers of car tires are 
doing fleet tests at the moment and buy several hundred kilos for that. But 
they are still on board and have provided us with positive feedback' Project 
manager
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Marketing function
The central role in market learning in project Anti-resist was mainly carried out by a sales manager 
from the sales/marketing group. When Anti-resist started, this sales manager was part of the 
elastomer reinforcement group. However, during the development phase the employees that 
focused on tires split off from this group and Beta established a specific tires group headed by the 
sales manager. So when the sales manager became business manager of the tires group and had to 
spread his attention, he was supported in market learning for project Anti-resist by several sales 
managers working in the tires group.
All employees that carried out the marketing function in the project could be considered 
marketing specialists because interacting with customers was part of their official task description.
The task focus of the tires business manager and sales managers was relatively low. They were 
involved in both exploration and exploitation and had other tasks next to Anti-resist such as selling 
filament yarn for tire reinforcement. In other words, project Anti-resist's marketing function was 
highly integrated in the mainstream organization (table 7.4).
Table 7.4: Marketing function Anti-resist
(phase; period) 
Marketing function
Case study evidence
(Initiation, 2004) 
Sales manager
'At the start of the project I was account manager, which is a technical sales function 
for tires worldwide...so I sell yarn, but I was also involved in this project. The marketing 
and commercial part is done by me' Business manager 
'Market feedback was provided by (sales manager ed.) Researcher
(Developm. and 
commerc. '04-'07) 
Business manager /  
Sales managers
'In 2005, the tire department was founded. They gave me full responsibility of tires, 
including commercial responsibility' Business manager
'(Business manager ed.) had direct contacts with customers and found the partners 
which we used for testing...He is responsible for the tires (sales/marketing group ed.) 
and has several sales colleagues who can help out' Project manager
Senior management involvement
The senior managers of Beta were, to some extent, involved in the market learning of project Anti­
resist. During initiation, they framed the search for new market knowledge by emphasizing the 
strategic choice to look for new applications in existing market segments. During development and 
commercialization, they supported project members by allocating human and financial resources. 
However, they also controlled market learning. Project members had to report regularly on project 
progress and market feedback and a specific high level steering committee was established to track 
progress during development and commercialization (Table 7.5).
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Table 7.5: Senior management involvement Anti-resist
(phase; period) 
Senior management 
involvement
Case study evidence
(Initiation, 2004) 
Framing
'In the past we were sold out, but now we are expanding and we also need the future 
to be bright, so senior management encourages us to look for new applications in our 
market segments' Business manager
'Our strategy is to see the application area as wide as possible. Here we see a 
difference with our direct competitor which seems to focus on high margin 
applications' Business manager (of other sales/marketing group)
(Developm. and
commercialization
'04-'07)
Support /  Control
'All along there was the support of the management of the company' Business 
manager
'We always have budgets to initiate new things' Business manager 
'In the steering team meeting higher management is involved, like VP R&D and VP 
commercial, which is my boss. Here we discuss large investments. So investments for 
the plant are discussed there. I provide input by presenting the progress of the project' 
Business manager
'The lines in our organization are short. (Business manager ed.) can easily contact his 
boss and my boss is also involved in the project. Specifically in the later phases of the 
project, people from the management team even had direct contact with me if they 
wanted to ask a question' Researcher
'This project is supported, I can hire more people, but I like working with a small group' 
Business manager
'Next to the project meeting and steering team meeting we have another meeting 
with top management where we talk about what we need for the coming year. Here 
you discuss the subjects that you are working on and is decided if you receive budgets 
to continue' Business manager
'There is support, certainly, but in the later phases of the project, when they started 
building the plant, control was increased' Researcher
'Without a doubt, top management supported us and was not afraid to take some 
risks' Project manager
Market knowledge generation
In the initiation phase of project Anti-resist, market knowledge was updated by doing desk research 
and visiting customers. In the development and commercialization phases, market knowledge was 
mainly generated and updated by collaborating with potential buyers to test prototype products 
(table 7.6).
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Table 7.6: Market knowledge generation Anti-resist
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
generation
Case study evidence
(Initiation, 2004) 
Desk research /  
Visiting customers
'We interviewed three of our customers in 2004, which are the biggest three in the 
market and cover about 65%, and asked them what their future needs were' Business 
manager
'I can show you the figures. Here you see that rolling resistance is an important 
customer concern. You see that it is going on until 2012. This is based on the 
interviews with customers and desk research' Business manager 
'Based on desk research (sales/marketing group ed.) made rough calculations of the 
market potential very early in the project' Researcher
(Developm. and
commercialization
'04-'07)
Collaboration with 
customers
'We collaborated with a number of customers, using a secrecy agreement. We had our
prototypes and asked them to have a look at them ..w e already tested the product on
lab-scale but then we could say we were testing tires' Business manager
'We did tests with customers. A lot of the lab results were confirmed by customers'
Researcher
Market knowledge integration
For project Anti-resist, market knowledge integration in the initiation phase occurred by employees 
making use of their internal organizational network. Later on, during development and 
commercialization, recurrent team meetings were used, and prototypes were discussed. The team 
also used a cross-functional project implementation framework which is known throughout the 
organization. The use of this framework resulted in common language and awareness of different 
responsibilities across the team. This provided additional support for market knowledge integration 
(table 7.7).
Table 7.7: Market knowledge integration Anti-resist
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
integration
Case study evidence
(Initiation, 2004) 
Internal 
organizational 
network
'At the start it was not a separate project and there was no management involved. I 
had talks with our research institute and they took a look at it. There was no separate 
budget and no project formulated' Business manager
'Research and (sales/marketing group ed.) got together and decided to work on this 
rolling resistance issue' Researcher
(Developm. and
commercialization
'04-'07)
Recurrent meetings 
/  Prototypes /  
Implementation 
framework
'We have what we call a project team meeting every six weeks to keep everyone on 
the same page. Nowadays it is sometimes 12 people involved. We have manufacturing, 
research, marketing, and the project coordinator' Business manager 
'I worked together with the sales manager from (sales/marketing group ed.)...we had 
official meetings but also informal contacts' Researcher
'We discussed the granule prototype with (sales/marketing group ed.) and they told us 
it looked good, because the tire industry is used to working with granules. A lot of 
powders are granulated because powders give dust' Researcher 
'We have project team meetings where we sit together with marketing, research, 
logistics, purchasing, and manufacturing...working together never was a problem' 
Project manager
'We also use a project management tool. You have different phases such as 
exploratory phase, development, and commercialization...This framework also 
includes stage-gate checklists. We used that to structure our discussions in the team' 
Business manager
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7.2 Foam (Gamma)
Gamma is part of a large multinational company. It primarily manufactures and sells a large variety of 
plastic resins and compounds. Important end markets are the automotive, electrics and electronics 
(E&E), and building industries. Companies in these end markets use Gamma's products to fabricate 
products which are sold to other companies, governments and the general public. Gamma has R&D 
departments, manufacturing plants, and sales organizations all over the world and its history can be 
traced back to the 1930s. In 2006 the business unit had around 5,000 million Euros in annual sales 
and employed about 11,000 people (table 7.8).
Table 7.8: Key numerical data Gamma 2002-2007 (based on annual reports)
Gamma 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Sales (mln. Euro) 3,853 3,850 4,462 4,858 4,859 5,100
EBIT (operating profit) 619 310 416 638 493 n.a.
EBIT/sales ratio (%) 16.1 8.0 9.3 13.1 10.1 n.a.
Employees n.a.# n.a. 10,000 10,000 11,000 11,000
R&D expenses (mln. Euro) 100 100 100 110 105 103
R&D/sales ratio (%) 2.6 2.6 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.1
# n.a. = not available
Gamma has organized its activities in a matrix. Product technology (i.e. research) and product 
management operates globally while sales, including technical support and application development, 
has a regional scope. Additionally, there is a separate global marketing organization which includes a 
global application technology department. Figure 7.2 presents a simplified organizational chart. 
Recently, Gamma carried out project Foam.
Figure 7.2: Simplified organizational chart Gamma (based on interviews and company presentations)
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General outline of project Foam
Project Foam was mainly carried out by the global marketing department of Gamma involving 
employees from the United States and Europe. It required a high level of investment because 
Gamma had to invest several millions of Euros in a new production line. The project fits the 'tech- 
market-discontinuities' category because unfamiliar technology was used to target new applications.
Before 2005, Gamma provided a high performance plastic resin to a company that turned this 
resin into high performance foam which was mainly used as core material in structural components 
of commercial and military aircraft interiors. Product features that were specifically valued were its 
forming and fire properties and its radar transparency. In 2005, the foam producer decided to phase 
out producing the foam and withdraw from the market because of restructuring reasons. Gamma 
offered to help keeping their foam product in service but was unable to persuade them. Because 
foam businesses have higher margins than resin businesses Gamma started analyzing if it made 
sense to produce and sell the foam by itself. This started the initiation phase in 2005. In 2006, the 
decision was made to develop an own foam material and development starts. In October 2006 
Gamma bought manufacturing equipment and started developing the foam production line in their 
global application technology department in the United States. In parallel, it identified six aircraft 
interior manufacturers as validation partners based on their use of the current material. These were 
all existing customers that already bought several resin types from Gamma. The business unit 
managed to collaborate with these partners for testing purposes as it moved through the 
development phase. Gamma also did put efforts in getting their new material qualified by aircraft 
builders. By 2008, Gamma had managed to scale up the manufacturing process to a certain extent. 
Project Foam entered the commercialization phase when team members started looking for 
distribution partners. Gamma had decided that it was going to manufacture the foam in three 
standards sizes. Because potential customers could order a wide variety of sizes the organization 
needed distribution partners that had a specific sawing capability. For Europe such a partner was 
found in the United Kingdom. After developing an internal order handling system, the first 
commercial orders were received by the end of 2008.
In general, Gamma regards project Foam as a successful project because the product could be 
introduced into the market. However, because technical developments took longer than expected 
the market introduction was delayed by almost a year. Additionally there was some confusion on 
roles and responsibilities in the commercialization phase. The marketing organization started 
contacting potential customers and distributors in Europe without involving the local sales people. 
This also might have caused some delay. Table 7.9 presents the key characteristics of project Foam 
with the corresponding case study evidence.
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Table 7.9: Key characteristics Foam
Characteristics Case study evidence
Category:
Tech/market-
discontinuity
'At the start of the project we did not sell high performance foam' Sales manager 
'We have some patent applications filed for our process....The newness is in the 
conversion technique. It is a completely different production process as (original foam 
producer ed.) uses. They use a batch process, our process is continuous' Project manager 
'This is a new application for us, we already sell resins to (aircraft interior manufacturers 
ed.) but these are used in other applications...we did not sell products that are used as 
core-products in aircraft interiors. It is really a new market space for us. Actually we 
developed a whole new platform' Marketing manager
Investment level: 
High
'In 2006 we got the approval for the technical program. Senior management basically 
said: here is 5 million dollars, go and do it' Marketing manager 
'Global marketing also had to look into other foam applications, because buying the 
production line required high investments' Sales manager
Market learning
Project Foam was focused on customers (aircraft interior manufacturers) that were already known to 
Gamma. Consequently, it already had significant market knowledge on the customer dimension at 
the start of the project. In contrast, at the start of the project Gamma had little product usage (new 
foam product), market segment (high performance foam), and application need (cores of aircraft 
interior components) knowledge.
Exploration and exploitation in market learning were combined across market knowledge 
dimensions in the initiation and development phases and over time during the development and 
commercialization phases. Sufficient market knowledge was generated. Apart from the confusion 
related to roles and responsibilities in the commercialization phase, market knowledge integration 
occurred without any considerable problems (table 7.10).
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Table 7.10: Market learning Foam
(phase)
Knowledge
dimension
(period)
Learning
Type
Case study evidence
(Initiation)
Segment
Customer
('05-'06)
Exploration
Exploitation
'At the start of the project we did not sell high performance foam' Sales 
manager
'Global marketing looked at volumes and prices and market expectations. They 
also had to look at what are other opportunities for foam' Sales manager 
'At the start of the project we quantified the market and identified certain 
applications for this material. So we had some comfort level of what the 
market really was. The investments were based on a multigenerational plan 
which included analyses on different applications in the high performance foam 
market. We studied market reports on high performance foam and where it 
was used' Marketing manager
'I was in contact with (aircraft interior manufacturers ed.) and they were 
concerned because (original foam producer ed.) told them they were planning 
to stop producing foam. I fed this information back into the organization. I gave 
the specific commercial input' Sales manager
'The reality is that customers who use our thermoplastics for injection molding 
are also potential customers for the foam form as well. So we know all of them 
and the contacts were already there' Marketing manager 
'From a commercial view, first question was analyzing the reactions of 
customers of the incumbent material to the situation. Were they designing out 
the material? Were we chasing a market space that was getting smaller 
because customers were phasing out this material, or was it that they lost 
business because they couldn't continue what they needed to do' Marketing 
manager
(Developm.)
Application
Product
Customer
('06-'08)
Exploration
Exploration
Exploitation
'With the individual validation partners I moved from a market segment level 
to an application le ve l. I gathered the customer needs and continuously kept 
customers informed and involved throughout the program' Marketing 
manager
'I have been active in handling customer needs in order to qualify this material. 
We acquired the specs of the validation customers and made sure that the 
product hit their requirements' Project manager
'The type of discussions we had with customers was completely different than 
what we normally have. It is not an injection molding material. We did not talk 
about mold temperature, conditions of raw materials or flow lines' Marketing 
manager
'Working with several validation partners was quite important. They tested 
initial prototypes of the material to see if it would meet their set of
requirements and fed their experiences back to us... We were open to them,
showing them how we developed it and the different test methods that we 
used' Marketing manager
'During the development phase I got in close contact with the foam people at 
our customers' Marketing manager
(Commerc.)
Application
Product
Customer
(2008)
Exploitation
Exploitation
Exploitation
 ^ 'In the scale-up phase of the technical innovation we produced the foam on 
the actual manufacturing equipment and validated that with the validation 
partners. Besides that, we started the commercial implementation. We 
I looked for a distributor and introduced this organization to the customers to 
make sure they were comfortable with the distributor' Marketing 
manager
'We completed developing one of the three grades last September (2008 ed.) 
customers are now doing final qualifications' Project manager
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Marketing function
The central role in market learning in the initiation phase of project Foam was mainly carried out by a 
U.K. sales manager and a marketing manager located in The Netherlands. During the development 
phase this role was primarily in the hands of marketing managers of the global marketing 
organization. When the project was in the commercialization phase, eventually, several regional sales 
managers were added.
All functions that carried out this central role were marketing specialists in a sense that interacting 
with customers was part of their official task description.
The task focus of the employees that carried out the marketing function was relatively high. 
Although all employees involved had additional sales tasks or other projects next to project Foam 
they were either concentrating on the exploration part or the exploitation part of the of market 
learning in the course of project Foam. Hence, exploration and exploitation in market learning were 
carried out by different employees. For example, in the initiation phase the regional sales manager 
came with the feedback from the aircraft interior manufacturers that the foam company planned to 
phase out high performance foam production (exploitation), while the marketing manager was 
involved in exploring the high performance foam segment (exploration). Because the marketing 
manager was solely focused on exploration and was not responsible for routine activities of the 
mainstream organization it is fair to say that, for project Foam, the overall marketing function was 
relatively differentiated from the mainstream organization (table 7.11).
Table 7.11: Marketing function Foam
(phase; period) 
Marketing function
Case study evidence
(Initiation '05-'06) 
Sales manager /  
Marketing manager
'I am the commercial manager for Ireland and the United Kingdom. I am responsible 
for the commercial success of our products in this area.J did this project next to other 
projects. It was part of my daily job' Sales manager
'I was in contact with (aircraft interior manufacturers ed.) and they were concerned 
because (original foam producer ed.) told them they were planning to stop producing 
foam. I fed this information back into the organization. I gave the specific commercial 
input' Sales manager
'My responsibility is to develop a strategy for composites in the transportation market 
within (Gamma ed.). We talk in general terms about composites as being honeycomb 
materials, prepreg materials, and foams.' Marketing manager 
'For the business case I worked with my marketing colleagues to define the market 
space and pitched that to our higher management' Marketing manager
(Developm. '06-'08) 
Marketing managers
'In this project, global marketing was taking the project through development as well, I 
was not so much involved in that phase' Sales manager
'With the individual validation partners I moved from a market segment level to an 
application level. I gathered the customer needs and continuously kept customers 
informed and involved throughout the program' Marketing manager
(Commerc. 2008) 
Marketing managers 
/  Sales managers
'I became involved again when we were getting to commercialization last year. We had 
a product and a timeline for having a commercial product. Together with (marketing 
managers ed.) I identified the customer base and developed a supply chain solution for 
the material' Sales manager
'In partnership with the distributor I went to the end-customer to make sure that they 
had the confidence that the intermediate partner was technically and commercially 
capable of providing the material' Marketing manager
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Senior management involvement
The senior managers of Gamma's global marketing organization and the top management team of 
Gamma were, to some extent, involved in the market learning that took place via project Foam. 
During initiation, they framed the search for new market knowledge by emphasizing the strategic 
choice to look for new market segments beyond segments where plastics pellets were sold and 
injection molding was the key processing technology, such as fibers and foams. Before Foam started, 
senior management already allocated resources to a 'new market segment' group operating in the 
global marketing organization which had to implement this strategic intent. During development and 
commercialization, senior managers supported project members in their market learning efforts by 
allocating resources. However, in these phases they also controlled market learning. Project 
members had to collect lots of market data before the investments for the new production line were 
approved. Additionally they had to report regularly on project progress and market feedback (Table 
7.12).
Table 7.12: Senior management involvement Foam
(phase; period) 
Senior management 
involvement
Case study evidence
(Initiation '05-'06) 
Framing
New markets group is focusing, among other things, on high performance foam 
Company presentation 2007
'Foam was always on our mind. There was always the idea, should we do that. We 
knew it was a value added process. But there is also the golden rule, don't compete 
with your customers' Marketing manager
'It is our long term strategy to look into our resin portfolio and develop new products 
based on downstream manufacturing processes such as films, foams, and fibers, which 
allow us to focus on new markets' Marketing director
'There is a strategy about innovating our current plastic resins, and there is a strategy 
to go beyond injection molding if you will' Project manager
(Developm. and 
commercialization 
'06-'08)
Support /  Control
'In 2006 we got the approval for the technical program. Senior management basically 
said: here is 5 million dollars, go and do it' Marketing manager
'Back in 2006, we identified a XX mln. aircraft interior market, but that was not enough 
for senior management to go ahead. We needed to deliver a plan which included data 
on more applications' Marketing manager
'Every three or four months I provide an overview of the status of all my projects to 
the top management of the organization, and I also have to choose one project for an 
in-depth presentation...there we have the dialogue on progress'. Marketing Manager 
'Selection criteria to start the project were a combination of economics, ROI and IRR, 
and demonstrating a small lab-scale size...reporting goes through marketing to the CEO 
of the company' Project manager
'We had acceptable levels of funding during project implementation' Project manager
Market knowledge generation
In the initiation phase of project Foam, customer knowledge was updated and segment knowledge 
was developed by doing desk research and talking with customers. Additionally, organizational 
members used an explicit step-by-step framework which is used throughout Gamma's marketing 
organization to map the foam market segment. In the development and commercialization phases, 
market knowledge was mainly generated and updated by collaborating with customers for testing
153
Tech/market-discontinuities
prototype products. Collaborations were established with downstream product specifiers (i.e. aircraft 
interior manufacturers and aircraft builders) and a distributor which adds value by customizing the 
foam to customer specifications (table 7.13).
Table 7.13: Market knowledge generation Foam
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
generation
Case study evidence
(Initiation '05-'06) 
Desk research /  
Visiting customers /  
Using Framework
'For developing the business case, we studied market reports to get familiar with the 
market space and with applications...you can buy market reports on high performance 
foam and where that goes into' Marketing manager
'I was in contact with (aircraft interior manufacturers ed.) and they were concerned 
because (original foam producer ed.) told them they were planning to stop producing 
foam. I fed this information back into the organization. I gave the specific commercial 
input' Sales manager
'From a commercial view, first question was analyzing the reactions of customers of 
the incumbent material to the situation. Were they designing out the material? Were 
we chasing a market space that was getting smaller because customers were facing 
out this material, or was it that they lost business because they couldn't continue what 
they needed to do' Marketing manager
'In global marketing, we follow a framework, also at the start of the project. We have a 
specific market assessment phase before we present the business case to senior 
management. Within that framework there is a whole series of tools available' 
Marketing manager
(Developm. and 
commercialization 
'06-'08)
Collaboration with 
customers
'Working with several validation partners was quite important. They tested initial 
prototypes of the material to see if it could meet their set of requirements and fed 
their experiences back to us....We selected six validation partners which went with us 
through the development phase. We were open to them, showing them how we 
developed it and the different test methods that we used' Marketing manager 
'I would say commercially we did a very good job, we selected six validation customers 
which was enough to hit most of the requirements, and they are all buying different 
grades. We dealt with them with a fair amount of personal contact' Project manager
Market knowledge integration
For project Foam, market knowledge integration in the initiation phase occurred by organizational 
members making use of their internal network. The sales manager contacted the global marketing 
organization to see if something could be done to help out the aircraft interior OEMs concerning 
their foam supplier phasing out a product that they needed. Later on, during development and 
commercialization, recurrent team meetings were held and prototypes were discussed. The team 
also used a cross-functional development framework which is known throughout the organization. 
The use of this framework resulted in common language and awareness of different responsibilities 
across the team. This provided additional support for market knowledge integration. However, 
market knowledge integration was also hindered by lack of interaction between the global marketing 
organization and the U.K. sales manager at the start of the commercialization phase (table 7.14).
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Table 7.14: Market knowledge integration Foam
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
integration
Case study evidence
(Initiation, '05-'06) 
Internal 
organizational 
network
'I fed this information (customer information ed.) back into the organization. I gave the 
specific commercial input by connecting with the global marketing organization and 
the product management organizations' Sales manager
'When initiating the project I worked fairly solo, although I had some ad-hoc meetings 
with some colleagues' Marketing manager
(Developm. and 
commercialization 
'06-'08)
Recurrent meetings 
/  Prototypes /  
Implementation 
framework
'Except for the beginning of the project there was always a project team involved' 
Marketing manager
'Most of the folks are based in the U.S., at least from the technical side. We get 
together fairly regularly. Globally, we have monthly core team (app. technology, 
marketing, sales ed.) calls....Together with the European folks I went to possible 
distribution partners' Project manager
'One of the challenges we faced was related to roles and responsibilities. Later in the 
project, global marketing contacted customers in the U.K. without my knowledge. That 
caused some friction because that influences sales projections in a country' Sales 
manager
'Not everything went perfectly during commercial validation. We (global marketing 
ed.) had to communicate across different continents and there were times that we did 
not communicate directly with the field people (sales ed.). When they tried to pick up 
responsibility and talked to the validation partners they found out things we told the 
validation partners but did not communicate to them' Marketing manager 
'As a team we discussed the validation program and prototypes of the technical 
feasibility phase before we started working with external validation partners' Project 
manager
'Our team followed a formal process that is used in the organization, with different 
gates and milestones...are we on track cost wise, time wise, performance wise, all 
those things are mapped' Marketing manager
'We used the process framework that is in place in the organization.. a phase-gate 
system to carry out project work' Project manager
7.3 Dye (Gamma)
Just as project Foam, project Dye was carried out by Gamma. Therefore this section will leave out the 
description of the business unit and will start directly with the general outline of project Dye.
General outline of project Dye
Project Dye was a joint effort of the global marketing department, the sales organization and a 
product line of Gamma and was carried out in Europe. It required a medium level of investment. 
Gamma had to develop a new product and invest in studying a new market segment. However, no 
substantial investments in manufacturing facilities had to take place. The project fits the 'tech- 
market-discontinuities' category because unfamiliar technology was used to target a new 
application.
In 2003, the corporate research department of the multinational owning Gamma invented a dye 
that had a specific glow under UV light and blended well with plastic resins. The corporate research 
department approached Gamma to see if there was an interest from their side. Gamma decided that 
the research project was worth investing in because the organization was working on developing an 
anti-counterfeiting solution to prevent illegal CD and DVD copying. This new dye had the potential to
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fit in this development. The new dye also triggered the idea to look at other anti-counterfeiting 
solutions. Gamma decided to appoint a marketing manager from global marketing to take a first look 
at this newly identified market segment. This started the initiation phase in 2005. After a year of 
market research, the marketing manager identified five potential applications for the new dye in the 
anti-counterfeiting market segment. Gamma decided to focus on spirits anti-counterfeiting as 
launching application area such as the introduction of self-made whiskies under an established brand 
name. Among other things this choice was based on the fact that Gamma was already selling plastic 
resin to bottle caps and closures manufacturers that operate in this field. The idea was that 
downstream manufacturers would produce caps of spirits bottles for brand owners with Gamma's 
plastic resin which included the new dye. Downstream stakeholders, such as spirits wholesalers and 
customs could identify if they were dealing with 'the real thing' if they shined with an UV lamp on the 
plastic caps. The development phase began when Gamma started collaborating with a European caps 
and closures manufacturer that showed interest in the anti-counterfeiting solution. Gamma 
delivered the complete system (i.e. plastic resin pellets with newly developed dye) and the caps and 
closures manufacturer started in-house testing at the end of 2006. When opening a bottle of spirits, 
the cap had to break from the neck of the bottle. However, it appeared that Gamma's resin was to 
strong and the bottles were very hard to open. Based on this feedback, Gamma aimed to make its 
plastic resin less strong. In March 2007, the caps and closures manufacturer tested the adjusted 
product. Results were slightly better but inconsistent. Some bottles could be easily opened but other 
bottles were much harder to open. At the same point in time, Gamma's marketing manager came 
across a representative from a whisky brand owner that bought caps from Gamma's validation 
partner. This representative was enthusiastic about Gamma's solution, contacted the caps and 
closures manufacturer and expressed interest. Additionally he advised Gamma's marketing manager 
to investigate if the dye blended well with the plastic resin that was already in use to produce the 
caps. If this was the case, he assured that validation trajectories, and therefore implementation, 
would go faster. This new direction changed the internal organization of the project. The plastic resin 
that was already in use for producing caps was not a plastic resin that was manufactured and sold by 
Gamma. Therefore, the marketing manager stopped working together with the plastic resin product 
line and started working with the product line that (externally) buys plastic resin and has 
compounding as main activity. Because of lack of collaboration between Gamma's color technology 
group and their compounding product line, some problems arose in identifying the color that 
matched the color that was used for the whisky bottles of the brand owner. After solving this 
problem, Gamma's validation partner (i.e. caps and closures manufacturer) continued testing 
Gamma's solution. The new variant passed several rounds of testing and the commercialization 
phase started in 2008. First sales could be realized at the end of the same year.
In general, Gamma regards project Dye as a successful project. The product could be introduced 
into the market and some spin-off projects could be started. However, during development there 
were some difficulties regarding collaboration between different departments within Gamma, which 
had a negative impact on project efficiency. Table 7.15 presents the key characteristics of project Dye 
with the corresponding case study evidence.
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Table 7.15: Key characteristics Dye
Characteristics Case study evidence
Category:
Tech/market-
discontinuity
'I am working as marketing manager for this industry that is a new domain for us: anti­
counterfeiting solutions. It is kind of an industry but it covers other traditional industries 
because you can have solutions for, for example, automotive, spirits, electronics...It also 
includes a new technology. The dye that we use is new, it turns bright yellow under UV 
light which is difficult to achieve. It is developed and patented by us' Marketing manager 
'We never used this product (dye ed.) before because it was recently developed' Sales 
manager
'The dye is hard to copy because we patented this new technology' Researcher
Investment level: 
Medium
'We had to invest in developing the technology and researching the market. We buy the 
resin from an external company and an external company manufactures the pigment. So 
we have these separate components coming and our product line compounds and blends 
everything together and delivers pellets to the customer' Marketing manager
Market learning
Project Dye was focused on a customer (caps and closures manufacturer) that was already known to 
Gamma. Consequently, Gamma already had significant market knowledge on the customer 
dimension when initiating the project. In contrast, at the start of the project Gamma had little 
product usage (resin with newly developed dye), market segment (anti-counterfeiting market), and 
application need (spirits anti-counterfeiting) knowledge.
Exploration and exploitation in market learning were combined across market knowledge 
dimensions in the initiation and development phases and over time during the development and 
commercialization phases. Sufficient market knowledge was generated. Apart from the lack of 
collaboration between two of Gamma's departments during development, market knowledge 
integration occurred without any considerable problems (table 7.16).
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Table 7.16: Market learning Dye
(phase)
Knowledge
dimension
(period)
Learning
Type
Case study evidence
(Initiation)
Segment
Customer
('05-06)
Exploration
Exploitation
'In 2005 I started to work on this project. The first year I really did a lot of 
background research...trying to understand what were the problems, what 
were the needs. Studying diverse traditional industries, just trying to 
understand this big thing, this counterfeiting. Could we do something and could 
we make money there? Where there market spaces where people use plastics 
and have these problems?...Although we work with a variety of customers it 
was not a question that we asked before. But if you ask them 'do you have a 
problem with counterfeiting?'..^ lot of them have, it is amazing' Marketing 
manager
'The marketing manager explained to us (sales managers ed.) in which area to 
dig for new opportunities' Sales manager
'We (sales managers ed.) went to several of our existing customers and found 
out that (caps and closures manufacturer ed.) had an interest.one of our 
technical sales guys is following this company for a long time, he knows about 
their production and machinery' Sales manager
'I tried to see what we could do with existing customers, because we know 
them and it is easy to talk with them. We have this big commercial organization 
and I used the technical sales managers as entry point. I went with them to 
customers and presented that this (anti-counterfeiting ed.) was something we 
were working on' Marketing manager
(Developm.)
Application
Product
Customer
('06-'08)
Exploration
Exploration
Exploitation
'I learned from (whisky brand owner ed.) that if we wanted to start something 
quickly, we should not change anything to the resin that was already in use in 
this application. If we changed something, the (whisky brand owner ed.) would 
have to revalidate its bottling process' Marketing manager 
'When working together, (caps and closures manufacturer ed.) agreed that 
using the same plastic resin that they were already using made them feel more 
comfortable' Sales manager
'(Caps and closures manufacturer ed.) tested our first prototype product. They 
contacted us and said, works fine, we can mould caps and it glows under UV 
light, but the thing is we cannot open the bottles. So that was back to the 
drawing board for us' Marketing manager
'We had several rounds of testing at (caps and closures manufacturer ed.) to 
see if proper caps could be made and the product behaved as in our lab. You 
have to be very open to customers on that. You have to present some internal 
data to build confidence but also emphasize that you have to discover things 
together' Sales manager
'We followed two parallel lines. First we dealt with the technical guys of the 
company (caps and closures manufacturer ed.), but later we also talked to their 
purchasing and sales department to make sure we had the ok of various 
stakeholders at (caps and closures manufacturer ed.)' Sales manager
(Commerc.)
Application
Product
Customer
(2008)
Exploitation
Exploitation
Exploitation
\ 'After we had established that the product worked properly, we entered a 
phase of fine-tuning the product. It is about how much dye we should apply 
to get the result the customer wanted' Sales manager 
'After the formulation was frozen, the customer had to decide what color 
f intensity they wanted to buy' Researcher 
' After the last trials, (caps and closures manufacturer ed.) made some 
industrial parts that were shipped to (whisky brand owner ed.) along with a 
price proposal, we also received a feedback on their reaction' Marketing 
manager
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Marketing function
The central role in market learning in the initiation phase of project Dye was mainly carried out by a 
marketing manager and several sales managers located in Europe. During development and 
commercialization, this role was primarily in the hands of the same marketing manager and one sales 
manager.
These marketing manager and sales managers were all marketing specialists in a sense that 
interacting with customers was part of their official task description.
The task focus of the employees that carried out the marketing function was relatively high. 
Although the employees involved had additional sales tasks or other projects next to project Dye, 
they were mainly concentrated on either the exploration part or the exploitation part of market 
learning in the course of the project. For example, in the initiation phase the marketing manager 
developed new segment knowledge (i.e. exploration) while the sales managers updated their 
customer knowledge (i.e. exploitation). Because the marketing manager was solely focused on 
exploration and was not responsible for routine activities of the mainstream organization it is fair to 
say that the overall marketing function in project Dye was relatively differentiated from the 
mainstream organization (table 7.17).
Table 7.17: Marketing function Dye
(phase; period) 
Marketing function
Case study evidence
(Initiation '05-'06) 
Marketing manager 
/  Sales managers
'The marketing role in this project could not easily be done in a product line. Because it 
was vague: a lot of traditional industries and across plenty of product sites. Because it 
is so broad you cannot ask anyone in one product to work on it or anybody in the field 
to focus on it. So we decided to put a special resource behind it, being me, to look at it. 
I have several projects where I focus on this new segment' Marketing manager 
'In 2005 I started to work on it. The first year I really did a lot of background 
research...trying to understand what were the problems, what were the needs. 
Studying diverse traditional industries, just trying to understand this big thing, this 
counterfeiting...At the start I visited about 20 customers covering 5 to 6 traditional 
industries together with several sales colleagues who work in the field' Marketing 
manager
'My main task is defining existing and new customers where we can position our 
existing products. When we have developed something new, as in this project, we 
work with a marketing manager. I introduce him or her to the customer. They bring 
the extra knowledge.. did this project next to my other work' Sales manager
(Developm. and 
commercialization 
'06-'08)
Marketing manager 
/  Sales manager
'We had several meetings with (caps and closures manufacturer ed.) during the 
validation process. Additionally, when a prototype got tested someone from the field 
that knows a lot about injection molding was present at the customer to help out' 
Marketing manager
'Together with (marketing manager ed.) I worked with (caps and closures 
manufacturer ed.) to validate our product and get it through development and 
commercialization' Sales manager
Senior management involvement
The senior managers of Gamma's marketing organization and the top management team of Gamma 
were, to some extent, involved in the market learning of project Dye. During initiation, they framed
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the search for new market knowledge by emphasizing the strategic focus to look into the anti­
counterfeiting segment for product differentiation purposes. They also appointed a marketing 
manager who was totally dedicated to building up knowledge in this field. During development and 
commercialization, senior managers supported project members by allocating resources to carry out 
market analyses. However, in these phases they also put effort in controlling market learning. The 
marketing manager had to present an extensive business case to senior management before the 
resource request for development was approved. Additionally, she had to report regularly on project 
progress and market feedback (Table 7.18).
Table 7.18: Senior management involvement Dye
(phase; period) 
Senior management 
involvement
Case study evidence
(Initiation '05-'06) 
Framing
'Before I was appointed, the dye was already developed. One of my colleagues in the 
U.S. started a project in 2004 in the field of CD and DVD. I was appointed because 
senior management wanted to extend the existing market focus and look for 
applications beyond CD and DVD' Marketing manager
(Developm. and 
commercialization 
'06-'08)
Support /  Control
'For larger projects and new things we have the Growth Initiative Board (GIB) which 
consists of several senior managers. Here we present our programs and ask for funding 
if needed. This project got approved by the GIB. Every month I have to write a 
summary on progress related to specific points such as total available market, industry 
fit and confidence levels, projections...Every three months I also do presentations 
where we have a dialogue with the GIB' Marketing manager
'(Marketing manager) has to report every three months and has to show what she is 
doing, and what she needs to move ahead' Sales manager
'To start a (development phase ed.) you have to have an indication of what the market 
is, and an indication in terms of price...and at least a potential market or customer that 
could be interested. So you have to do some kind of assessment even though it is not 
100% clear at that moment' Sales manager
Market knowledge generation
In the initiation phase of Dye, customer knowledge was updated and segment knowledge was 
developed by doing desk research, visiting conferences and talking with existing customers. 
Additionally, the marketing manager used an explicit step-by-step framework which is used 
throughout Gamma's marketing organization to map the anti-counterfeiting market segment. In the 
development and commercialization phases, market knowledge was mainly developed and updated 
by collaborating with the caps and closures manufacturer that was used as launching customer (table 
7.19).
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Table 7.19: Market knowledge generation Dye
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
generation
Case study evidence
(Initiation '05-'06) 
Desk research /  
Visiting conferences 
/  Customer visits /  
Using framework
'In 2005 I started to work on it. The first year I really did a lot of background research.
A lot of internet, statistics and looking at custom studies. I also went to conferences on 
brand protection and talked to customers in diverse traditional industries, trying to 
understand the segment, general problems and needs' Marketing manager 
'Together with (marketing manager ed.) I went to several customers and we found out 
that (caps and closures manufacturer ed.) was interested' Sales manager 
'We use a framework in marketing with different phases. When initiating a project you 
have a market assessment phase, and there are different tools available which you can 
use for, for example, market mapping and segmentation. Some of them are even 
required in developing the business case' Marketing manager
(Developm. and 
commercialization 
'06-'08)
Collaborating with 
customer
'In this project we collaborated with (caps and closures manufacturer ed.) which was 
our validation partner. Together with them we tested product prototypes' Marketing 
manager
'During development the customer tested our prototype products and we received 
feedback on that' Researcher
Market knowledge integration
For project Dye, market knowledge integration in the initiation phase occurred by the marketing 
manager making use of her internal organizational network. The marketing manager contacted 
several sales managers from different European countries and asked them to help her to find out if 
there was specific customer interest for the anti-counterfeiting solution. Later on, during 
development and commercialization, recurrent team meetings were used, and prototypes were 
discussed. The team also used a development framework which is known throughout the 
organization. The use of this framework resulted in common language and awareness of different 
responsibilities across the team. This provided additional support for market knowledge integration. 
However, to some extent market knowledge integration was also disturbed because two 
departments (i.e. color technology department and the compounding product line) had difficulties in 
collaborating.
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Table 7.20: Market knowledge integration Dye
(phase; period) 
Market knowledge 
integration
Case study evidence
(Initiation, '05-'06) 
Internal 
organizational 
network
'I tried to reach customers via our commercial organization.J have a 12 year history in 
this company so I know these guys (that are working in the commercial organization
ed.). I know who is working in certain areas, so I call them... Basically you need to
know them and convince them' Marketing manager
'(Marketing manager ed.) approached me to talk about this new dye' Sales manager
(Developm. and 
commercialization 
'06-'08)
Recurrent meetings 
/  Prototypes /  
Implementation 
framework
'When we were making samples I had regular meetings with several sales colleagues 
and people from technology. Because we are people that work in remote locations this 
means a lot of teleconferencing' Marketing manager
'We had regular calls with (marketing manager ed.) where we discussed samples. It 
worked well because we had a good relationship with her' Researcher 
We did teleconference meetings where everyone from each department calls in' Sales 
manager
'When we decided to change the resin, this meant that, internally, we had to move 
from one product line to the other. The product lines were ok with that but we had 
some discussion with color technology....there is a lot of history behind this...color 
technology has difficulties working with the product line to which the project was 
relocated because they sometimes act rather independently. So things did not move as 
quickly as they should' Marketing manager
'Maybe you have heard it from (marketing manager ed.) but we had some differences 
in opinion with color technology in the U.S. about UV stability...there is a lot of politics 
behind it' Researcher
'The product lines and their technology groups used a cross-functional framework to 
actually develop the product. It parallels our validation stage, and I was also involved' 
Marketing manager
'We used the product line's cross-functional development framework involving 
technology, sales and marketing' Sales manager
7.4 Overall comparison
This chapter discussed findings on projects that fall into the 'tech/market-discontinuities' project 
category. Based on the accumulated data from three cases, Anti-resist (Beta), Foam (Gamma), and 
Dye (Gamma) some similarities and differences between cases can be brought to light.
Similarities
In all three cases project members searched for new application need and new product usage 
knowledge, while leveraging and updating market knowledge on one or more of the other market 
knowledge dimensions.
What were the similarities in configuration of the marketing organizations that triggered and 
allowed project members to carry out this specific type of market learning? First of all, in all three 
cases, the business unit's senior management tried to influence market learning by adopting multiple 
roles. In the initiation phase, these managers framed specific strategic areas to update or search 
market knowledge. They either identified and articulated an already defined market segment as 
focus area or they emphasized searching for new segments and new application spaces. In the 
development and commercialization phases of the product innovation projects, senior managers 
supported market learning by providing resources to the project members and by acting as sounding
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board when necessary. However, to some extent, senior management also controlled market 
learning efforts by tracking progress and asking for market feedback updates from project members. 
Additionally, in all three cases, the organizational members that carried out the marketing function 
were specialists and showed the skills to carry out desk research on market segments and to 
interview existing customers in the initiation phase of the projects. In the later phases these 
managers were able to develop collaborations with customers to test product prototypes. Finally, in 
all three cases the project members that performed the marketing function were able to collaborate 
and interact with other participating project members in the course of the product innovation 
projects. Cognitive barriers between functional specialists that can hamper knowledge integration 
were, eventually, successfully mitigated. Important practices used to develop a shared language and 
narratives between project members were recurrent meetings, using an implementation framework, 
and discussing new product prototypes.
Differences
The overall comparison revealed only small differences between projects Foam and Dye. While 
project Foam was in need of a high level of investment, project Dye could be carried out with a 
medium level of investment. Furthermore, project members in Dye used an additional market 
knowledge generation practice in the project's initiation phase: visiting conferences.
Larger differences could be observed when distinguishing between project Anti-resist on one side 
and projects Foam and Dye on the other side. The first difference relates to market learning 
behavior. While organizational members involved in project Anti-resist focused on generating and 
integrating new market knowledge on two dimensions (product usage, and application need), 
employees involved in projects Foam and Dye did this on three dimensions (segment, product usage, 
and application need). In project Anti-resist, project members kept acting within the borders of a 
familiar market segment. As the business manager involved in Anti-resist put it:
'(Anti-resist ed.) is a new product and a new application for us. This is quite exciting because we do not 
disturb our current application in this market segment. Market segment is the same, but it is a new 
application in the tire market. We are not replacing anything. So we already had relationships and were 
familiar with the market. This is an added value of the project. Since the market is known it is easier to 
interact. We have an innovation group also, but they are looking at different markets and they have a lot 
of difficulties talking to potential customers because they are not experts in a particular market segment'
In contrast, although project members in project Foam and Dye used existing customers as launching 
customers, they had to get familiar with market segments that were totally new to the organization. 
They had to analyze these first before they could make deliberate investment decisions. A large part 
of these two projects consisted of just getting familiar with these newly identified market segments.
Furthermore, two differences in the organizational context of market learning could be observed 
between project Anti-resist on the one hand and projects Foam and Dye on the other hand. The first 
difference has to do with the task focus of the organizational members that carried out the
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marketing function in the projects under study. While in all three projects these organizational 
members had other projects and tasks next to the project that was analyzed, the ones in Foam and 
Dye had more focused tasks. The organizational members that carried out the marketing function in 
these two projects were mainly focused on either exploration or exploitation but not both. In 
contrast, the employees that carried out the marketing function in Anti-resist were involved in both 
exploration and exploitation. Because organizational members that were responsible for exploration 
in Foam and Dye were solely focused on exploration and not involved in activities that were carried 
out by the mainstream organization it is fair to say that the marketing function in Foam and Dye was 
relatively differentiated from the mainstream organization. This was not the case in project Anti­
resist. The second difference relates to market knowledge generation practices. While in project Anti­
resist, organizational members that carried out the marketing function solely relied on desk research 
and contacting customers to generate market knowledge in the initiation phase of the project, the 
organizational members in Foam and Dye also used a formalized framework that was available in the 
global marketing organization of Gamma. A reason for this difference might be that in the case of 
project Anti-resist, the project members updated their segment and customer knowledge while 
project members in projects Foam and Dye, in contrast, had to develop new segment knowledge. In 
the latter two projects, the organizational members that carried out the marketing function had to 
collect and make sense out of more relatively new market information. A formalized framework 
which emphasizes specific tasks could help them navigating through these uncharted market spaces. 
For Anti-resist, which was based on familiar segment knowledge, codified within organizational 
documents and tacit within employee heads, there was, probably, less need for such a framework. 
Using such a framework in project Anti-resist would likely have over-formalized market knowledge 
generation.
164
Cross-case comparison
8 Cross-case comparison
Chapter eight presents a cross-case comparison of the ten cases that were discussed separately in 
chapters five through seven. The purpose of this chapter is to compare the findings on the ten 
individual cases and discuss similarities and differences. The cross-case comparison is more 
parsimonious than the individual case descriptions. However, because it is based on insights that 
were found across cases, it is more robust. This comparison will be the main source of input for 
drawing general conclusions. In general, this chapter follows the structure of the conceptual 
framework that was presented in chapter three. However, two explanatory concepts that emerged 
during data analyses are added: project success and investment level. This chapter starts with 
discussing project success and the observed market learning behavior across projects. Additionally, 
we illustrate that based on the 'overall level of exploration in market learning strategy' three 
separate groups of projects can be constructed. Next, differences and similarities in dimensions of 
ambidextrous marketing organizations between these groups are discussed. In discussing these 
dimensions, we also highlight their changes in the course of a product innovation project. This chapter 
concludes with a summary.
8.1 Project success
At the start of the empirical study, ten projects were selected for in-depth investigation. These 
projects were introduced into the market less than three years ago (Heat, Green, Gears, Diffuse, 
Additive, Anti-resist, Foam, Dye) or were close to market introduction (Anti-tracking, Bond). 
Consequently, by using 'market introduction' as intermediate measure for success, at least, eight of 
the ten projects under study can be considered successful. During our research, also project Bond 
became part of the success group because the resulting product could be introduced into the 
market. In contrast, developments in project Anti-tracking could not be commercialized and 
therefore this project can be considered unsuccessful by the standards taken in this study. Strong 
evidence was found that an important reason for struggling with market introduction was the lack of 
generating and integrating segment knowledge. Project Anti-tracking illustrates the need for a 
significant level of market knowledge for effective and efficient product development and helps to 
make a distinction between sufficient and insufficient market learning. However, this project will not 
be included in further cross-case comparison. This decision is made because the present research 
studies how organizations resolve the market learning paradox in product innovation processes. It 
does not study the amount of market learning in relationship with project success or failure. 
Consequently, the remainder of this chapter discusses the cross-case comparison of the nine 
remaining cases: Heat, Green, Additive, Diffuse, Bond, Gears, Anti-resist, Foam, and Dye.
8.2 Market learning
Market learning in product innovation refers to the generation and integration of market knowledge 
in the course of a product innovation trajectory. In each of the nine projects, project members
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combined exploration and exploitation in market learning across dimensions in a single product 
development project phase. For example, market knowledge on a newly defined market segment 
was generated and integrated in the initiation phase by, among other sources, making use of existing 
customer contacts. New application need knowledge was generated and integrated in the 
development phases by prototyping 'off the shelf' products in new applications. Additionally, it was 
observed that exploration and exploitation within a single market knowledge dimension were 
combined in different product development project phases. For example, collaborations with 
potential customers in a project's development phase resulted in new market knowledge (i.e. 
exploration), that was refined in the commercialization phase (i.e. exploitation). The upper limit for 
exploration in the projects under study was three market knowledge dimensions. In none of the 
projects we observed exploration on all four market knowledge dimensions.
Based on the 'overall level of exploration in market learning strategy' that could be attributed to a 
single project it is possible to develop three groups of projects (table 8.1). The first group includes 
projects Heat and Green which displayed a low level of exploration. In both projects attention was 
centered on a segment, applications and customers that were already familiar to the firm (i.e. 
exploitation). Exploration in market learning was limited to the product usage dimension during the 
development phase of the projects. In this phase experimentation took place by means of testing 
prototype products that were based on new technological knowledge and therefore new in the 
market.
Table 8.1: Groups of projects based on the 'overall level of exploration in market learning strategy'
Project Original
category
Level of 
exploration 
(new category)
Exploration
segment
Exploration
application
need
Exploration
product
usage
Exploration
customer
Heat Tech-
discontinuities
Low No, only 
exploitation
No, only 
exploitation
Yes No, only 
exploitation
Green Tech-
discontinuities
No, only 
exploitation
No, only 
exploitation
Yes No, only 
exploitation
Diffuse Market-
discontinuities
Medium No, only 
exploitation
Yes No, only 
exploitation
Yes
Anti-resist Tech/market-
discontinuities
No, only 
exploitation
Yes Yes No, only 
exploitation
Additive Market-
discontinuities
High Yes Yes No, only 
exploitation
Yes
Bond Market-
discontinuities
Yes Yes No, only 
exploitation
Yes
Gears Market-
discontinuities
Yes Yes No, only 
exploitation
Yes
Foam Tech/market-
discontinuities
Yes Yes Yes No, only 
exploitation
Dye Tech/market
discontinuities
Yes Yes Yes No, only 
exploitation
The second group contains projects Diffuse and Ant-resist. These projects both showed a medium 
level of exploration. Instead of one market knowledge dimension (i.e. product usage), as in the low-
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exploration projects, exploration could be observed regarding two market learning dimensions. In 
Diffuse an existing product was used and project members worked within an already defined market 
segment (i.e. light management). Exploration in market learning took place in the development 
phase on the dimensions application need and customer. Project Anti-resist showed a similar level of 
exploration. However, on a market knowledge dimension level, it was not identical to project Diffuse. 
Instead of generating and integrating new market knowledge on the application need and customer 
dimensions, exploration took place with respect to the product usage and application need 
dimensions. Still, also in project Anti-resist the bulk of the exploration efforts took place during the 
development phase of the project. Finally, a group of projects with a high level of exploration can be 
identified. This group consists of projects Additive, Gears, Bond, Foam, and Dye which exhibited 
exploration in market learning on three market knowledge dimensions. While all projects in this 
group showed exploration on the segment dimension there were some differences when focusing on 
the other market knowledge dimensions. Project members in projects Additive, Gears, and Bond did 
target new customers and new applications, while employees involved in Foam and Dye generated 
and integrated new market knowledge on the product usage and application need dimensions. 
Timing wise, all projects in this group did combine exploration on the segment dimension with 
exploitation on another market knowledge dimension in the initiation phase of the project. In the 
development phase exploration on two other dimensions was combined with exploitation on a third 
market knowledge dimension.
Project grouping around the 'overall level of exploration in market learning strategy' 
fundamentally departs from the original classification alongside a technology and market axis which 
was introduced in the methodology chapter. Consequently, some groups in the new classification 
contain projects that originally did belong to separate groups. For example, the medium-exploration 
group includes both market discontinuities and tech/market discontinuities (see also table 8.1). 
However, as will be shown in the next paragraphs, the new classification discriminates better 
between the distinct natures of the separate dimensions of the ambidextrous marketing 
organizations.
8.3 Investment level
'Investment level' was not included as a notion in the conceptual framework, but emerged as 
discriminating concept during analyses. A distinction could be made between projects that needed a 
low level of investment, a medium level of investment and a high level of investment. Project Diffuse 
clearly needed a low level of investment for the business unit in which it was carried out. Most of the 
work by the development group could be done next to other projects and tasks, and no investments 
in new products, technologies, or manufacturing facilities were needed. In contrast, projects Green 
and Foam undoubtedly needed a high level of investment. This observation is largely based on both 
cases needing large investments in manufacturing facilities to introduce the new products into the 
market. The remaining six projects (i.e. Heat, Anti-resist, Additive, Bond, Gears, and Dye) needed a 
medium level of investment. Some projects required investments in research to develop new 
technology while the new product could be produced in existing facilities (e.g. project Heat), or
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manufacturing was initially outsourced (e.g. projects Anti-resist and Dye). Other projects used 'off the 
shelf' technology or products and had to invest in generating and integrating market knowledge that 
was new to the business unit in which the projects were carried out (projects Additive, Bond, and 
Gears).
8.4 Marketing function
The central role in market learning in product innovation projects is carried out by the 'marketing 
function': organizational members that form the interfaces, or span the boundaries, between the 
project and the market. On the concept 'marketing function' the analyses focused on two elements: 
specialization and task focus (table 8.2).
Table 8.2: Marketing function
Overall level of exploration 
in market learning strategy
Initiation and implementation
Low • Specialist(s)
Heat, Green • Low task focus
Medium • Specialist(s)
Diffuse, Anti-resist • Low task focus
High • Specialist(s)
Additive, Bond, Gears, Foam, • High task focus
Dye
Although the analyses on the individual cases showed that the employees that carried out the 
marketing function had different job titles, such as 'new business development manager' or 'sales 
manager', they were all specialists: their official job description included establishing an interface 
with the market. In none of the projects that were analyzed, non-specialists, such as researchers or 
manufacturing engineers, unofficially added the marketing function to their task. Usually there were 
one or two specialists involved throughout a project, or there was a general manager from a higher 
hierarchical level who gave support to a functional specialist. For example, in project Dye the 
marketing function was carried out by a marketing manager and a sales manager, and in project 
Green the business manager assisted sales managers in the initiation phase of the project in this task.
On task focus of the marketing function, a distinction could be made between a low and a high 
task focus. In projects with a low and medium level of exploration, employees that carried out the 
marketing function had a low task focus. A low task focus implies that the specialists had a central 
role in both the exploration and exploitation part of the market learning that took place via the 
project. Additionally, these specialists were highly integrated in the mainstream organization, which 
implies that next to the project under study, they were also involved in other projects and/or tasks 
that maintained the stability or efficiency of the running business such as selling or answering 
questions from customers. In contrast, in high-exploration projects the employees that carried out 
the marketing function had a high task focus. A high task focus implies that either these employees 
had a central role in exploration and exploitation but were totally dedicated to the project under
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study and freed from other responsibilities (projects Additive, Bond, and Gears) or these employees 
were involved in several projects but only focused on the exploration or the exploitation part of 
market learning in the project under study (projects Foam, Dye). In terms of integration and 
differentiation, a high task focus implies that the marketing function as a whole was relatively less 
integrated in the mainstream organization.
8.5 Senior management involvement
Senior management refers to organizational managers that allocate and control product innovation 
resources but are not, like project members, involved in day-to-day project activities. In most cases 
these managers belong to the top management team of the organization or are their direct reports 
such as general product managers. The analyses on individual cases revealed that senior 
management involvement in the market learning during product innovation could be captured by 
four distinct management roles: directing, framing, supporting, and controlling. Additionally, we 
observed a significant change in roles when projects moved out of the initiation phase, where market 
learning is used for idea generation, and entered the implementation phase, where market learning 
is used in project execution. Because limited change in roles was observed when the project moved 
from the development phase to the commercialization phase, we combined these two phases and 
called this combination implementation (table 8.3).
Table 8.3: Senior management involvement
Overall level of exploration 
in market learning strategy
Initiation Implementation
Low 
Heat, Green
• Directing • Supporting /Controlling
Medium 
Diffuse, Anti-resist
• Framing • Supporting/Controlling 
(Diffuse: Limited controlling)
High
Additive, Bond, Gears, Foam, 
Dye
• Framing • Supporting/Controlling
Both directing and framing directly result from the organization's innovation strategy and relate to 
initiating the generation and integrating of market knowledge at the start of a project. Directing 
refers to senior managers giving concrete assignments to organizational members acting on a lower 
hierarchical level to update market knowledge on specific dimensions. Senior management used 
directing in the specific case of low-exploration projects. In project Heat, for example, senior 
managers became aware of the market trend that due to new engine designs operating 
temperatures would become higher. Because they wanted to maintain market leadership in the 
engine segment they asked application development to investigate specific future application needs 
on engine parts at existing customers. Framing differs from directing in the sense that senior 
management is not giving concrete assignments but articulates a, less specific, strategic direction 
that can trigger the generation and integration of market knowledge on a lower hierarchical level.
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Framing is the articulation of the business unit's vision of what it wants to achieve beyond the near 
future. Framing was observed in projects with a medium and high overall level of exploration in 
market learning strategy. For example, in the case of project additive, senior management articulated 
the intent to 'get more out of the existing product line by looking for new market segments' which 
resulted in organizational members generating market knowledge and developing new ideas.
After project approval by senior management, implementation (i.e. development and 
commercialization) takes place. At the start of the implementation trajectory, senior management's 
involvement switched from directing or framing to project supporting and controlling. Supporting 
refers to the allocation of human and financial resources to carry out necessary market analyses and 
acting as sounding board for project members. Controlling refers to tracking progress in market 
analyses, detecting deviations from original plans, and taking action when it is deemed necessary. 
Carrying out support and control did not happen in distinct periods of time but occurred 
simultaneously. On supporting and controlling no clear differences were found between the three 
groups of projects. The one exception found was project Diffuse. During implementation limited 
senior management controlling was observed. It might be that because this project needed limited 
investments, there was less risk involved and therefore it gained less senior management attention.
8.6 Market knowledge generation
On practices to generate knowledge from the market, it was found that in all projects employees 
scanned the market in the initiation phase by doing desk research. This desk research was combined 
with visiting conferences or trade-fairs and/or visiting existing customers. In low-exploration projects, 
market knowledge generation practices were used to update segment, application need, and 
customer knowledge. For medium-exploration projects these practices were used to update market 
knowledge on two dimensions: segment and customer (project Anti-resist) or segment and product 
usage (project Diffuse). Finally, for high-exploration projects these practices were used to generate 
new segment knowledge and update market knowledge on one additional market knowledge 
dimension. Furthermore, an additional market knowledge generation practice was used in the 
initiation phase of two high-exploration projects (i.e. Foam and Dye): using a market knowledge 
generation framework. Project members used a formalized 'market assessment' process that 
supported them in this phase with market mapping and segmentation tools to collect and interpret 
new market information. This framework which emphasized specific tasks that had to be carried out 
could help them to navigate through uncharted market space and to make sense out of lots of 
unfamiliar market data (table 8.4).
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Table 8.4: Market knowledge generation
Overall level of exploration 
in market learning strategy
Initiation Implementation
Low 
Heat, Green
• Market scanning by desk research in 
combination with visiting conferences 
and existing customers
• Collaborating with customers to 
test prototypes
Medium 
Diffuse, Anti-resist
• Market scanning by desk research in 
combination with visiting trade-fairs 
and/or existing customers
• Collaborating with (potential) 
customer(s) to test prototypes
High
Additive, Bond, Gears, Foam, 
Dye
• Market scanning by desk research in 
combination with visiting conferences 
and/or existing customers
• Using framework (Foam, Dye)
• Collaborating with (potential) 
customer(s) to test prototypes
• Hiring segment specialist(s) 
(Additive, Bond, Gears)
During development and commercialization, project members in all projects under study 
collaborated with one (potential) customer or a small group of (potential) customers to test 
prototypes. In these phases, testing prototypes was used to generate new market knowledge, or 
update existing market knowledge on the product usage, application need, and customer 
dimensions. Because we did not observe significant differences in market knowledge generation 
practices used in the development phase compared to the commercialization phase we combined 
these and labeled this set of activities implementation. Again, an additional market knowledge 
generation practice was found in three high-exploration projects (projects Additive, Bond and Gears): 
Hiring segment specialist(s). In these cases the organization hired new employees that had extensive 
knowledge on the market segment that the firm was entering by carrying out the product innovation 
projects under study. For example, in project Additive the organization hired two people that had 
20+ years of experience in the plastics segment which was a newly defined market segment for the 
firm and the focus in the project. Hiring segment specialists supported market knowledge generation 
in these projects because these new employees increased the firm's absorptive capacity in the 
direction of the newly defined market segment.
8.7 Market knowledge integration
Market knowledge integration refers to bringing together different dimensions of market knowledge 
but also linking overall market knowledge with other knowledge relevant in product innovation such 
as technological and manufacturing knowledge.
Two different practices were found that were used to integrate market knowledge during the 
initiation phase of the product innovation projects under study: using the hierarchy of authority and 
using the internal organizational network. In low-exploration projects it was found that market 
knowledge was integrated by using the hierarchy of authority. This implies that senior managers 
collected market knowledge, including the knowledge that was generated by employees that were
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acting on a lower hierarchical level, and other relevant knowledge, and integrated it28. For example, 
in project Heat the European product manager collected the necessary information, compiled it, and 
wrote the business plan that formed the foundation to implement the project. In contrast, market 
knowledge integration in the initiation phase of the projects with a medium to high level of 
exploration in market learning strategy occurred with limited senior management involvement. In 
these cases, employees acting on a lower hierarchical level used their internal organizational network 
to integrate market knowledge. Different functional specialists contacted each other to discuss ideas 
in which they used newly generated or updated market knowledge. For example in project Foam, the 
sales manager contacted employees that worked in the product line and the marketing department 
to discuss new market developments and how to react. An exception was project Bond where the 
organizational network was not used. In this project there was only one organizational employee 
involved and market knowledge integration occurred 'within' this single person (table 8.5).
Table 8.5: Market knowledge integration
Overall level of exploration 
in market learning strategy
Initiation Implementation
Low 
Heat, Green
• Using the hierarchy of authority • Having recurrent team meetings
• Discussing prototypes
• Using cross-functional 
implementation framework (Heat)
Medium 
Diffuse, Anti-resist
• Using the internal organizational 
network
• Having recurrent team meetings
• Discussing prototypes
• Using cross-functional 
implementation framework (Anti­
resist)
High
Additive, Bond, Gears, Foam, 
Dye
• Using the internal organizational 
network
(Bond: Only one function involved)
• Having recurrent team meetings
• Discussing prototypes
• Using cross-functional 
implementation framework
During development and commercialization, project members in the projects under study relied 
on having recurrent team meetings, discussing prototypes, and using cross-functional implementation 
frameworks to integrate market knowledge. Because we did not observe significant differences in 
market knowledge integration practices used in the development phase compared to the 
commercialization phase, we combined these and labeled this set of activities implementation. 
Recurrent meetings were used for interaction between different functional specialists. In these 
meetings progress and insights were discussed and work was synchronized. However, in two projects 
(project Foam and Dye) market knowledge integration was somewhat hampered by lack of 
collaboration between several functional specialists. Additionally, market knowledge integration was 
supported by project members discussing prototypes and using a cross-functional implementation 
framework. These 'boundary objects' resulted in common language and awareness of different
28 It can be argued that for low-exploration projects next to 'directing', 'integrating' is an additional senior 
management role that could be observed in the initiation phase.
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responsibilities in product innovation across the functional specialists working on the project, 
decreasing the changes that cognitive boundaries would have a negative impact on market 
knowledge integration.
8.8 Summary
This chapter presented a cross-case comparison of the ten cases that were discussed separately in 
chapters five through seven. The purpose of this chapter was to compare the findings on the ten 
individual cases and discuss similarities and differences. This cross-case comparison will be the main 
source of input for drawing general conclusions in chapter nine. Based on project success level it was 
decided to drop project Anti-tracking from the comparison because the outcome of this project 
could not be introduced into the market in the timeframe of this research. It appeared that 
regrouping the projects based on 'the overall level of exploration in market learning strategy' instead 
of using the initial classification, which used a technology and a market axis, resulted in an improved 
discrimination between the distinct nature of the separate dimensions of the ambidextrous 
marketing organizations. Furthermore, we dropped the distinction between the last two product 
innovation phases because we did not observe significant changes in organizational dimensions when 
moving from development to commercialization. Taking the 'overall level of exploration in market 
learning strategy' as starting point, focusing on the concepts investment level, marketing function, 
senior management involvement, market knowledge generation practices and market knowledge 
integration practices, and tracking the projects over time, we found several clear qualitative 
differences in organizational dimensions when resolving the market learning paradox in product 
innovation. Comparisons at the level of the individual organizational dimensions sometimes resulted 
in overlapping results. For instance, in all three categories senior management used a combination of 
supporting and controlling in the implementation phase. However, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, combining these elements, and using the 'level of exploration in market learning strategy' 
and 'the product innovation project phase' as contingency factors results in three unique 
ambidextrous marketing organization configurations by which firms resolve the market learning 
paradox in the course of really new product development projects.
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9 Conclusions and discussion
This final chapter presents the main conclusions of this research and discusses its implications for 
theory and practice. After presenting a general answer to the research question in the first section, a 
more detailed discussion is presented in sections two and three. This discussion is organized around 
the general structure that was already used in chapter three and the chapters that discussed the 
empirical study. After presenting managerial implications, this chapter concludes with the limitations 
of the current research that provide meaningful opportunities for further research.
9.1 Answering the research question
This research provides insight into the way organizations, and specifically business units in the 
chemical industry, can introduce really new product innovations and still be oriented towards the 
market. It presents how organizations can resolve the market learning paradox (i.e. combining 
exploitation and exploration) when developing really new products. By taking an integral perspective 
on market learning in product innovation we aimed to answer the following research question:
'How do firms resolve the market learning paradox in the course of really new product 
development projects?'
Based on an in-depth analysis of market learning behavior and several important dimensions of the 
configuration of the marketing organization in nine successful product innovation projects in 
different organizational settings we are able to answer this question. In one sentence our answer is:
'It heavily depends on the ratio between exploration and exploitation in the market learning 
strategy and the specific product development process phase of a product development project'
This conclusion, together with a theoretical discussion, is further elucidated in the following sections. 
In these sections we have numbered key findings and make them stand out by using an italic font 
style.
9.2 Market learning
In this research, market learning in product innovation refers to the generation and integration of 
market knowledge in the course of a product development trajectory. This research reveals that the 
content of market learning (i.e. market knowledge) should be treated as a multi-dimensional 
construct.
1a) While the majority of research in marketing and product innovation, at most, distinguishes 
between two dimensions in market knowledge in product innovation (i.e. market segment 
knowledge and customer need knowledge), data from this research suggest four dimensions
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(figure 9.1): segment knowledge, product usage knowledge, application need knowledge, and 
customer knowledge (Smits et al. 2009).
Segment knowledge refers to knowledge on market size, growth rate and turbulence, and 
stakeholders such as competitors, distributers, and regulating groups which can influence customer 
behavior. This market knowledge dimension has some precedent in the marketing and innovation 
literature. It reflects what Jaworski and Kohli (1996: 126) have called 'a sensitivity....to the underlying 
forces that shape a market or industry' and relates to the dynamics in exogenous factors that shape 
customer needs and wants. Furthermore, Veldhuizen et al. (2006), for instance, use 'environmental 
information' to identify competitor and general industry information, while research by Adams and 
colleagues (1998) used the term 'business data' to identify knowledge on issues such as emerging 
trends in the marketplace, competitors, and estimates of market size.
Conceptual framework: Market 
knowledge in successful product 
development is a diverse 
resource including, at least, two 
knowledge dimensions.
Empirical research: Market 
knowledge in successful 
product development is a 
diverse resource including four 
market knowledge dimensions
Figure 9.1: Market knowledge in successful product development
In addition, our research suggests that the general dimension of customer need knowledge, as it is 
used in the majority of the literature (Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver and Slater 1990), can further 
be detailed by the independent dimensions product usage knowledge and application need 
knowledge. Product usage knowledge is about knowledge on the use of a product by customers29 
and its behavior in downstream manufacturing processes, and application need knowledge is about 
knowledge on customer needs and wants a product should satisfy in specific applications and refers 
to application requirements. Finally, our research identifies customer knowledge. This is a knowledge
29 In this research the term 'customer' refers to business-to-business customers such as downstream 
manufacturers.
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dimension which is seldom discussed in empirical studies in marketing and product innovation30. This 
knowledge does not refer to customer needs and wants but relates to other relevant knowledge 
related to customers such as contact information, knowledge on the 'decision making unit' and 
knowledge on the customer's innovation strategy.
Furthermore, this research distinguishes between exploitation and exploration in market learning. 
Exploitation refers to updating and integrating market knowledge that already resides in the firm 
while exploration is about generating and integrating market knowledge that is new to the 
organization. Both types of learning fulfill complementary roles in product innovation (March 1991; 
Moorman and Slotegraaf 1999). Exploitation increases the impact of exploration by refining new 
knowledge and reaping its benefits, and acting as 'stepping stone' for exploration. Similarly, 
exploration overcomes the inherent limitations of exploitation, such as lack of breakthrough learning 
and the inability of adapting to significant environmental changes. Our process data shows that in 
each of the nine projects, exploitation and exploration in market learning were combined across 
distinct market knowledge dimensions in the same period of time and over time within a single 
market knowledge dimension. Following Penrose's (1959: 70) metaphor, who saw firm resources as 
pieces of a 'jigsaw puzzle' which are combined and recombined to produce outputs, organizations 
delink pieces of market knowledge from existing products and operations and try to link these to 
new pieces of market knowledge and other relevant pieces such as technological and manufacturing 
knowledge. Eventually, if they find combinations that seem to fit, they refine these combinations to 
the extent that the output (i.e. the product) can be introduced into the market.
1b) Based on the 'overall level of exploration in market learning strategy', three different types 
of product innovation projects could be identified. Projects with a low level of exploration in 
market learning demonstrated exploration on one market knowledge dimension. Projects with a 
medium level of exploration demonstrated exploration on two market knowledge dimensions. 
Finally, projects with a high level of exploration demonstrated exploration on three market 
knowledge dimensions.
1c) Although we aimed at selecting a wide variety of product innovation projects, from this study 
it appears that the most fruitful approach to product innovation lies at the intersection of 
exploitation and some level of exploration. At maximum, exploration took place on three of the 
four market knowledge dimensions. Hence, in none of the projects under study it was found that 
new knowledge was generated and integrated on all four market knowledge dimensions.
Finding 1c is in line with some arguments that can be found in prior work. Based on the 'path 
dependency' argument, Nelson and Winter (1982), for instance, have argued that even the most 
innovative form of exploration is built on a small set of existing skills. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
demonstrate this with their discovery that firms need some existing knowledge that is used as
30 Notable exceptions are Abernathy and Clark (1985), Moorman and Slotegraaf (1999), Danneels (2002), and 
Zahay et al. (2004).
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'absorptive capacity' to integrate new knowledge. Other researchers, such Danneels (2002), O'Reilly 
and Tushman (2008) and Brown and Eisenhardt (1997), argue that it simply makes more sense, from 
a risk-taking point of view, for established firms to leverage existing resources and capabilities in 
their journeys of product renewal than to start from scratch.
9.3 Organizational configurations
The cases in this study highlight the dynamics in organizational configurations for resolving the 
market learning paradox in the course of really new product innovation as well as their diversity. In 
our conceptual framework we included four dimensions of ambidextrous marketing organizations: 
marketing function, senior management involvement, market knowledge generation and market 
knowledge integration. Based on our empirical research we are now able to further detail these 
dimensions and present an overall collection of possible characteristics (figure 9.2).
c.f. = cross-functional 
Figure 9.2: Detailed dimensions of ambidextrous marketing organizations
Furthermore, we found that firms do not use one typical configuration of their marketing 
organization to become ambidextrous and resolve the market learning paradox in product 
development:
2a) Configurations of the marketing organizations were adapted to changing contingencies in 
the course of a product innovation project. In this respect, the most significant change was 
observed when projects moved out of the initiation phase, where market learning was used for 
idea generation, and entered the implementation phase, where market learning was used in 
project execution.
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2b) By distinguishing between projects with a low, medium, and high level exploration we found 
that the 'overall level of exploration in market learning strategy' had an impact on suitable 
organizational configurations.
While there is some support in the literature for the distinction between initiation and 
implementation for organizing product development activities (Duncan 1976; Zaltman et al. 1973), 
prior studies that specifically take the level of exploration into account are scarce31.
A cross-classification of two product innovation project phases (i.e. initiation and implementation) 
and three levels of exploration (i.e. low, medium, high) yields three different supporting 
configurations of a firm's marketing organization and necessary changes in the course of a product 
innovation process (tables 9.1 and 9.2). Although rather distinct configurational archetypes can be 
identified, there is some overlap. When focusing on changes over time, for instance, we found that 
the characteristics of the marketing function did not change when projects moved out of the 
initiation phase and entered the implementation phase. Additionally, when focusing on the level of 
exploration in market learning, we found that, specifically in the initiation phase, the characteristics 
of the dimensions of the ambidextrous marketing organizations did gradually change when moving 
from projects with a low level of exploration to projects with a high level of exploration. 
Consequently, taking into account this latter finding, the largest differences in a suitable 
ambidextrous marketing organization were found when contrasting the initiation phase of low- 
exploration projects with the initiation phase of high-exploration projects.
We also found that some market knowledge generation and integration practices did not emerge 
in all projects facing the same contingencies. This represents configurational equifinality in which 
managers have latitude in design options to address conflicting contingencies (Eisenhardt and Martin 
2000; Gresov and Drazin 1997). It appears that depending on the heritage and preferences of the 
organization equally valid, but slightly different, ambidextrous marketing organizations can be 
created. For example, with regard to market knowledge generation practices in the case of initiating 
high-exploration projects (table 9.1, configuration I), a formal framework was used in project Foam 
but not in project Additive. This section continues with discussing the theoretical implications of our 
findings on organizational configurations in more detail.
Marketing function
The marketing function connects 'the market' with other groups in the organization that are relevant 
in product innovation such as research and manufacturing. By connecting the customer to product 
design it plays a central role in market learning (Day 1994a; Workman 1998). Based on our research, 
two features of the organizational configuration by which organizations resolve the market learning 
paradox can be attributed to the concept of marketing function: functional specialization and task 
focus.
31 A notable exception is McGrath (2001).
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Table 9.1: Three organizational configurations to support market learning (initiation phase)
Project initiation phase (starting up the project)
Level of exploration ^ Low (I) Medium (II) High (III)
Configurational dimension U C^ J j o
Marketing function •— — •
• Specialist(s) V V V
• Low task focus V V
• High task focus V
Senior management involvement • — — •
• Directing V
• Framing V V
• Supporting
• Controlling
Market knowledge generation • — — •
• Market scanning V V V
• Collaborating with customers to test prototypes
• Using framework (V)#
• Hiring segment specialist(s)
Market knowledge integration • — — •
• Using the hierarchy of authority V
• Using the internal organizational network V (V)
• Having recurrent team meetings
• Discussing prototypes
• Using cross-functional implementation framework
# Practices within parentheses were not found in all cases facing the same contingencies.
Table 9.2: Thee organizational configurations to support market learning (implementation phase)
Project implementation phase (developing the product and introducing it into the market
Level of exploration ^ Low (Ia) Medium n (IIa)
• H R
High n(IIIa)
Configurational dimension U i s
Marketing function • — ------9
• Specialist(s) V V V
• Low task focus V V
• High task focus V
Senior management involvement • — -----------------•
• Directing
• Framing
• Supporting V V V
• Controlling V V V
Market knowledge generation • — ------•
• Market scanning
• Collaborating with customers to test prototypes V V V
• Using framework
• Hiring segment specialist(s) (V)#
Market knowledge integration • — ---------------- •
• Using the hierarchy of authority
• Using the internal organizational network
• Having recurrent team meetings V V V
• Discussing prototypes V V V
• Using cross-functional implementation framework (V) (V) V
# Practices within parentheses were not found in all cases facing the same contingencies.
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In line with the majority of the findings from previous research in marketing (Becker and Lillemark 
2006; Rust and Moorman 1999; Verhoef and Leeflang 2009; Veryzer 2005) this research underwrites 
the importance of a specialized marketing function for market oriented really new product 
innovation.
3a) Although we did find differences in structure, responsibilities, and terminology between 
projects under study, in all organizational configurations we observed that the project's 
marketing function was carried out by specialists, such as application developers, product 
managers, sales managers, and new business developers, or combinations of those. In none of 
the projects this function was carried out as extra task by project members that had research or 
manufacturing as their major responsibility.
Although the marketing literature is not very explicit on possible organizational structures 
associated with the paradoxical task of combining exploration and exploitation in market learning, 
the literature on organizational learning and specifically the organizational ambidexterity branch 
offers some general guidance in this matter. This latter stream of literature argues that ways to 
capture both exploration and exploitation have to include creative combinations of integration and 
differentiation in organizational structure (Raisch 2008; Raisch et al. 2009). One group of studies has 
advocated structural differentiation between the mainstream organization being active in 
exploitation and separate organizational groups or individuals that carry out exploration (Benner and 
Tushman 2003; Christensen 1997; Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). In these cases, integration of 
exploration and exploitation takes place by ambidextrous senior managers and lower level 
integration mechanisms such a meetings between project members from the two distinct parts of 
the organization (Gilbert 2006; Tran 2008). A second group of studies advocates integration in which 
exploration and exploitation are both carried out in the mainstream organization (Adler et al. 1999; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; McDonough and Leifer 1983). In these cases, the integrated 
organizational context should be complemented by 'tactical' structural differentiation practices, such 
as setting up project teams, quality circles, and job enrichment schemes, which enable organizational 
members to make choices and move back and forth between a more bureaucratic structure for 
routine tasks and a more organic structure for less routine tasks. Because neither differentiation with 
tactical integration nor integration with tactical differentiation will allow for maximizing both 
exploration and exploitation, an organizational designer's task is to determine the right degree of 
differentiation and integration in organizational structure. Recent voices have speculated that the 
right combination might depend on the relative importance of exploration and exploitation in 
organizational tasks (Raisch et al. 2009). This research inductively resulted in empirical findings that 
confirm this speculation. In short, we were able to distinguish between a low and a high task focus of 
a project's marketing function. A low task focus implies that the marketing function is strongly 
integrated in the mainstream organization and responsible for exploration and exploitation in the 
project under study as well as for more routine task such as selling existing products, answering 
customer questions or solving routine customer problems. In contrast, a high task focus implies that
181
Conclusions and discussion
the marketing function is less integrated in the mainstream organization. In these cases two different 
options were identified. In some projects where the marketing function had a high task focus it 
consisted of one or several well integrated organizational members that were responsible for routine 
tasks and for the exploitation part in the project and one or several other organizational employees 
that were less integrated and were responsible for the exploration part. In other projects, the 
marketing function consisted of one or more organizational members that were responsible for both 
exploration and exploitation in the project but were relieved from routine tasks and therefore 
showed limited integration in the mainstream organization.
3b) This research found indications that a marketing function that is carried out by 
organizational members with a low task focus seems to work well in projects with a low to 
medium level of exploration (tables 9.1 and 9.2, configurations I, la, II, and Ila). In contrast, it 
showed that for projects with a high level of exploration the marketing function might be better 
off with organizational members that have a high task focus (tables 9.1 and 9.2, configurations 
III and IIIa).
In high-exploration projects it is less likely that solely deploying organizational members that are 
highly integrated in the mainstream organization will yield successful results. When organizational 
designers ignore this advise, treat high-exploration projects as 'business as usual', and rely on highly 
integrated marketing functions, it is expected that organizational members that carry out the 
marketing function have to work in too many different 'thought worlds' (Dougherty 1992), which is 
often beyond their cognitive limits (March 1991).
Most literature on organizational ambidexterity has taken a static viewpoint on integration and 
differentiation and recommends fixed positions (e.g. Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). However, modern 
contingency theory has brought to light that alignment is a dynamic process rather than something 
that ends in a steady state. Organizations frequently need to reconfigure in order to adapt to 
changing internal and external contingencies (Short et al. 2008; Siggelkow 2002). Although some 
literature on organizational ambidexterity has taken a dynamic perspective, it remains unclear how 
differentiated systems that are designed for exploration evolve over time. Several studies point to 
the benefits of temporary decentralization in which mainstream organizations use differentiated 
units for exploration and then reintegrate them in later phases of the innovation life cycle when 
exploitation becomes more dominant (Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003; Westerman et al. 2006). In 
contrast, a second group of studies has shown that differentiated units can remain differentiated 
from the mainstream organization for long periods of time despite increasing levels of exploitation. 
For example, Raisch (2008) shows that the premium coffee maker Nespresso started out as a rather 
autonomous unit within the Nestlé Group and maintained this position for over two decades even 
though the level of exploitation increased.
3c) Our findings fit with this second group of studies and illustrated that for product innovation 
projects where the marketing function as a whole had a high task focus, and therefore was
182
Conclusions and discussion
relatively differentiated from the mainstream organization (tables 9.1 and 9.2, configurations III 
and Ilia) it maintained the same level of differentiation in the course of the project despite an 
increase of exploitation in market learning.
We speculate that the abovementioned finding results from the fact that the project periods which 
presented full exploitation (i.e. the commercialization phases) were too short and too tightly coupled 
with the other product development phases to justify changes in the structure of the marketing 
function.
Senior management involvement
The concept senior management involvement relates to organizational leadership. Senior 
management refers to organizational managers who are involved in strategic product planning and 
the allocation and control of product innovation resources but are not, like project members, 
involved in day-to-day project activities. Often these managers belong to the top management team 
of the organization or are their direct reports such as product managers. From previous literature we 
know that senior management (non)involvement can have an impact on market learning for really 
new product innovation. The product development literature has shown that a right balance of 
support and control has a positive impact on implementing really new product innovations (Bonner 
et al. 2002; Lewis et al. 2002; Swink 2000). Additionally, the marketing literature has underlined that 
senior management's strategic mission flexibility and the willingness to take risks, complemented by 
a certain tolerance for failure, supports market oriented really new product innovation (Atuahene- 
Gima et al. 2005; Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Kirca et al. 2005). Finally, the literature on organizational 
ambidexterity regards senior managers as playing an important role in resolving organizational 
learning paradoxes and fostering ambidexterity. In situations where units for exploration and 
exploitation are highly differentiated, it is argued that senior management should develop a 
compelling strategic intent that justifies the importance of both exploration and exploitation. 
Furthermore, it is proposed that these managers should have a large stake in integrating exploration 
and exploitation across the two separate units (O'Reilly and Tushman 2008; Smith and Tushman 
2005; Tushman and O'Reilly 1996). Also when employees who are responsible for exploration are 
more integrated in the mainstream organization, senior management is important. As key leaders in 
organizations it is proposed that they should put in place strategies and systems that shape the 
exploration and exploitation behavior of organizational members acting on a lower hierarchical level 
(Ghoshal and Bartlett 1994; Smith 2006) or play a more catalytic role, in which they promote 
ambidextrous ideas that emerge bottom up (Floyd and Lane 2000; Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004).
In the context of resolving the market learning paradox in the course of really new product 
development projects, our analyses crystallized into four distinct senior management roles: directing, 
framing, supporting, and controlling. Directing and framing are product innovation strategy making 
roles whereas supporting and controlling are roles that were observed during project 
implementation. These four roles are largely in line with findings from earlier research. For instance, 
framing is quite similar to articulating a compelling strategic intent while supporting market learning
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in really new product innovation, which is a rather uncertain activity by nature, is comparable to the 
willingness of senior management to take some risks. We add to the literature the importance of two 
internal contingency factors.
4a) We illustrated that although senior management was involved in every phase of the product 
innovation process, it changed its role from directing or framing in the initiation phase (table 9.1, 
configurations I, II, and III) to a combination of supporting and controlling in the implementation 
phase (table 9.2, configurations Ia, IIa, and IIIa).
4b) We observed an impact of the level of exploration on suitable senior management roles for 
project initiation. In situations with a low level of exploration we found a directing senior 
management role (table 9.1, configuration I), while for projects with a medium and high level of 
exploration we found that senior management adopted a framing role (table 9.1, configurations 
II and III).
This second finding challenges the theorizing of scholars that have focused on managing the initiation 
phase, or the front end, of product innovation (Kijkuit and Van den Ende 2007; Reid and de Brentani 
2004). For example, Reid and De Brentani (2004: 176) suggested that incremental and really new 
innovations 'differ extensively in the way in which problems are structured and in which information 
searches are initiated at the fuzzy front end of new product development'. It was argued that for 
incremental innovations early stage opportunities and problems are identified and structured by the 
organization and information search is directed from senior management down to organizational 
members acting on a lower hierarchical level. In contrast, for really new innovations it was proposed 
that information is typically unstructured and brought in by functional specialists acting on a 
relatively low hierarchical level without such activity being explicitly directed by senior management. 
New business organizations may be asked generically 'to find something new' or 'challenge the 
strategic status quo' (i.e. framing) but concrete problems and opportunities are 'emergent' and 'flow 
from the bottom up' (Bartlett and Ghosal 1993; Burgelman 1991; 2002). By taking a more detailed 
perspective and steering away from a product-centric view, we illustrate that these propositions can 
be misleading.
4c) In contrast to the suggestions brought forward by 'front end' scholars, our data suggested 
that for really new product innovation with a low level of exploration senior management might 
better use directing instead of framing (table 9.1, configuration I).
Additionally,
4d) We did not find that senior management changed its role when projects moved out of the 
development phase and entered the commercialization phase in spite of the changes in the level 
of exploration between the two phases. Again it is speculated that the commercialization phases
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were too short and too tightly coupled with the development phases to observe changes in the 
role played by senior management.
Also,
4e) In contrast with previous literature (O'Reilly and Tushman 2008; Smith and Tushman 2005; 
Tushman and O'Reilly 1996) we did not observe that senior management had a large role in 
integrating exploration and exploitation in situations where units for exploration showed higher 
differentiation from the mainstream organization (table 9.1 and 9.2, configuration III and IIIa).
In the projects in this study, exploitation and exploration in market learning were mainly integrated 
by mechanisms such as meetings between project members acting on a relatively low hierarchical 
level. Because most of the literature on organizational ambidexterity ties exploitation to incremental 
innovation and exploration to really new innovation (Li et al. 2008b; Raisch and Birkinshaw 2008), 
we, again, speculate that this finding emerged due to our detailed perspective. It appears that with 
regard to successful product innovation, senior managers are more involved in integrating projects 
than in integrating knowledge resources which are the 'puzzle pieces' at a more detailed level. Also 
we did not find full time project leaders who acted in-between senior managers and project 
members and integrated exploration and exploitation as expected by Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008). 
A reason for this might be that only a minority of present-day innovation projects is led by full time 
project managers (Barczak et al. 2009).
Finally,
4f) We found that a low level of investment might have an impact on senior management 
involvement in market learning in the implementation phase of a project.
In project Diffuse, which is one of the two projects that fall into the medium level of exploration 
category and is the only project that showed a low level of investment, we found that senior 
management carried out a limited level of control in the implementation phase (table 9.2, 
configuration Ila). Most likely, the low level of investment did place this project at the bottom of 
senior management's priority list and they did not bother to carry out explicit control during project 
implementation.
Market knowledge generation
In the context of market knowledge generation in really new product innovation, specifically the 
marketing literature has recommended that organizations should mix primary and secondary data 
generation techniques to collect information on market segments and customers. In particular, it is 
recommended that development organizations should use experiential interaction with (potential) 
customers because it is this interaction that will yield marketing knowledge that is new to the firm. 
This interaction requires a non-competitive attitude towards knowledge sharing from the focal firm
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and its (potential) customer. It should take the form of using experiential market research 
techniques, such as 'emphatic design' or testing product prototypes. These techniques can cross 
cognitive boundaries and allow for sharing knowledge of a tacit nature (Hamel and Prahalad 1994; 
Leonard 1995; Lynn et al. 1996; O'Connor 1998; Slater and Mohr 2006; von Hippel 1986).
From our data, it emerged that organizations generate market knowledge in every phase of the 
process. However, the practices that were used in the initiation phase were different from the ones 
that were used during project implementation.
5a) In the initiation phase, organizational members used market scanning to generate market 
knowledge (table 9.1, configuration I, II, and III).
Market scanning refers to the extent to which organizational members devote efforts to generating 
general market knowledge on events and trends, and 'foreseeing' developments in market segments. 
For scanning the market several channels were used. In all projects employees relied on secondary 
data by doing desk-research. In most projects, these secondary data were complemented by primary 
data that were gathered by visiting trade fairs, conferences and existing customers. When scanning, 
organizational members tried to cognitively and behaviorally decouple themselves from the firm's 
existing market knowledge on one, several, but not all, dimensions and open their eyes for 
opportunities for exploration. Employees had to 'unlearn' (Hedberg 1981) parts of their market 
knowledge to open themselves up for new market knowledge. For example, project members in 
project Anti-resist aimed at visiting existing customers in a familiar market segment to openly discuss 
emerging opportunities that potentially could lead to uncovering latent customer needs. In this case, 
our findings are largely in line with studies that uncovered that the ability to generate new external 
knowledge relies on a combination of external brokerage and internal absorptive capacity 
(Atuahene-Gima and Murray 2007; Holmqvist 2004; Liebeskind et al. 1996; Tiwana 2008).
5b) For the implementation phase, we found that organizational members narrowed down their 
focus and aimed at collaborating with one or several (potential) customers to explore and refine 
product prototypes (table 9.2, configuration Ia, IIa, and IIIa).
During the development part of the implementation phase, project prototypes were explored. 
Organizational members generated new market knowledge on one or two of three market 
knowledge dimensions: customer, product usage or application need, and updated market 
knowledge on one or two of the remaining dimensions. In the commercialization part of the 
implementation phase, prototypes were refined. Organizational members worked together with 
(potential) customers to update market knowledge until the product was ready for market 
introduction. Hence, it appeared that collaboration with customers to test prototypes in really new 
product development can be used for exploration as well as for exploitation purposes.
Furthermore, using the level of exploration as distinguishing contingency variable resulted in a 
difference in market knowledge generation practices between low- and medium-exploration projects
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on one side, and high-exploration projects on the other side, that only received scarce attention in 
previous literature on market oriented product development.
5c) In two out of the five high-exploration projects, a formal process framework was used by 
project members to support market knowledge generation in the initiation phase (table 9.1, 
configuration III).
Although this task formalization was not present in the organizations in which the other three 
projects with the same market learning characteristics were situated, a respondent in project Bond, 
which is one of these other projects, explicitly articulated the need for such a framework as well. 
When linking this finding to theory, it can be argued that, generally, the literature has presented both 
positive and negative perspectives on the effects of task formalization (Adler and Borys 1996; 
Jaworski and Kohli 1993). The positive perspective argues that formalization provides guidance and 
clarifies responsibilities which can reduce role stress resulting in organizational members feeling and 
being more effective. The negative view, in contrast, argues that formalization reduces task variety 
and autonomy and therefore reduces intrinsic motivation, which creates resistance or decreases 
commitment to innovation and change. In our cases, the formal process framework had an enabling 
effect. It was seen as useful by organizational members in their efforts to generate and make sense 
of market data that was totally new to them as well as to the firm. Possible negative effects were 
mitigated by a certain level of self-control over the use or non-use of framework elements. 
Interestingly, we did not observe the use of, nor need for, a formal process framework in projects 
with a lower level of exploration (table 9.1, configuration I and II). This might be the result of 
differences in uncertainty and complexity between activities (Adler et al. 1999; Cardinal 2001; 
Levinthal and March 1993). The initiation of projects with a lower level of exploration was steered by 
a higher level of market knowledge that already resided in the firm. This reduced the potential 
variance of activities that could be pursued. For example, in project Additive (i.e. high level of 
exploration) organizational members widely searched for new opportunities, while functional 
specialists in project Diffuse (i.e. medium level of exploration) were more 'constrained' in their 
search for new opportunities. Project members in this latter project had to stay within a familiar 
market segment (i.e. light management). We observed that in these situations of lower levels of 
exploration, actionable results of knowledge searching were less uncertain and achieved faster than 
in situations of higher levels of exploration.
5d) It can be argued that because of less complexity and uncertainty in tasks, there was less 
need for a process framework to guide market knowledge generation in the initiation phase of 
low- and medium-exploration projects. It might be that a formal process framework for market 
knowledge generation in the initiation phase is only considered as 'useful' at an increased level 
of exploration.
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Another practice that was used to generate market knowledge in product innovation and is not 
often discussed in existing literature on market oriented product development is hiring new 
employees.
5e) In three out of the five high-exploration projects, one or several segment specialists were 
hired to support market knowledge generation in project implementation (table 9.2 
configuration IIIa).
These new employees had extensive expertise in the market segments that were uncovered by the 
firm when initiating these high-exploration projects. Several streams of literature have presented 
arguments in favor of hiring new employees for innovation purposes. In general, new employees may 
provide new cognitive resources and fresh social capital which enhance accessing, generating and 
interpreting new knowledge, thereby fostering organizational innovation (Ancona and Caldwell 1998; 
Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Perretti and Negro 2007; Ruekert 1992). However, there are also 
potential downsides to hiring new employees. Next to search costs, socialization processes between 
newcomers and current employees can be costly and difficult because they often do not share the 
same knowledge and predominant norms and values (Jackson et al. 1993).
5f) Because we did not find the practice of hiring segment specialists in any of the four cases 
with a low or medium level of exploration we might have captured a trade-off point by using the 
level of exploration as discriminating contingency. In situations of high levels of exploration, the 
benefits of hiring new employees might be more important than its detriments. In contrast, in 
situations with low and medium levels of exploration, the costs and difficulties of hiring new 
employees might be higher than its benefits.
Market knowledge integration
The two main tasks in product innovation are to physically make a new product and to sell it in the 
market (Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1986; Song and Montoya-Weiss 1998). To accomplish these tasks, 
firms need multiple knowledge resources and integrate these (Grant 1996b). Specifically, knowledge 
on the four identified market knowledge dimensions has to be integrated with knowledge on 
manufacturing and technologies (Danneels 2002). The marketing literature, work on product 
development, and research on knowledge integration have identified several practices to support the 
interaction between different functional specialists which, potentially, enhances knowledge 
integration (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima 2007; Grant 1996b; Griffin and Hauser 1996; Inkpen and 
Tsang 2005; Olson et al. 1995). These practices include, for instance, meetings between functional 
specialists and the use of specific liaison roles between departments. However, in using these 
practices, effective market knowledge integration may still be hampered by cognitive and relational 
barriers. While cognitive barriers can be overcome by practices such as using 'boundary objects' 
(Carlile 2002), overcoming relational barriers often needs more fundamental measures (Griffin and 
Hauser 1996; Inkpen and Tsang 2005; Kahn 1996). Firms can decrease relational barriers and
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enhance collaboration by implementing interrelated reward criteria and incentive systems. These 
measures have the potential to reduce mistrust and increase collaboration between different 
functions.
6a) Based on our findings, we add to the abovementioned literature that the level of exploration 
and the product development process phase seem to matter in choosing suitable market 
knowledge integration practices.
We found differences between the practices in use in the initiation phases when contrasting them 
with the ones that were used for project implementation. Furthermore, specifically in the initiation 
phase we came across differences between low-exploration projects on one side and medium- and 
high-exploration projects on the other side.
6b) During the initiation of projects with a low level of exploration (table 9.1, configuration I), in 
which senior management had a relatively large role, market knowledge was integrated by 
using the hierarchy of authority.
Senior management directed functional specialists to update several market knowledge resources in 
their efforts to identify future product concepts and report back to them (i.e. directing). 
Subsequently, based on the feedback from these functional specialists these senior managers 
formulated broad application needs which could be used as guidelines for research departments. 
Using the terminology of studies on intra-organizational knowledge flows (Gupta and Govindarajan 
2000; Schulz 2003): knowledge flows between different hierarchical levels (i.e. vertical knowledge 
flows) dominated knowledge flows between functional specialists acting on a similar hierarchical 
level (i.e. horizontal knowledge flows) in the initiation phase. This finding is in line with prior research 
which has argued that vertical knowledge flows, specifically top-down knowledge inflows, fit 
organizational activities with a low level of exploration and a high level of exploitation (Mom et al. 
2007; Olson et al. 1995). These knowledge flows tend to posses a clear and proven understanding of 
cause-effect relationships and encourage the recipient organizational members to respond to 
problems and opportunities in familiar ways.
6c) In contrast, during the initiation of projects with a medium and high level of exploration, 
where senior management was less involved in the initiation phase, we observed horizontal 
instead of vertical knowledge flows (table 9.1, configuration II and III).
In the initiation phase of high-exploration projects, different functional specialists acting on a 
relatively low hierarchical level came together to discuss ideas and concepts which resulted in the 
integration of market knowledge with other relevant knowledge resources. Because these activities 
happened prior to an official project status and with limited senior management involvement, 
knowledge integration was dependent upon the internal organizational network ties among these
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functional specialists32. In most of the projects, functional specialists had to search for 
complementary knowledge by using less familiar (i.e. weak) intra-organizational ties. For example, 
the sales manager in project Foam (organization Gamma) contacted her colleagues from on of 
Gamma's product lines and Gamma's marketing organization to discuss potential solutions to a 
customer problem. These were ad-hoc meetings outside the scope of her daily routines. According to 
social network theory, these less familiar intra-organizational ties can provide search benefits 
(Hansen 1999), autonomy (Perry-Smith and Shalley 2003), and diverse knowledge resources 
(Granovetter 1973) at low cost in terms of time and effort, making it possible to foster creative idea 
generation and concept development.
6d) We found that market knowledge integration during project implementation occurred by
having recurrent team meetings, discussing prototypes, and using cross-functional
implementation frameworks in all projects under study (configurations Ia, IIa and IIIa).
At the start of project implementation, the product concepts under study became officially 
legitimized by their home organization, were supported and controlled by senior management, and 
received an official project status. For low-exploration projects, this generally resulted in decision­
making in market knowledge integration being delegated from a strategic level to a project level, 
decreasing the involvement of senior management. In contrast, for medium- and high-exploration 
projects, decision making in market knowledge integration shifted from a rather informal context 
with limited senior management involvement to a more formal context with increased senior 
management involvement. An important practice used for knowledge integration for project 
implementation that we found across projects was the use of recurrent meetings of small teams of 
functional specialists. Based on prior literature we can present arguments of why this practice fits so 
well with this specific product development phase. For instance the marketing and product 
development literatures show that project structure is an important antecedent of really new 
product innovation performance (Ancona and Caldwell 1992; Hansen 1999; Olson et al. 1995; 
Sheremata 2000; Tushman and Nadler 1978). In contrast to the initiation phase where knowledge 
integration often requires individuals with a wide network of weak ties, knowledge integration in the 
implementation phase benefits from small development groups with stronger ties, characterized by 
frequent two way interactions. These strong ties create trust and mutual understanding between 
functional specialists which are essential in carrying out highly interdependent and uncertain tasks 
such as the implementation of a really new product development project.
Recurrent meetings were complemented by discussing prototypes and, in some cases, using cross 
functional implementation frameworks. By using these boundary objects project members with 
different functional background were able to sufficiently cross cognitive barriers. With respect to 
using cross functional implementation frameworks, similar findings can be reported as the ones we 
presented on the formalization of market knowledge generation in an earlier section.
32 The exception is project Bond. Because this project heavily relied on existing technology, it was possible for 
one application development manager to integrate all relevant knowledge in the initiation phase of the project.
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Implementation frameworks had an enabling effect and were seen as useful by project members in 
their efforts to develop a common language and awareness of different responsibilities in product 
innovation across functional specialists. However, the non-use of an implementation framework in 
other cases showed that it is not always essential for market knowledge integration. Additionally, we 
did not find that the use or non-use of a cross-functional implementation framework was dependent 
on the level of required investments as in the case of senior management control.
Furthermore, in two projects (i.e. projects Foam and Dye) we observed that a certain lack of 
collaboration between several functional specialists hampered efficient market knowledge 
integration and, at least, slowed down project implementation. However, because these projects 
could still be introduced into the market this lack of collaboration did not have a strong impact on 
project effectiveness.
Finally, also with regard to market knowledge integration practices we did not find that the nature 
of practices in use changed when projects moved out of the development phase and entered the 
commercialization phase in spite of change in the level of exploration between the two product 
development phases.
9.4 Managerial implications
As was argued in the introduction of this book, limited attempts have been made to come up with 
principles and guidelines to help managers to resolve the market learning paradox that arises from 
renewing product offerings. Our research fills this gap and has clear implications for managers that 
have to deal with this challenge in their daily work. Based on our findings, we can provide guidance 
on what configuration of the marketing organization supports what market learning behavior. More 
specifically, our research can be used to assist managers in developing market knowledge resource 
typologies and to develop and use benchmarks in benchmarking studies. Additionally, considering 
supporting instruments of policy makers and governmental authorities, our research demonstrates 
the importance of hybrid education programs and facilitating networking between firms.
Developing market knowledge resource typologies
If managers want to address the market learning paradox, we suggest they move away from a 
product-centric view of the firm and develop a typology of market knowledge resources on which 
existing products are built. Because of the relatively tacit nature of market knowledge and its 
distribution across functional departments, such as sales, marketing, and application development, 
market knowledge resources are often not obvious and therefore hard to identify. A pragmatic 
approach to identify market knowledge resources is to explicitly classify the market segments that 
the firm already has constructed, customers that are targeted, how products are used in the market, 
and the customer applications in which products are used. In these efforts literature that is targeted 
to business practitioners can be helpful. Several of these studies have offered practical guidelines 
and case examples which can help managers in resource identification and classification, and 
developing consensus among different stakeholders (e.g. Marino 1996). Once a market knowledge
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resource typology is developed, it can be used for mapping the existing product portfolio as well as 
current product development projects. In competition analysis, this typology may also be useful 
when estimating the nature of product portfolios of current and potential competitors.
A market knowledge resource typology can also be used as guideline for looking into the future. 
When developing product innovation strategies, or reviewing initiatives that emerge bottom up, 
senior managers can classify potential strategic options by assessing the degree of fit with existing 
market knowledge resources. The market knowledge resource typology can form the foundation for 
assessing what market knowledge resources are already in place and 'only' have to be updated and 
what knowledge resources have to be developed from scratch. In assessing strategic options, firms 
should take into account that leveraging existing market knowledge resources is an attractive option 
in product innovation. Cognitively this is easier and it involves lower risk than developing new 
products that are purely based on exploration in market learning.
Finally, a market knowledge resource typology can be used by managers in discussions on how to 
define and measure new product success or performance. It appears that the knowledge gained from 
failed projects is often instrumental in achieving subsequent successes (Maidique and Zirger 1985). 
However, traditional success measures of new products often view the project in isolation (e.g. sales 
figure, development timeframe, and market share). Their potential impact on later projects is not 
taken into account. A market resource typology can be helpful in developing complementary success 
measures that use a broader perspective and are not restricted to single projects (e.g. what was 
learned?). Adding these measures to the traditional measures provides a richer picture of new 
product success. For instance, a product that failed when judged on short-term financial measures 
may have contributed new knowledge about the attractiveness of a particular market segment. In 
turn, this knowledge may prevent future failures and increase the chances of future success. For 
high-exploration projects, these measures, which reflect long term investments and organizational 
learning, may even be more relevant than the traditional, single project, measures of success.
Developing and using benchmarks
Assessing strategic options requires honest judgment of existing marketing capabilities residing 
inside the firm. Managers need to understand the multiple and interrelated dimensions of the way 
marketing activities are arranged and have to be configured to reach objectives. Also they need to 
accept that there is no single configuration template that fits all product development situations. In 
this context, our work can be used for benchmarking purposes. Although benchmarking has been a 
popular management tool in areas such as operations and quality management, its use in marketing 
is less common. Benchmarking involves, at least, three key steps (Day 1994a):
1) Identifying a firm or group of firms with desired performance (i.e. benchmark firm);
2) Calibrating characteristics and practices that are believed to be important in creating the 
performance in the benchmark firm;
3) Identifying gaps between the benchmark firm and the firm undertaking the benchmarking.
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Specifically, our research is helpful in steps one and two. We have presented firms that have 
successfully dealt with the market learning paradox and consequently have achieved desired 
performance (i.e. a product's market introduction). In addition, we have constructed the 
configuration profiles of ambidextrous marketing organizations that allowed these organizations to 
achieve this performance.
Identifying gaps between the benchmark firms and a firm undertaking the benchmarking can yield 
two general responses. First, managers of the firm undertaking the benchmarking may consider the 
existing configuration of their marketing organization as given. For this response our research 
provides insight into what type of market knowledge dynamics in product innovation will present the 
best fit with the existing configuration and therefore will, most likely, have the highest chance to be 
successfully carried out by the firm. For example, if organizational members that make up the firm's 
marketing function cannot be provided with slack resources and have little experience in working 
fairly outside the mainstream organization, we have shown that it makes little sense to pursue new 
product opportunities that target new market segments. In these situations, with the premise that 
solely relying on incremental innovations is not an option, it makes more sense to pursue really new 
product opportunities within existing market segments. Although pursuing these new product 
opportunities requires specific senior management roles, and market knowledge that is new to the 
firm, configurations that suit this situation do not call for adaptations in the organizational structure, 
hiring new employees, and installing additional processes to generate market knowledge. Second, in 
contrast to developing strategic options that fit existing organizational configurations, managers may 
decide to develop and execute gap-closing improvement strategies to move closer to the benchmark 
that allows them to move into strategic directions in which they never (successfully) went before. 
Also for these situations, our research offers guidelines. In particular we have presented targets for 
senior management involvement, the marketing function, and market generation and integration 
practices for different levels of exploration in market learning strategy and different product 
innovation process phases. These targets can be used by the organizations as benchmarks. This 
section continues with discussing these targets in more detail.
Based on our research we recommend that for projects with a low level of exploration the 
organizational members that carry out the project's marketing function should be employees with 
the primary task to link the organization to the market. They should have experience with marketing 
tasks and not have large responsibilities in other relevant product development areas such as 
research or manufacturing. In addition, it is not necessary to take these organizational members out 
of the mainstream organization and develop a separate exploratory marketing entity. Because of the 
low level of exploration in market learning, these managers are better off within the mainstream 
organization, from which they can more easily leverage existing marketing knowledge. If senior 
management allows it, it appears not problematic for these managers to carry out exploratory tasks 
in combination with assignments of a more routine nature. For senior management involvement in 
these projects we recommend that they should have a large stake in the initiation of the project's 
market learning efforts. They should be involved in market segment foresight studies to identify 
future developments and trends. They also should be involved as knowledge integrators, linking
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market knowledge with other product innovation knowledge resources. However, senior managers 
should also delegate relatively specific market knowledge generation tasks to organizational 
members acting on a lower hierarchical level. In the implementation phase of low-exploration 
projects, senior management should be less directly involved in market learning efforts than in the 
initiation phase. For the implementation phase it is recommended that their involvement should 
consist of a mixture of control and support. Because innovation projects that require new market 
knowledge often take longer to develop and have less clearly defined and measurable markets than 
incremental innovations, control and support measures have to be adapted to the level of 
exploration in market learning. Projects with a certain level of exploration in market learning need 
support and control measures that have higher risk and failure tolerances than the ones used for 
incremental product innovation projects. If strict quantitative measures that are applied to 
incremental project are also applied to really new projects it is likely that most of the latter would 
never be implemented. For incremental projects, the market learning that takes place in the 
initiation phase is enough to make rather accurate projections about the market success of a new 
product. For these projects, senior management has to ask for unambiguous market data that are 
used in traditional financial measures such as Net Present Value. For really new projects, however, 
qualitative measures seem more appropriate. Points of attention might be answers to questions such 
as: 'Do we get positive feedback on product concepts at trade-fairs and conferences? What parties 
want to work with us to validate product concepts? Can we leverage our existing market knowledge 
to get involved in this market segment?' To generate market knowledge in low-exploration projects, 
organizational members that carry out the project's marketing function should have the skills to 
'unlearn' some of their market knowledge, interview customers during the initiation of projects and 
work together with customers in the implementation period. Firms can nurture these skills by 
providing formal and informal training experiences, such as training on interviewing skills or market 
research techniques, reflection sessions, and coaching. The use of such programs represents a way to 
further increase employee sensitivity to market knowledge (Ruekert, 1992). Finally, market 
knowledge integration in the implementation phase of low-exploration projects benefits from 
structural interaction mechanisms such as recurrent meetings of a team with different functional 
specialists. However, it is likely that these interactions will only benefit knowledge integration when 
accompanied by a certain level of collaboration and limited cognitive barriers between functions. 
Collaboration can be increased by implementing clear and transparent organizational reward criteria 
and incentive systems for joint activities such as product development. These measures can reduce 
potential mistrust and strengthen collaboration among different functions (Griffin and Hauser 1996). 
Cognitive barriers, in turn, can be decreased by using prototypes in inter-functional discussions, and 
the realization and use of a cross-functional implementation framework. However, while discussing 
prototypes seems a practice that is generally applicable and beneficial, the benefits of the use of a 
cross-functional implementation framework seem more idiosyncratic and dependent on the heritage 
of the organization.
Our research suggests that configurations of the marketing organization that are used for low- 
exploration projects can, for the most part, also be used for projects with a medium level of
194
Conclusions and discussion
exploration in market learning. However, it is recommended that for these latter projects 
organizations should make two adaptations in the initiation phase. First, instead of directing, senior 
management should adopt a framing role. In this role, senior management articulates a strategic 
intent that should trigger corresponding market learning efforts by functional specialists without 
setting very specific directions. Examples are: 'We want to expand the application area of our current 
products' or 'Our organization aims at using technology X to develop new products for existing 
market segment Y'. Little direct involvement of senior management in actual market learning efforts 
requires that these managers can act as charismatic leaders that can inspire. Their framing should be 
expressed in language that is easily understood by organizational members that have to act on it. It 
has to be well communicated so that it can create 'rhetorical universes' which address gaps between 
the current and desired situation and stimulate action (Eccles and Nohria 1992). The second 
difference with low-exploration projects relates to senior management involvement in market 
knowledge integration during project initiation. While for low-exploration projects it is 
recommended that senior management is actively involved in market knowledge integration, for 
medium-exploration projects they should take a less active role. For medium-exploration projects it 
is recommended that market knowledge integration during initiation should consist of horizontal 
knowledge flows initiated by functional specialists using their internal organizational network. 
Although there are limitations resulting from lack of specialist knowledge and loss of efficiency, 
organizations can strengthen their employees' internal organizational network by adopting job­
rotation and co-location schemes. Such mechanisms establish additional ties on top of the more 
formal functional department ties.
Suitable configurations of the marketing organization for projects with a high level of exploration 
in market learning, in turn, have some features in common with configurations that are appropriate 
for medium-exploration projects. However, in setting benchmarks, organizations should be aware 
that there are two main differences. The first difference relates to the marketing function. While for 
low- and medium-exploration projects we found that all organizational members that carried out this 
function generated and integrated market knowledge in combination with more routine tasks, this 
was not the case for high-exploration projects. In high-exploration projects, the marketing function 
was somewhat differentiated from the mainstream organization and the organizational members 
that carried out this function were partly or wholly released from routine tasks. Hence, for 
structuring the marketing function in high-exploration projects we recommend that organizations 
consider two options of differentiation. The first option is to apply task partitioning at the project 
level and make organizational members that act within the mainstream organization responsible for 
the project's exploitation part and other routine tasks and set other employees that focus on the 
project's exploration part aside from the mainstream organization. The second option is to apply 
more differentiation and separate the whole marketing function, give them responsibility for the 
project's exploration and exploitation in market learning and release them from routine tasks such as 
selling existing products. We think that organizational choices in this context may depend on aspects 
such as the possibilities for knowledge integration, the size of the organization, and the tightness of 
coupling between different market knowledge dimensions. The second difference in suitable
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configurations for high-exploration projects when compared to projects that show a medium level of 
exploration is related to market knowledge generation. Although not all high-exploration projects 
showed similar characteristics, we uncovered two market knowledge generation practices in high­
exploration projects that were not present in medium-exploration projects: using a framework in the 
initiation phase and hiring (a) segment specialist(s) in the implementation phase. Based on these 
findings we recommend that firms should consider implementing the abovementioned additional 
market knowledge generation practices when aiming to develop high-exploration projects.
Supporting instruments of policy makers and governmental authorities
Considering supporting instruments, our research also has implications for policy makers and 
governmental authorities. As governments are concerned with economic growth, innovation is a key 
theme for policy makers. An important challenge is the transformation of (generic) technologies into 
commercially viable products. As was shown by our research this process can be enhanced by a well 
developed market orientation of workers in firms in which product and process technology is of 
major importance. By stimulating technology focused higher education institutes, such as technical 
universities, to develop hybrid programs that focus on technical fields as well as on business fields, 
policy makers can already contribute to this at the start of many careers. For instance, a bachelor's or 
master's degree in chemistry combined with a master's degree in marketing can lay a solid 
foundation for becoming a technical marketing professional.
In addition we have illustrated that really new product development is often initiated by the 
market scanning efforts of firms, aiming at getting in contact with potential customers and 
organizations that act within market spaces that are new to the focal firm. In this context, we can 
recommend governmental authorities at different legislative levels to facilitate the networking 
between firms. Support programs, for instance, can be focused on networking events and developing 
awareness of the importance of collaborative innovation.
9.5 Limitations and suggestions for further research
As every research our investigation also suffers from some limitations that provide meaningful 
opportunities for further research. We believe that there are several directions in which our research 
can be extended by using a similar research design. In addition, we draw attention to two other 
research directions and identify some methodological aspects that need further consideration.
Extension of the research using a similar research design
In our view, important directions in which the current research can be extended are studying other 
industries, other organizational dimensions, and other knowledge resources.
This study has focused on identifying ambidextrous marketing organizations that allow chemical 
firms to resolve the market learning paradox in really new product development. Although we 
believe in the value of single industry studies, and we are confirmed in this view by a significant 
amount of prior research, the question remains if our conclusions hold up in other industries. Even 
though product innovation is of the utmost importance in the chemical sector, we do acknowledge,
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however, that compared to contexts such as electronics the industry can be characterized as a 
medium-tech industry with medium levels of change in customer preferences (Mizik and Jacobson 
2003). It may be that organizations operating in more turbulent environments need alternative 
configurations of their marketing organization to effectively resolve market learning paradoxes. For 
example, focusing on exploration by means of structural differentiation may simply not be necessary 
or even impossible. Organizations in highly dynamic environments with very short product life cycles 
may be engaged in persistent continuous change resulting in limited routine tasks and well-definable 
market segments. In these contexts, alternative organizational routines for resolving the market 
learning paradox may have a more prominent place. For instance, Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) 
studied product innovation in the turbulent computer industry of the 1990s, and found limited 
evidence of structural differentiation by which small exploratory units acted aside mainstream 
organizations. Instead, they found that successful organizations combined limited structure (e.g. 
priorities and responsibilities) with extensive interaction and freedom to improvise, used a wide 
variety of low cost probes, and implemented rhythmic transition processes to direct attention to 
different timeframes and the ties between them. Further research could add other industries to 
examine to what extent our findings can be transferred to other settings and look further into the 
generalizability of our results.
To arrive at comprehensive and general theory, we were forced to balance the complexity of a 
dynamic research design and data from ten cases with the simplicity of presenting evidence of only 
four broad dimensions of ambidextrous marketing organizations. We believe that a fruitful avenue 
for further research is to use a similar research design but include other, or a larger number of 
organizational elements. A potential 'candidate' could be organizational incentive and reward 
systems. From our data it emerged that functional specialists were, for a large part, stimulated to 
start generating and integrating market knowledge by directing and framing efforts of their senior 
management. Although these strategic processes are of great importance, we think that they need to 
be complemented by corresponding lower level indicators and incentive systems. Indeed, prior 
literature has suggested the impact of incentive systems on proper implementation of learning 
strategies (Dosi et al. 2003; Griffin and Hauser 1996; Jolink 2009; Leonard-Barton 1992). Maybe we 
implicitly captured some of the effect of these systems by focusing on the responsibilities of 
functional specialists. However, we did not explicitly address them in our research. For instance, the 
inferior collaboration between the marketing function and other functionalities in project Dye might 
be the result of lack in evaluations that use team performance indicators. Furthermore, additional 
research could include a more detailed perspective on the organizational hierarchy. For reasons of 
simplification, we made a distinction between two management layers in our research. We reserved 
the terms functional specialists and project members for organizational members that were involved 
in day-to-day product development activities and used the term senior management for the group of 
managers that acted on higher hierarchical levels. Further research could identify more hierarchical 
levels and unravel the potential differences between middle management and top management 
responsibilities, the nature of their involvement in single and multiple projects, and their 
interactions. When moving in this direction, prior work that includes three hierarchical levels in the
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context of organizational renewal, such as Floyd and Lane's (2000) study, may be used as starting 
point.
Finally, our research design specifically put the spotlight on a firm's market knowledge resources. 
Another potential direction for further research might be to include other knowledge resources that 
are used in product development. For instance, one could study the impact of organizational 
configurations on technology learning and how it influences the interaction between different 
product innovation knowledge categories. To distinguish between exploitation and exploration in 
technology, one can make use of patent data as, for instance, was done by Rosenkopf and Nerkar 
(2001). Although several additional works also studied organizational learning in the context of 
technology (Ahuja and Lampert 2001; Danneels 2002; Katila and Ahuja 2002), different levels of 
exploration have, to the best of our knowledge, never been linked to suitable organizational 
configurations.
Other research directions
Besides the extension of our research with a similar research design we draw attention to two other, 
potentially interesting, research directions: the link between senior management involvement and 
level of investment, and the use of virtual customer environments.
In our data set, project Diffuse hardly needed demanding technological developments. In addition, 
the product could be manufactured in existing facilities and did not require extensive new market 
scanning. Putting it differently, although Diffuse was a discontinuous product development project 
because project members focused on a new application, it only needed a low level of investment. In 
comparison with other projects, Diffuse was the only project with these characteristics. Interestingly, 
it was also the only successful project for which senior management carried out limited control over 
market learning efforts. While we fully acknowledge that this relationship might be accidental, 
intuitively it makes sense. Senior management has many roles to play and therefore has to make 
priority lists to divide attention. It is likely that projects that involve more resources and represent 
large potential gains or losses are higher on these priority lists. However, while there is significant 
research on the role of senior management control in product innovation with different levels of 
innovativeness (Bonner et al. 2002; Cardinal 2001; Lewis et al. 2002; Sethi and Iqbal 2008; Swink 
2000), there are less studies on this similar topic in the context of projects with different levels of 
investment. Beyond including the level of investment as control factor in quantitative theory testing 
studies, further research could treat it as a research topic in its own right. Does the notion of control 
differ in projects that require different levels of resources? Do firms that have control policies in 
place that take the level of investment into account perform better than firms that do not consider 
this aspect? These are questions in the management of innovation that require further attention.
Another theme is using virtual customer environments to generate market knowledge in product 
innovation. We found this particular practice in project Gears. In 2005, Alpha, Gears' home 
organization, partnered with a party that provided an online intermediary environment, linking 
chemicals and plastics producers with downstream designers. With this party they developed an 
online gear selector to get in contact and start co-development trajectories with potential customers.
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This practice was not included in our final model because Gears was the only project in which it was 
observed. However, looking at other companies reveals that this practice is far from unique. In this 
day and age, firms across industries (e.g. Cisco, Bang & Olufsen, Levi's, Fiat, Microsoft, Lego) have 
started establishing virtual customer environments where customers can share knowledge and 
otherwise participate in product innovation (Nambisan 2002; Nambisan and Baron 2009; Prahalad 
and Ramaswamy 2000; von Hippel 2005). The adoption of these technologies has the potential to 
greatly enhance the connectivity between customers and producers and support new models of 
innovation with customer's partnering in the process as idea generators and implementers. As 
Sawney and Prandelli (2000: 31) have put it: new technologies enable 'a shift from a perspective of 
exploiting customer knowledge by the firm to a perspective of knowledge co-creation with the 
customers'. Although this trend has certainly gained a foothold in business practice and is likely to 
become more important in the future, research has only taken initial steps to gain understanding of 
these developments. Examples of potential questions to frame further research in this area are for 
instance: 'How do new ICT technologies change the nature of customer contributions to product 
innovation?' 'How should firms communicate their innovation objectives in virtual customer 
environments?' 'Do we need new marketing roles or positions to ensure the integration between a 
virtual customer environment and other organizational functions?'
Methodological aspects that need further consideration
Finally, we present several important directions for further research that are born out of the 
methodological limitations of our study: mitigating cognitive biases and impression management, 
including the 'other side of the story', and statistical generalization.
Studying dynamic organizational processes necessarily entails collecting longitudinal data. These 
data can be obtained by either observing the sequence of change events as they occur in real time or 
by retrospective reports (Poole et al. 2000: 118). Because of time restrictions we were forced to use 
the latter approach and collect most of our data after the project outcomes were known. 
Retrospective studies provide the advantage of knowing the 'big picture', how things developed, and 
what they brought as result. This post-hoc knowledge is valuable for data interpretation and 
constructing a narrative of the development process. However, there are also downsides. Prior 
knowledge of process outcomes, such as project success, invariably suffers from cognitive biases and 
impression management from both respondents and researchers (Huber and Power 1985). For 
instance, there is a tendency to filter out events that do not fit or that render the story less coherent. 
This tendency to reduce the 'difficult' nature of the data 'may result in censorship of interesting 
dynamics and minority views' (Poole et al., 2000: 118). Although we took several measures to 
minimize the negative aspects of retrospective studies (see chapter 4), additional studies which 
include real-time analyses may further reduce these. As proposed by Leonard-Barton (1990), these 
studies, for instance, could combine our retrospective results with real-time product innovation 
cases to better observe the change process throughout its unfolding.
In our study we took the firm as focal actor in market learning processes. For this reason we 
classified knowledge sharing between the firm and external parties, like customers, as market
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knowledge generation, and knowledge sharing between groups and individuals within the firm as 
knowledge integration. Because we interviewed multiple individuals of different functional groups 
and hierarchical positions within the firm we obtained very detailed data on intra-firm relationships. 
This information allowed us to develop a detailed and balanced perspective on market knowledge 
integration in product innovation. In contrast, however, in our analyses of market knowledge 
generation we were rather one-sided. We solely analyzed this knowledge flow based on intra- 
organizational voices without including the 'other side of the story' that could be brought forward by 
customers. To extend our study, further research might use dyadic or network perspectives including 
more than one organization (Anderson et al. 1994). These research designs could facilitate painting a 
more complete picture of inter-organizational knowledge sharing and learning processes in product 
innovation.
Finally, although our cases were essential for building theory, they only permit a certain level of 
analytical generalization (Yin, 1994). Further research may also want to test the theoretical insights 
that were obtained by our study. Testing the relationships between ambidextrous marketing 
organizations, exploratory and exploitative market learning, and new product performance by large 
scale survey studies can result in statistical generalizations across various settings, thereby increasing 
external validity. In this respect, we think two viable approaches exist. The first one is to pick several 
elements from the organizational configuration and measure linear relationships. A second approach 
might be to test complete configurations by using profile deviation techniques (see e.g. Doty et al. 
1993; Vorhies and Morgan 2003). By using these techniques researchers can quantitatively assess 
organizational configuration fit with a market learning strategy as the degree to which this 
configuration differs from an empirically derived ideal profile that achieves superior performance of 
strategy implementation. Furthermore, to include a dynamic perspective, and quantitatively 
investigate changes along the product development trajectory, methods such as panel data analysis 
(Lewis et al., 2002) or event history analysis (Lee and Pennings 2002; Poole et al. 2000) might be 
used. As final point, quantitative researchers should notice that our process perspective has resulted 
in several activity based concepts (e.g. hiring segment specialists). These concepts answer the call for 
conceptual development around key managerial activities to enable a more thorough treatment of 
the dynamics and events underlying product innovation (Dougherty 1996; Jelinek and Schoonhoven 
1993). However, they are also far different from the well-developed traditional structural constructs 
such as formalization, centralization, and specialization that have dominated (marketing) 
configuration research (Burns and Stalker 1961; Olson et al. 2005; Ruekert et al. 1985; Vorhies and 
Morgan 2003). Consequently, quantitative researchers have to develop our concepts into measures 
and subject them to a rigorous purification process to ensure construct validity.
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Appendix A: Interview protocol organizational context
1) Organizational position interviewee
Could you please explain your position in the organization?
2) General overview organization
2.1 Could you briefly describe the markets of your organization?
• Products
• Added value of products (high/low)
• The number of competitors/intensity of competition
• What companies are direct/indirect customers (examples)
• The pace of change in technology
• Complexity of technology
• The pace of change in market demand
2.2 Could you briefly describe the organizational structure of your organization?
2.3 Could you briefly describe the general strategy of your organization?
3) Product development strategy 
See the 'innovation map'
3.1 Could you please provide a rough estimation of the division of the product development 
budget for two categories of projects: incremental/really new? (in %)
3.2 Could you please provide a rough estimation of the division of projects in each category? (in 
%)
4) Product development process
4.1 Could you please indicate the general steps that are taken/or activities that are carried out 
when developing a new product?
4.2 Does the organization have a formal process for product development?
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4.3 What do you consider to be the main differences between the processes for incremental and 
really new product development?
5) Product development of really new products
(In this research a distinction is made between three main-process steps: the initiation of new
product ideas, the development of the new product, and the commercialization of the new product)
5.1 What organizational structure is used for the initiation of ideas, and what employees 
are involved? (For example: brainstorming in teams)
5.2 What organizational structure is used to develop a new product, and what employees are 
involved?
5.3 What organizational structure is used for product commercialization, and what employees 
are involved?
5.4 Are target markets identified in the initiation phase? In what way?
5.5 Does your organization stimulate the initiation of really new product development? In what 
way?
5.6 Is it possible that target markets change in the development and commercialization phases 
of a project? If so, who can initiate changes?
5.7 To what extent is the product development process formalized by specific rules and 
procedures?
5.8 Have criteria been specified to evaluate really new product ideas? What are these criteria? Is 
everyone familiar with them?
5.9 Is progress in the development and commercialization phases being measured? If so, what 
are criteria? Is everyone familiar with them?
5.10 Does your organization use particular targets with regard to really new product 
development?
5.11 Are these targets usually achieved/not achieved?
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5.12 Does your organization, in general, introduce more/the same amount of/less really new 
products as compared to competitors?
6) Market information processing in really new product innovation
6.1 How is the marketing function organized within your organization?
6.2 What role does the marketing function, generally, play within really new product 
development?
6.3 What sources are used for generating market information on industrial customer needs and 
preferences? And on general trends in market segments?
6.4 Which techniques are used to generate information from these sources?
6.5 How does your organization distribute and use market information for the initiation of new 
product ideas?
6.6 Does your organization cooperate with (potential) industrial customers to develop a new 
product? And to commercialize a new product?
6.7 How does your organization distribute and use market information in the development and 
commercialization phases of product innovation?
7) Other organizational systems
7.1 Is training used to prepare employees for an orientation towards the market? Which 
employees are trained?
7.2 How do marketing and R&D work together in your organization?
7.3 How does your organization recruit employees that will be responsible for the marketing 
function in product innovation?
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Appendix B: Interview protocol project
1) Respondent's role
1.1 Function within the company?
1.2 Role within the project?
2) General description project
2.1 Reason to start the project?
2.2 What is new in the project? ('innovation map')
3) General project characteristics
3.1 Could you please describe the project in terms of:
phases (and related time/budget/how far are you at the moment?); 
who is/was involved? (directly and indirectly);
the management of the project (formal process? To what extent own decision­
making?);
structure of the project/coordination (within the matrix, team?).
3.2 To what extent does the project represent the usual way a project is carried out? (why/why 
not?)
4) Initiation: Idea, and from idea to concept
4.1 Who proposed the original idea?
4.2 Was it an outsider/insider?
4.3 How did the idea relate to the existing product development strategy?
4.4 At that time, was there a pressure to come up with new ideas? (or did the existing business 
still delivered enough money?)
4.5 When did the idea/concept become an official product development project?
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4.6 Who initiated the official product development project status?
4.7 According to your opinion, what were the personal motives of the initiator to start the 
project?
4.8 What were selection criteria to start the project?
4.9 Who provided/provides the resources for the project?
Product development is sometimes seen as entering into a series of 'challenges'
4.10 What 'challenges' were identified when turning the idea into a concept?
Examples possible challenges: Acquiring knowledge on market domains;
Acquiring knowledge on customer needs;
The cooperation with customers of customers;
The cooperation between different functional 
specialists;
The development of the technology;
Receiving management support/funding.
4.11 How were these challenges dealt with (level of success)?
4.12 Did the people involved feel that they were well equipped to deal with the challenges?
4.13 Were there strict guidelines to deal with the challenges?
4.14 Was there a planning for this phase?
4.15 Was this phase monitored? How? By whom? What were criteria?
5) Implementation: Development and commercialization
5.1 What 'challenges' were identified when developing the product and introducing it into the 
market?
Examples possible challenges: Acquiring knowledge on market domains;
Acquiring knowledge on customer needs;
The cooperation with customers of customers;
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The cooperation between different functional 
specialists;
The development of the technology;
Receiving management support/funding.
5.2 How were these challenges dealt with (level of success)?
5.3 Did the people involved feel that they were well equipped to deal with the challenges?
5.4 Were there strict guidelines to deal with the challenges?
5.5 Was there a planning for this phase?
5.6 Was this phase monitored? How? By whom? What were criteria?
6a) Results finished project (project is introduced into the market)
6a.1 Do you think the project has been successful? Why? (effectiveness/efficiency)
6a.2 Is this opinion shared by organizational members that were not directly involved in the 
project? (e.g. senior management)
6a.3 If you could do the project again, is there something that you would do differently?
6a.4 What impact did the project have on the organization? (financially/non-financially)
6a.5 What impact did the project have on yourself? In what way?
6b) Results running project
6b.1 When will the project be successful? What dimensions are included? 
(effectiveness/efficiency)
6b.2 Does the team have confidence in the success of the project?
6b.3 Is this opinion shared by other organizational members that are not directly involved in the 
project? (e.g. senior management)
6b.4 If you could do the project again, is there something that you would do differently?
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6b.5
6b.6
Do you think the project will have an impact on the organization? In what way? 
(financially/non-financially)
Do you think the project will have an impact on yourself? In what way?
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
Am bidexter33 marketingorganisaties om productontwikkeling te ondersteunen  
Doel en relevantie van het onderzoek
Om als maakbedrijf te overleven in een wereld met toenemende globalisering, snelle technologische 
ontwikkelingen en complexe klanteneisen is innovatie in het productaanbod van groot belang. 
Wanneer bedrijven deze productinnovatie succesvol ten uitvoer willen brengen zijn 
marketingactiviteiten, zoals het uitvoeren van marktanalyses, het doen van marktonderzoek en het 
samenwerken met klanten essentieel. Deze processen zorgen niet alleen voor effectieve 
productinnovatie maar hebben ook een positief effect op haar efficiency. Echter er wordt ook 
gewaarschuwd voor de risico's van de bovenstaande activiteiten in de context van productinnovatie. 
Veel interactie met voor het bedrijf bekende markten en klanten kan een bedrijf erg gefocusseerd 
maken, waardoor het oogkleppen op krijgt en verzuimt zich mede te concentreren op ontwikkelingen 
die buiten de bekende aandachtgebieden vallen. Hierdoor kan het marktontwikkelingen missen die 
in de toekomst van het bedrijf van belang kunnen worden en kan de onderneming zelfs ten onder 
gaan.
Om echt marktgericht te innoveren zouden bedrijven het verfijnen van voor hen bekende kennis 
over de markt, een proces wat in dit onderzoek wordt aangeduid met de term exploitatie, moeten 
combineren met exploratie activiteiten waarin het bedrijf kennis over nieuwe klanten en 
marktsegmenten opdoet en gebruikt in productinnovatie. Binnen veel productinnovatieprojecten 
vervullen exploitatie en exploratie in het leren over de markt dan ook complementaire rollen. 
Exploitatie verhoogt de impact van exploratie doordat het nieuwe marktkennis verfijnt en concreter 
maakt gedurende het productontwikkelingsproces. Tegelijkertijd overwint exploratie de beperkingen 
van exploitatie zoals het onvermogen van het bedrijf zich aan te passen aan significante 
veranderingen in de omgeving.
Ondanks dat exploitatie en exploratie beide nodig zijn in productinnovatieprojecten blijkt het niet 
gemakkelijk beide marktleerprocessen binnen één project te combineren. Exploitatie en exploratie 
zijn fundamenteel verschillende strategieën die verschillende en tegenstrijdige mentale modellen en 
vaardigheden vereisen. Exploitatie bouwt voort op al bestaande kennis en betreft variatieverlagende 
activiteiten en het planmatig oplossen van problemen, terwijl exploratie geassocieerd kan worden 
met variatieverhogende activiteiten, leren door te doen, en toekomstgerichtheid. Omdat beide 
tegengestelde activiteiten schaarse middelen en aandacht nodig hebben creëert de combinatie van 
exploitatie en exploratie organisatorische uitdagingen. Organisaties worden geconfronteerd met een
33 Van Dale Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal geeft aan het woord 'ambidexter' de volgende 
betekenissen: (1) Iemand die zich even vaardig van de linker- als van de rechterhand weet te bedienen; (2) 
(figuurlijk) zeer handig man. In de bedrijfskunde wordt de term 'ambidexter organisatie' gebruikt om een 'duo- 
vaardige' of 'tweeledige' organisatie aan te duiden die in staat is exploitatie en exploratie te combineren.
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'marktleer-paradox': de gelijktijdige aanwezigheid van tegengestelde markleer processen. Dit boek 
probeert inzicht te geven in de manier waarop bedrijven deze uitdaging aangaan en hoe zij, 
organisatorisch gezien, de marktleer-paradox gedurende het verloop van echt vernieuwende 
productontwikkelingsprojecten proberen op te lossen.
Voor theorievorming is dit onderzoek ondermeer van belang omdat de marketing discipline nog 
weinig aandacht heeft voor leerparadoxen. Hier is meer aandacht voor binnen het organisatie 
discipline. Vooral het onderzoek naar ambidexter organisaties gaat in op de vraag hoe organisaties 
leerparadoxen zouden kunnen oplossen. Echter dit laatstgenoemde onderzoek bevindt zich nog in de 
beginfase en daarom is er nog veel onduidelijk. In het bijzonder is onduidelijk hoe exploitatie en 
exploratie in individuele productontwikkelingsprojecten gecombineerd kunnen worden, hoe 
specifieke organisatieafdelingen of functies met deze combinatie omgaan, en hoe exploitatie en 
exploratie in de tijd gecombineerd worden. Dit onderzoek gaat dieper in op deze aspecten.
Dit onderzoek heeft ook waarde voor de praktijk. Ondanks dat het buiten kijf staat dat echt 
vernieuwende productontwikkeling steeds belangrijker wordt voor maakbedrijven zijn er nog steeds 
grote verschillen in productinnovatiesuccessen tussen bedrijven. Ook is er geconstateerd dat CEOs 
over het algemeen vinden dan de marketing functie een grotere bijdrage zou moeten leveren aan 
productinnovatie. Er zijn echter nog weinig richtlijnen en principes die managers helpen om met de 
marktleer-paradox in productinnovatie om te gaan. Tevens bestaat de gereedschapskist van 
adviseurs vooral uit oplossingen die hetzij het exploitatie aspect, hetzij het exploratie aspect 
ondersteunen. Er zijn nieuwe benaderingen nodig die juist de combinatie van exploitatie en 
exploratie als uitgangspunt nemen. Gedetailleerde en actiegeoriënteerde inzichten over hoe 
organisaties omgaan met de marktleer-paradox in productinnovatie zijn daarom belangrijk voor 
hedendaagse managers.
Theoretische achtergrond
Om een conceptueel raamwerk te ontwikkelen dat gebruikt kan worden als bril om naar de empirie 
te kijken zijn in dit onderzoek drie theoretische stromingen geïntegreerd. Om een overzicht te 
verkrijgen van de context waarin marktleerprocessen in productinnovatie voorkomen is gebruik 
gemaakt van inzichten uit de literatuur over productontwikkeling. Deze stroming is aangevuld met 
studies die zich richten de organisatie van kennis en leerprocessen binnen productinnovatie. Ten 
slotte is gebruik gemaakt van inzichten uit de marketingliteratuur om specifiek in te zoomen op de 
organisatie van de interactie van een bedrijf met de markt en haar klanten binnen productinnovatie.
Uit de studies over productontwikkeling kan worden afgeleid dat in het ontwikkelingsproces voor 
echt nieuwe producten drie verschillende fasen kunnen worden onderscheiden, te weten initiatie, 
ontwikkeling, en commercialisering, en dat 'leren door te doen' te prefereren is boven een scherpe 
scheiding tussen een uitgebreide planning en het uitvoeren van deze planning. Naast de activiteiten 
van projectleden speelt ook de betrokkenheid van het hogere management een rol bij het succesvol
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ontwikkelen van echt nieuwe producten. Op basis van de bestudeerde literatuur zou het hogere 
management het traject moeten ondersteunen met middelen maar tegelijkertijd ook de voortgang 
van het traject moeten controleren.
Uit studies over kennis en leerprocessen in de context van productinnovatie kan worden afgeleid dat 
'de generatie van kennis uit de externe omgeving' en de 'interne integratie van deze kennis' twee 
belangrijke kennisstromen in productontwikkeling zijn. Tevens kunnen specifieke organisatorische 
condities worden afgeleid die de bovengenoemde kennisstromen kunnen faciliteren. Deze tweede 
literatuurstroming heeft ook verder inzicht gegeven in de leerprocessen exploitatie en exploratie en 
hun betekenis in product innovatie. Als laatste zijn uit deze literatuurstroming verschillende 
algemene oplossingen gedestilleerd om de combinatie van exploitatie en exploratie organisatorisch 
vorm te geven.
De marketing literatuur heeft het inzicht verschaft dat marktgerichtheid een belangrijke voorwaarde 
is voor succesvol innoveren. Dit geldt voor zowel kleine aanpassingen in product-markt-combinaties 
als voor echt vernieuwende productinnovaties. Tevens maakt deze literatuur het mogelijk om vier 
categorieën van antecedenten voor marktgerichte echt vernieuwende productinnovatie aan te 
duiden: marketing functie, factoren gerelateerd aan het gedrag van het hogere management, 
marktinformatie generatie methoden, en de integratie van inzichten van verschillende functionele 
specialisten binnen de organisatie.
Conceptueel raamwerk
Gebaseerd op de drie bovengenoemde literatuurstromingen is een conceptueel raamwerk 
ontwikkeld. Dit raamwerk rust op vier assumpties met betrekking tot het marktleerproces in echt 
vernieuwende productontwikkeling:
1. Echt vernieuwende productontwikkeling is een proces dat opgedeeld kan worden in drie fasen, 
te weten initiatie, ontwikkeling, en commercialisering, en een passende werkstrategie is leren 
door te doen.
2. De effectiviteit en efficiency van echt vernieuwende productontwikkeling kan vergroot worden 
wanneer medewerkers die betrokken zijn bij productontwikkeling actief zijn in het 'leren over de 
markt' wat verwijst naar de generatie en integratie van marktkennis.
3. Marktleren in echt vernieuwende productontwikkeling bestaat uit een combinatie van exploitatie 
en exploratie.
4. De combinatie van exploitatie en exploratie in productinnovatie kan in één bepaalde tijdsperiode 
(binnen één productontwikkelingsfase) of in de tijd (verschillende productontwikkelingsfasen) 
plaatsvinden.
Tevens is aangenomen dat organisaties de marktleer-paradox in productinnovatie op zouden kunnen 
lossen door ambidexter marketingorganisaties te ontwikkelen. Dit zijn complexe organisatievormen
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die een combinatie van exploitatie en exploratie in marktleren faciliteren. In een eerste poging de 
kernelementen uit deze organisatorische configuraties te duiden is uitgegaan van vier 
organisatorische elementen die gebaseerd zijn op het combineren van de drie bovengenoemde 
literatuurstromingen. Het eerste element is aangeduid met de naam 'marketing functie' en verwijst 
naar de organisatorische taken en verantwoordelijkheden van de projectleden die binnen een 
productontwikkelingsproject de schakel vormen tussen het project en de markt. Het tweede element 
is 'betrokkenheid van het hogere management' genoemd en verwijst naar de betrokkenheid van het 
hogere management bij het markleren binnen het productontwikkelingsproject. Het derde element 
is aangeduid met de term 'marktkennis generatie' en verwijst naar de praktijken die gebruikt worden 
om in productontwikkelingsprojecten marktkennis te genereren. Het element 'marktkennis 
integratie', tenslotte, verwijst naar praktijken die gebruikt worden om marktkennis binnen 
productontwikkelingsprojecten te integreren met andere vormen van kennis die van belang zijn bij 
productontwikkeling zoals technologische kennis. Verder is er van uitgegaan dat de bovengenoemde 
elementen op basis van empirisch onderzoek verfijnd zouden kunnen worden en dat specifieke 
configuraties van organisatorische elementen zouden kunnen veranderen gedurende het 
productontwikkelingsproces.
Methodologie
De empirische data die gebruikt zijn om het conceptueel raamwerk aan te scherpen zijn verkregen 
door gebruik te maken van een meervoudige casestudie in de context van de chemische industrie. 
Het ging daarbij om echt vernieuwende productontwikkelingprojecten (analyse-eenheid). Deze 
projecten zijn echter niet bestudeerd in isolatie maar er is ook gekeken naar het raakvlak van deze 
projecten met de organisaties waarin ze uitgevoerd zijn. In totaal zijn tien 
productontwikkelingsprojecten bestudeerd, in zes verschillende business units van zes verschillende 
multinationals die actief zijn in de chemische industrie. Negen van de tien projecten kennen een 
zekere mate van succes omdat hun resultaat, het nieuwe product, geïntroduceerd is in de markt. 
Data zijn gegenereerd door gebruik te maken van een combinatie van diepte-interviews, 44 in totaal, 
met project- en organisatieleden en het bestuderen van archiefdata, zoals aankondigingen van 
productintroducties, jaarverslagen en presentaties. Als eerste stap in de data analyse zijn de 
projecten afzonderlijk bestudeerd, daarna zijn vergelijkingen gemaakt tussen verschillende 
projecten. De totale analyse heeft geleid tot een genuanceerd raamwerk dat inzicht geeft in de 
manier waarop business units in de chemische industrie de marktleer-paradox in echt vernieuwende 
productontwikkelingsprojecten oplossen.
Marktkennis binnen productontwikkeling
De bevindingen uit dit onderzoek bevestigen eerder onderzoek dat marktkennis in productinnovatie 
gezien moet worden als een construct met meerdere dimensies. Echter, waar onderzoek in het veld 
van marketing en productontwikkeling doorgaans uitgaat van twee marktkennis dimensies: (1) 
Marktsegmenten-kennis en (2) klantenbehoeften-kennis, suggereert de data in dit onderzoek een 
indeling met vier dimensies: (1) Segmenten-kennis, (2) productgebruik-kennis, (3)
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applicatiebehoeften-kennis en (4) klanten-kennis. Segmenten-kennis refereert naar kennis over de 
grootte van een bepaalde markt, het groeitempo van deze markt, en kennis over verschillende 
belanghebbenden en hun beleid in een bepaald marktsegment zoals concurrenten en wetgevende 
instanties die klantengedrag kunnen beïnvloeden. Productgebruik-kennis verwijst naar kennis over de 
manier waarop producten door klanten34 gebruikt worden en hoe deze producten zich gedragen in 
de productieprocessen van klanten. Applicatiebehoeften-kennis refereert naar kennis over 
klantenbehoeften waarin een product ten aanzien van een bepaalde applicatie zou moeten voorzien. 
Klanten-kennis refereert naar overige kennis over klanten die relevant is binnen productontwikkeling 
zoals contact informatie en kennis over beslissers en beïnvloeders in het aankoopproces aan de zijde 
van de klant.
Verder is gevonden dat de combinatie van exploitatie en exploratie in de context van 
productinnovatie op twee manieren plaatsvindt. De eerste manier is de combinatie van exploitatie 
en exploratie in één productontwikkelingsfase, door binnen sommige marktkennisdimensies te 
exploiteren en binnen anderen te exploreren. De tweede manier is het combineren van exploitatie 
en exploratie binnen één marktkennisdimensie in de tijd. In dit geval vindt exploratie plaats in een 
bepaalde productontwikkelingsfase en schakelt men over op exploitatie in een volgende 
productontwikkelingsfase.
Op basis van de totale mate van exploratie in een productontwikkelingsproject was het tevens 
mogelijk om drie typen projecten te onderscheiden: (1) Projecten met een lage mate van exploratie 
lieten exploratie zien op één marktkennisdimensie, (2) projecten met een gemiddelde mate van 
exploratie lieten exploratie zien op twee marktkennisdimensies, (3) projecten met een hoge mate 
van exploratie, tenslotte, lieten exploratie zien op drie marktkennisdimensies. Ondanks dat de poging 
is ondernomen om zoveel mogelijk verschillen te creëren tussen onderzochte projecten laat deze 
studie zien dat de meest vruchtbare benadering aangaande productinnovatie ligt in exploitatie 
gecombineerd met een bepaalde mate van exploratie. In geen enkel project kwam het voor dat 
nieuwe kennis werd gegenereerd en geïntegreerd binnen alle vier de marktkennisdimensies.
Organisatorische configuraties
Aangaande ambidexter marketingorganisaties bleek dat organisaties in de chemische industrie niet 
gebruik maken van één bepaalde configuratie van hun marketingorganisatie om ambidexter te 
worden en de marktleer-paradox op te lossen. Door onderscheid te maken tussen projecten met een 
lage, gemiddelde en hoge mate van exploratie is gevonden dat de totale mate van exploratie invloed 
had op de passende configuratie van de marketingorganisatie. Tevens is gevonden dat de 
bovengenoemde configuraties veranderden in de tijd. De grootste verandering in de tijd vond plaats 
wanneer projecten uit de initiatiefase kwamen, waar marktleren gebruikt werd om ideeën te
34 W anneer in dit onderzoek gesproken wordt over klanten wordt er niet gesproken over de eindconsument 
maar over de volgende, business-to-business, klant in de keten.
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ontwikkelen, en de implementatiefase ingingen, waar marktleren gebruikt werd om ideeën om te 
zetten in producten en deze producten te commercialiseren.
Voor projecten met een lage mate van exploratie is gevonden dat de marketingfunctie in de initiatie- 
en implementatiefase ingevuld werd door specialisten die als primaire taak hadden om de verbinding 
te vormen tussen de organisatie en de markt. Ook is gevonden dat de werknemers die in deze 
projecten de marketingfunctie uitvoerden een lage taakfocus hadden. Dit hield in dat deze 
werknemers naast de werkzaamheden in het productontwikkelingsproject ook verantwoordelijk 
waren voor taken in de dagelijkse bedrijfsvoering zoals het beantwoorden van vragen van klanten of 
het verkopen van bestaande producten. Met betrekking tot de betrokkenheid van het hogere 
management bij projecten met een lage mate van exploratie is gevonden dat deze leiders relatief 
sterk persoonlijk betrokken waren bij het marktleren in de initiatiefase. Zij leverden vooral een 
bijdrage door de projecten te initiëren en actief te zijn in de integratie van marktkennis met andere 
belangrijke kennisdomeinen in productontwikkeling zoals technologische kennis. De betrokkenheid 
van het hogere management in de implementatiefase van het productontwikkelingsproces 
veranderde van actieve betrokkenheid naar het delegeren van marktleer-activiteiten naar 
projectleden, het ondersteunen van deze activiteiten door het toekennen van middelen, en het 
controleren van deze activiteiten door het verlangen van voortgangsrapportages. In 
productontwikkelingsprojecten met een lage mate van exploratie werd marktkennis gegenereerd 
doordat projectleden elementen van hun bestaande marktkennis 'afleerden', klanten interviewden 
in de initiatiefase, en met klanten samenwerkten in implementatiefase. Ten slotte werd in projecten 
met een lage mate van exploratie de integratie van marktkennis, die in de initiatiefase voornamelijk 
uitgevoerd werd door het hogere management, in de implementatiefase uitgevoerd door 
projectleden. Hiervoor werden structurele integratiemechanismen gebruikt zoals periodieke 
teambijeenkomsten. Deze mechanismen werkten echter alleen goed wanneer er ook een zekere 
mate van samenwerking aanwezig was en er methoden werden gebruikt om cognitieve barrières te 
overwinnen zoals het gebruik van prototypen binnen inter-functionele discussies en, in sommige 
projecten, het inzetten van inter-functionele implementatieraamwerken zoals Stage-Gate processen.
Projecten met een gemiddelde mate van exploratie vertoonden op een aantal configuratie 
elementen overeenkomsten met lage-exploratie projecten. Echter, voor de initiatiefase werden er 
ook enkele belangrijke verschillen gevonden. In plaats van een actieve rol van het hogere 
management aangaande de initiatie van projecten, zoals werd aangetroffen in lage-exploratie 
projecten, werd in gemiddelde-exploratie projecten gevonden dat het hogere management de 
projecten niet initieerde maar een kaderscheppende rol innam. Dit hield in dat deze leiders een 
strategische richting formuleerden die functioneel specialisten op een lager hiërarchisch niveau een 
kader gaf om marktleer-activiteiten te ontplooien en projecten te initiëren. Een tweede 
geobserveerd verschil was dat het hogere management in gemiddelde-exploratie projecten, in 
tegenstelling tot lage-exploratie projecten, minder actief betrokken was bij de integratie van 
markennis. Deze integratie vond in deze projecten plaats doordat hiërarchisch lager geplaatste
234
Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
functionele specialisten gebruik maakten van hun interne organisatorische netwerk om andere 
functionele specialisten op hetzelfde hiërarchische niveau te bereiken.
Projecten met een hoge mate van exploratie vertoonden, op hun beurt, vooral overeenkomsten met 
projecten met een gemiddelde mate van exploratie. Echter ook hier waren enkele belangrijke 
verschillende te duiden. Het eerste verschil betreft de marketingfunctie. Terwijl in gemiddelde- 
exploratie projecten gevonden werd dat organisatieleden die de marketingfunctie uitvoerden naast 
de werkzaamheden in het productontwikkelingsproject ook verantwoordelijk waren voor andere 
taken in de dagelijkse bedrijfsvoering was dit aanzienlijk minder het geval in hoge-exploratie 
projecten. In deze laatste projecten was de marketingfunctie minder geïntegreerd in de organisatie 
door gedeeltelijke of volledige vrijstelling van verantwoordelijkheid voor de dagelijkse 
bedrijfsvoering. Een tweede verschil met gemiddelde-exploratie projecten betrof marktkennis 
generatie activiteiten. In hoge-exploratie projecten werden twee additionele marktkennisgeneratie 
activiteiten geobserveerd die niet gevonden werden in gemiddelde-exploratie projecten: Het gebruik 
van een expliciet raamwerk met verschillende processtappen bij de generatie van marktkennis in de 
initiatiefase en het aannemen van specialisten aangaande het marktsegment dat de organisatie met 
het productontwikkelingsproject wilde betreden in de implementatiefase.
Implicaties voor managers
De bevindingen uit dit onderzoek zijn van belang voor managers die te maken hebben met de 
marktleer-paradox in hun dagelijkse werk. Gebaseerd op de resultaten van dit onderzoek kan gesteld 
worden dat managers die de marktleer-paradox in productinnovatie willen oplossen zouden moeten 
afstappen van een productcentrische kijk op de onderneming en de onderliggende marktkennis in 
kaart zouden moeten brengen. Deze analyse kan gebruikt worden bij het ontwikkelen en evalueren 
van productontwikkelingsstrategieën en in discussies over het bepalen van 
productontwikkelingsucces. Verder kunnen de configuratieprofielen van de ambidexter 
marketingorganisaties die geduid zijn in dit onderzoek gebruikt worden in zogenaamde 'benchmark' 
studies. De resultaten van dit onderzoek geven bedrijven inzicht in welke 
productontwikkelingsprojecten de grootste kans van slagen zouden hebben gezien hun huidige 
marketingorganisatie. Omgekeerd zouden op basis van deze onderzoeksresultaten organisaties ook 
kunnen kiezen om hun marketingorganisatie aan te passen in de richting van de 'benchmark' die 
beter past bij het uitvoeren van strategische keuzes.
Suggesties voor verder onderzoek
Tenslotte zijn enkele suggesties voor verder onderzoek geïdentificeerd. Om te bepalen of de 
bevindingen uit dit onderzoek stand houden in een bredere context zou dit onderzoek uitgebreid 
kunnen worden door dezelfde onderzoeksopzet toe te passen op andere industrieën en naast 
marktkennis te focusseren op andere kennis die van belang is bij productinnovatie. Ook lijkt, op basis 
van deze resultaten, nader onderzoek relevant naar de specifieke rollen van het top- en midden 
management in succesvolle productinnovatie en onderzoek naar de rol van virtuele
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klantenomgevingen binnen productinnovatie. Methodologische aspecten die verdere aandacht 
verdienen zijn het verminderen van cognitieve vooringenomenheden en de constructie van 
gekleurde impressies binnen de dataverzameling, het includeren van het perspectief van de klant, en 
het testen van de ontwikkelde theorie op grotere schaal.
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Am bidextrous marketing organizations to support product innovation 
Aim and relevance of the research
For a manufacturing firm to survive in a world of increasing globalization, rapid technological 
development, and complex customer demands, product innovation is of major importance. When 
firms want to be successful product innovators, marketing activities, such as carrying out market 
analyses, doing market research and collaborating with customers, are essential. These activities do 
not only increase the effectiveness of product innovation, they also have a positive impact on its 
efficiency. However, there are also voices that warn for the risks of carrying out these marketing 
activities in the context of product innovation. Strong interaction with markets and customers that 
are well known to the firm can make the firm overly focused. An organization can become trapped by 
'the tyranny of the served market' (Hamel and Prahalad 1994: 83) in which managers see the world 
only through their current customers' eyes. This may result in a situation in which they miss out on 
market developments that might become important for the company's future and it may even lead 
to the downfall of the organization.
To carry out really new market oriented product innovation, firms should combine refining market 
knowledge that is already known, called exploitation, with developing market knowledge that is new 
to the firm and use that in product innovation, called exploration. Within many of the product 
innovation projects mentioned above, exploitation and exploration in market learning fulfill 
complementary roles. Exploitation increases the impact of exploration by refining newly generated 
knowledge and reaping its benefits. Similarly, exploration overcomes the inherent limitations of 
exploitation, such as lack of breakthrough learning and the inability of adapting to significant 
environmental changes.
Although firms have to combine exploitation and exploration to be successful in really new product 
innovation projects, this is a difficult task. Exploitation and exploration are fundamentally different 
strategies and are associated with different and inconsistent mental models, skills and processes. 
Whereas exploitation is rooted in variance-decreasing activities, disciplined problem solving and the 
organization's past, exploration is about variance increasing activities, learning by doing and looking 
into the future. As both activities need scarce resources and attention the combination of 
exploitation and exploration creates organizational challenges. As such, organizations are confronted 
with a market learning paradox: the simultaneous presence of contradictory elements. This book 
aims to provide insight into the way firms meet this challenge and how they try to resolve the market 
learning paradox from an organization point of view.
The theoretical relevance of this research lies in the fact that, until now, research in marketing has 
had little attention for learning paradoxes. More than researchers in the field of marketing, scholars
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of organization have paid attention to paradoxical thinking and organizing for exploitation and 
exploration in innovation. Specifically the research on organizational ambidexterity has focused on 
how organizations could resolve learning paradoxes. Yet, this research is still in an early stage of 
development. Until now, research on organizational ambidexterity has had little attention for 
combining exploitation an exploration in single product development projects, within specific 
departments and functions, and how exploitation and exploration are combined over time. This 
research addresses these aspects.
Next to making several theoretical contributions, this research is also relevant for managers and 
policy makers. Although it is beyond questioning that really new product development is increasingly 
important for manufacturing firms, few guidelines and principles have been developed that can help 
managers in dealing with learning paradoxes in product innovation. The majority of tools and advice 
have addressed either the exploitation part or the exploration part without looking at the other. New 
approaches are needed that specifically focus on the combination of the twin concepts. With large 
differences in product innovation success rates between firms, and CEOs demanding that the 
marketing function should play a more active role in product innovation there is still sufficient room 
for improvement. Detailed, action-oriented evidence concerning the way(s) firms are resolving the 
market learning paradox in product innovation is therefore highly relevant for contemporary 
managers.
Theoretical background
To develop a conceptual framework which can be used in empirical analyses, this research has 
integrated three steams of literature. To develop a context in which market learning processes in 
product innovation are present insights from the literature on product development have been used. 
This stream of literature has been complemented by a group of studies that offered detailed insights 
on the organization of knowledge and learning processes within product innovation. Finally, this 
research has made use of insights from the marketing literature to focus specifically on the 
organization of the interaction of the firm with the market and her customers in the context of 
product innovation.
Studies on new product development have made clear that really new product development can be 
seen as a process consisting of three phases: initiation, development, and commercialization, and 
that 'learning by doing' should be preferred over making the explicit separation between planning 
and execution. Besides these activities of project members, also the involvement of senior 
management is of importance for successful really new product development. The literature on 
product development has recommended that senior management supports these processes by 
providing resources but, at the same time, controls their progress.
Based on studies on knowledge and organizational learning processes in the context of product 
development the 'generation of knowledge from the external environment' and the 'internal
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integration of this knowledge' were identified as two important knowledge flows in product 
innovation. Additionally, several organizational conditions were identified that could facilitate these 
knowledge flows. This second stream of literature has also brought further insight into the learning 
processes exploitation and exploration. Finally this stream of literature has offered several general 
solutions to organize the combination of exploitation and exploration.
The literature on marketing has brought the understanding that a market orientation is an important 
prerequisite for successful product innovation. This is the case for both small adaptations in product- 
market combinations and really new product development. Additionally, based on this stream of 
literature it was possible to identify four categories of antecedents of market oriented really new 
product development: marketing function, factors related to the behavior of senior management, 
market information generation methods, and cross-functional integration.
Conceptual framework
Based on the three steams of literature that were mentioned above a conceptual framework was 
developed. Within the conceptual framework the following four assumptions on market learning in 
really new product development were made:
• Really new product development is a process that can be subdivided into three phases: 
initiation, development, and commercialization, and a suitable working strategy is 'learning 
by doing'.
• The effectiveness and efficiency of really new product development projects is enhanced 
when project members engage in market learning, which refers to the generation and 
integration of market knowledge.
• Market learning in really new product development consists of a combination of exploitation 
and exploration.
• Combining exploitation and exploration in product innovation can take place in a single 
period in time (i.e. single product development phase) and over time (i.e. multiple product 
development phases).
Additionally, the assumption was made that organizations can resolve the market learning paradox in 
the course of really new product development projects by putting ambidextrous marketing 
organizations in place. These are complex organizational forms that facilitate a combination of 
exploitation and exploration. In a first attempt to identify the core organizational design dimensions 
for ambidextrous marketing organizations, this research relied on four broad organizational 
dimensions that could be derived from the three previously discussed streams of literature. The first 
dimension was named 'marketing function' and refers to the total number of tasks and 
responsibilities of the project members within product development project that form the linking pin 
between the project and the market. The second dimension was named 'the involvement of senior
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management' and refers to the involvement of senior management in market learning in the context 
of a really new product development project. The third dimension was called 'market knowledge 
generation' and refers to the practices used to generate market knowledge in the context of a really 
new product development project. Finally, the dimension 'market knowledge integration' was 
denominated which refers to practices used to integrate market knowledge with other relevant 
knowledge resources in product development such as technological knowledge. Also it was assumed 
that the dimensions that were mentioned above could be refined by the empirical part of the 
research, and that configurations could change during the product development process.
Methodology
The empirical data that was used to refine the conceptual framework has been collected through a 
multiple case study in the chemical industry. The main unit of analysis has been the really new 
product development project. However, these projects were not studied in isolation. Also the 
interface of these projects with the organizations in which they were carried out was studied. In 
total, the empirical part of the research was based on a sample of ten projects in six business units of 
six different chemical firms. Nine of these ten projects could be considered successful because the 
result of the project, the new product, was introduced into the market. Data were generated by 
using a combination of in-depth interviews, 44 in total, with project and organization members, and 
studying archival data such as announcements of product introductions, annual reports, and 
presentations. The first step in data analysis concerned analyzing data from single cases. Additionally 
a cross-case comparison was made. The total analysis has resulted in a refined framework which 
provided insight into how business units in the chemical industry resolve the market learning 
paradox in really new product development projects.
Market knowledge within product development
The findings of this research have confirmed prior research arguing that market knowledge in 
product innovation should be considered a multi-dimensional construct. However, while most 
research in marketing and product innovation distinguishes between two dimensions of market 
knowledge in product innovation: (1) Market segment knowledge and (2) customer need knowledge, 
data from this study suggested four dimensions: (1) segment knowledge, (2) product usage 
knowledge, (3) application need knowledge, and (4) customer knowledge. Segment knowledge refers 
to knowledge on market size, growth rate, and turbulence, and stakeholders such as competitors and 
regulating groups that can influence customer behavior. Product usage knowledge is knowledge 
about the use of a product by customers35 and the behavior of this product in downstream 
manufacturing processes. Application need knowledge is about knowledge on customer needs and 
wants a product should satisfy in a specific application and refers to specific application
35 In this research the term 'customer' refers to business-to-business customers such as downstream 
manufacturers.
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requirements. Finally, customer knowledge is about other relevant knowledge related to customers 
such as contact information, and knowledge on the 'decision making unit'.
Additionally, it was found that the combination of exploitation and exploration in the context of 
product innovation can happen in two ways. The first approach is to combine exploitation and 
exploration in a single product development phase by exploiting on several market knowledge 
dimensions and exploring on other market knowledge dimensions. The second approach is to 
combine exploitation and exploration within a single market knowledge dimension over time. In this 
case exploration happens in one product development phase and the switch to exploitation is made 
in the next product development phase.
Based on the overall level of exploration in a product development project it was also possible to 
distinguish between three types of projects: (1) Projects with a low level of exploration in market 
learning demonstrated exploration on one market knowledge dimension; (2) projects with a medium 
level of exploration demonstrated exploration on two market knowledge dimensions; (3) finally, 
projects with a high level of exploration demonstrated exploration on three market knowledge 
dimensions. Although attempts were made to select a wide variety of product innovation projects, 
from this study it appeared that the most fruitful approach to product innovation lies at the 
intersection of exploitation and some level of exploration. Hence, in none of the projects under study 
it was found that new knowledge was generated and integrated on all four market knowledge 
dimensions.
Organizational configurations
It was also found that organizations in the chemical industry do not use one typical configuration of 
their marketing organization to become ambidextrous and resolve the market learning paradox in 
product development. By distinguishing between projects with a low, medium, and high level of 
exploration it was found that the overall level of exploration in market learning had an influence on 
the suitable configuration of the marketing organization. Additionally, it was found that these 
configurations changed in the course of a product innovation project. In this respect, the most 
significant change was observed when projects moved out of the initiation phase, where market 
learning was used for idea generation, and entered the implementation phase, where market 
learning was used in developing ideas into products and commercializing these products.
For projects with a low level of exploration it was found that the marketing function in the initiation 
and implementation phases was carried out by specialists: Employees with the primary task to link 
the organization to the market. Additionally, it was found that employees that carried out the 
marketing function in these projects had a low task focus which means that besides the work they 
did for the product development project under study they were also responsible for tasks in the 
running business such as answering customer questions or selling existing products. Regarding senior 
management involvement in projects with a low level of exploration it was found that these seniors
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had a relatively strong personal involvement in marketing learning in the initiation phase. The 
involvement of senior management in the implementation phase of the product development 
project changed from active involvement in the generation and integration of market knowledge to 
delegating these activities to functional specialists acting on a lower hierarchical level. The 
generation of market knowledge in product development projects with a low level of exploration was 
mainly carried out by project members that carried out the marketing function. These employees 
'unlearned' some of their market knowledge, interviewed customers in the initiation phase, and 
worked together with customers in the implementation phase. Finally, market knowledge integration 
in projects with a low level of exploration, which was mainly carried out by senior management in 
the initiation phase, was carried out by functional specialists acting on a lower hierarchical level in 
the implementation phase. To support this integration, integration mechanisms such as recurrent 
team meetings were used. However, these mechanisms only worked well when they were combined 
with a certain level of collaboration and methods to decrease cognitive barriers such as using 
prototypes in inter-functional discussions, and, in some projects, applying inter-functional 
implementation frameworks such as Stage Gate processes.
Regarding organizational configurations, projects with a medium level of exploration showed 
similarities on some aspects when compared to projects with a low level of exploration. However, 
regarding the initiation phase some important differences were found. Instead of an active role of 
senior management with respect to the generation and integration of market knowledge, as was 
found in low-exploration projects, in medium-exploration projects senior management took a 
framing role. This means that these leaders formulated a relatively broad strategic direction which 
triggered corresponding market learning behavior by functional specialists acting on a lower 
hierarchical level without setting very specific directions. A second difference was that senior 
management in medium-exploration projects, in contrast with low-exploration projects, was less 
actively involved in market knowledge integration. In these projects, this integration was mainly 
done by functional specialists at a lower hierarchical level who made use of their inter-organizational 
network to reach other employees acting at the same hierarchical level.
Configurations for projects with a high level of exploration, in turn, had some features in common 
with configurations that fitted projects with a medium level of exploration. However, also in this case 
some important differences could be identified. The first difference related to the marketing 
function. While in medium-exploration projects organizational members that carried out the 
marketing function in the projects under study were also responsible for other tasks in the running 
business this was far less the case in high exploration projects. In these latter projects, the marketing 
function was less integrated in the mainstream organization because it was partly or completely 
released from tasks in the running business. The second difference with medium exploration projects 
related to market knowledge generation activities. In high-exploration projects two additional 
market knowledge generation activities were observed: The use of an explicit framework with 
different process steps that was focused on the generation of market knowledge in the initiation
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phase, and hiring new employees that were specialists on the market the organization wanted to 
enter with the product innovation project.
Implications for managers
The findings of this research are important for managers that have to deal with the market learning 
paradox in their daily job. Based on the results of this research it can be argued that managers that 
want to resolve the market learning paradox should move away from a product-centric view on the 
organization and map the underlying market knowledge resources. This analysis can be used for the 
development and evaluation of product development strategies, and in discussions on the 
identification of product innovation success. Additionally, the configuration profiles of the 
ambidextrous marketing organization that were identified in this study can be used for so-called 
benchmark studies. By making use of the results of this study organization could gain insight into 
which product development projects potentially have the highest success-rate based on the existing 
marketing organization. Conversely, based on the results of this research, organizations could also 
choose to adapt their marketing organization in the direction of the benchmark that fits their 
strategic direction.
Suggestions for further research
Finally, some opportunities for further research were identified. To determine if findings from this 
research also have validity in a larger context, this research could be extended by using a similar 
research design and study other industries or include other knowledge resources that are important 
in product innovation. Other research directions that, based on this research, seem fruitful are 
research on the specific roles of top and middle management in successful product innovation, and 
research on virtual customer environments in the context of product innovation. Methodological 
aspects that deserve further attention are mitigating cognitive barriers and impression management 
in data collection, including the customer's perspective, and statistical generalization of the theory 
that was developed.
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